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 In this dissertation, I argue for a convergence account of the ontological 
status of the fields of ethics and aesthetics. This project is accomplished in three 
parts.  
In Part I, I defeat six leading arguments in favor of divergence on the 
basis of principles, properties, obligations, motivation, seriousness, and 
dilemmas. Defeating each of these divergence arguments offers support for my 
convergence position. 
Part II focuses on moral and aesthetic judgments. I argue that, in both 
fields, evaluative judgments are formed through a combination of convention, 
emotion, reason, and a tendency to prefer utility. I offer a two-tiered account of 
judgment, whereby objective judgments can be reached through an appeal to 
convention, and subjective judgments allow us to critique the conventions 
themselves.  
 As good reason has been given to reject divergence, Part III of the 
dissertation is focused on determining whether to accept realist or antirealist 
convergence. Following a discussion regarding who bears the burden of proof in 
the realist/antirealist debate, an analysis of the implications of accepting 
divergence is offered, which demonstrates that moral and aesthetic evaluation 
and discourse is possible under an antirealist view, and a motivation to engage in 
these activities is not lost.
 1 
Introduction 
 In this dissertation, I will primarily be addressing philosophers, 
especially ethicists and aestheticians, as well as others concerned with meta-
questions within value theory. The dissertation ought also be of interest to art 
critics and applied ethicists who are interested in the theoretical issues behind 
their work. Of course, there are many within both fields that are not especially 
interested in meta-considerations, yet these people are also my target audience, 
for misguided notions at the meta-level are likely to lead to mistakes and 
confusions on the applied level as well. It is my hope that this paper will help 
clear away some of those cobwebs and lead to a more clear and accurate 
understanding of what exactly it is we are doing when we engage in ethical and 
aesthetic philosophy. 
This dissertation works to build a long-needed bridge between the fields 
of ethics and aesthetics. I offer an understanding of the way moral and aesthetic 
evaluative judgments are formed that demonstrates a unity between the two 
fields such that we ought, in the interest of consistency, hold the same 
ontological position in both domains. This project reveals a coherence between 
the two fields that has long been overlooked. 
 I first offer a convergence account of the ontological status of ethics and 
aesthetics. I argue that, in the absence of a relevant difference between the two 
fields that would justify accepting realism in one area and antirealism in the 
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other, one ought, to avoid arbitrariness, either accept realism in both ethics and 
aesthetics or accept antirealism in both fields. In Part I, I examine six suggested 
differences between the two fields which some have argued are sufficient to 
justify divergence. In each case, I argue that the proposed difference is not 
sufficient to justify divergence.  
 Part II is devoted to an in depth analysis of moral and aesthetic judgment 
formation. I first consider two divergence accounts of evaluative judgments, and 
explain why those accounts fail. I then offer my own analysis of the way in 
which we form moral and aesthetic judgments, drawing from elements of 
several theories to conclude that evaluative judgments are reached through a 
complex combination of conventional, emotional, and rational elements. I argue 
that a proper understanding of judgment formation indicates that they are 
formed in the same ways in both fields. I argue that our judgments in both fields 
rely on mind-dependent facts. In some cases these facts are subjective and in 
other cases they are objective but socially constructed. I introduce a two-tiered 
account of judgments that captures the complexity that is actually involved in 
evaluative deliberation. 
 In Part III, I consider, given the acceptance of a convergence account, 
whether it is more reasonable to converge toward realism or antirealism. While I 
do not argue that antirealist convergence is the only acceptable position, I do 
explain why an antirealist account does not imply an inability to form consistent, 
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rational judgments (on the contrary, it flows naturally from my account of 
judgments), or an inability to enforce standards of behavior. I argue that the 
antirealist picture I offer allows us to operate in the world and interact with 
others in the ways desired by realists, while avoiding the grounding problem 
faced by realist accounts.   
Getting Clear on Terms 
There is significant debate in the literature about how we are to 
understand the terms ‘realism’ and ‘antirealism.’ Richard Joyce describes the 
issue as “contentious and unsettled.”1 In discussing the term ‘realism,’ Philip 
Pettit says: 
The issue of how realism is defined is so contested that were I to try to 
defend any account I might offer, that would take me far afield. So let 
me just say what I shall mean by realism and offer some motivation for 
why I mean this. Readers are welcome to call the doctrine by another 
name, if they are so inclined.2 
 
While agreeing with Pettit that the final answer must be a rationally motivated 
stipulation of the terms as I use them, I will spend some time explaining the 
dominant positions taken in the literature today, and then situate myself within 
the debate. 
 Richard Joyce, while acknowledging widespread diversity in the use of 
the terms, says, “Traditionally, to hold a realist position with respect to X is to 
                                                
1 Joyce, Richard. “Moral Anti-Realism,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. 
2 Pettit, Philip. “Realism and Response-Dependence,” in Mind, New Series, vol. 100, no. 4, 
Mind and Content, October, 1991, p. 588. 
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hold that X exists in a mind-independent manner.”3 Moral antirealism, then, 
denies that moral properties, facts, or relations exist mind-independently. There 
are two ways we can understand that claim: 1) The denial that moral properties, 
facts, or relations exist at all. Moral noncognitivists and moral error theorists fall 
into this category. 2) The acceptance of only mind-dependent moral properties, 
facts, or relations. Moral subjectivists, idealists, and constructivists fall under 
this classification. On the traditional scheme, all of these positions are types of 
moral antirealism.4 
Richard Boyd accepts the traditional scheme, understanding moral 
realism as analogous to scientific realism, in that it can describe reality that 
exists “prior to thought” about that reality. He sees moral realism as contrasted 
with noncognitivism as well as conventionalism and other social constructivist 
theories.5 Social constructivism, a view promoted most prominently by John 
Searle, holds that there are entities that seem to have no meaning, and perhaps 
no existence, outside of the social group that gave rise to them. The concept of 
money is a classic example of one of these entities; the institution of marriage is 
another. Current work in social metaphysics suggests that such entities ought to 
                                                
3 Joyce. “Moral Anti-realism.” 
4 Ibid. 
5 Boyd, Richard N. “How To Be a Moral Realist,” in Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, 
edited by Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo. Blackwell Publishing, 2007, p. 163. 
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be understood as real, although they are mind-dependent.6 On my scheme, 
however, accounts of moral properties, values or facts as socially constructed 
will count as antirealist. 
Russ Shafer-Landau and Terence Cuneo offer an explanation of realism 
in line with the traditional view:  
 …realists deny that a feature makes things morally right just because of 
 any person’s attitudes toward it…That the larger society approves of 
 such actions is neither here nor there…[morality] does not hinge on the 
 endorsement of any group of people, no matter how smart, no matter 
 how kind or sympathetic. No one gets to make up the moral laws.7  
 
To make this point even more clear, Shafer-Landau and Cuneo draw a 
distinction between what they describe as conceiving-dependent and conceiving-
independent properties. A conceiving-dependent property is one that relies on 
“the intentional attitudes taken toward it by some actual or idealized (human) 
agents.”8 They offer ‘being illegal’ and ‘being a ten dollar bill’ as examples of 
conceiving-dependent properties. Conceiving-independent properties are those 
that do not rely on human intentional attitudes, such as being round or being 
symmetrical. Shafer-Landau and Cuneo define moral realism as “the claim that 
every moral fact is either a conceiving-independent moral fact, or is explained 
                                                
6 See Searle, John R. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford 
University Press, 2010.  
7 Shafer-Landau, Russ, and Terence Cuneo. Foundations of Ethics: An Anthology, Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007, p. 158. 
8Ibid. 
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by such facts.”9 On this view, the rightness or wrongness of an act might depend 
(based on the particulars of one’s moral theory) on the effects of the act on 
people (e.g., whether it makes them better or worse off), but that must be a fact 
independent of the evaluator’s beliefs about the act. 
 Contrasting with Shafer-Landau and Cuneo’s view is the position held 
by Alan Goldman, who describes his meta-aesthetic position as “relativized 
relational realism.”10 On this view, to assert that a work is beautiful is to assert 
that “…others with similar cultural backgrounds and educations ought to find 
pleasure in it to the extent that they are unbiased, sensitive, and 
knowledgeable.”11 This judgment is made in virtue of certain “…relations 
among phenomenal properties that would move relevant ideal evaluators.”12 For 
example, the claim “Annie Hall is good” expresses an aesthetic fact when 
uttered by me, because of particular facts about my culture, upbringing, biology 
and experiences that cause me and others sharing the relevant cultural and 
background features to have a pleasurable response when in contact with the 
movie (assuming that we are knowledgeable, free of bias, and so forth). It is 
important to note that the aesthetic properties on which the truth-value of 
aesthetic judgments depend, on this view, are mind-dependent. Thus, while 
                                                
9 Ibid. 
10 Goldman is a meta-ethical coherentist.  
11 Goldman, Alan H. “Aesthetic Versus Moral Evaluations,” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. 1, no. 4, June 1990, p. 728. 
12 Ibid. 
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Goldman classifies his view as a form of realism, it is antirealist on the 
traditional account. The amount of disagreement regarding the appropriate use 
of these terms should be becoming clear. 
 Richard Joyce acknowledges this disagreement, and points to 
subjectivism as a large part of the problem. The term ‘subjectivism’ is used to 
refer to at least three different views: 1) moral facts do not exist, and moral 
judgments are reports of the speaker’s mental attitudes; 2) moral facts exist and 
are determined by the mental states of evaluators; 3) moral facts exist and are 
dependent on the responses of particular kinds of beings, but are not determined 
by the mental states of evaluators. There is little dispute that 1) and 2) are 
antirealist views, but it is also fairly clear that 3) need not be understood as a 
form of antirealism. Thus, some subjectivists are realists and others are 
antirealists. 
 The second and third understandings of subjectivism point to an 
ambiguity regarding the issue of mind-dependence. On some understandings, 
realism must be mind-independent, but in another sense some form of mind-
dependence is compatible with realism. With that concern in mind, other 
theorists, such as Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, depart from the traditional view and 
define moral realism as the position that moral judgments are 1) truth apt and 2) 
often true, eliminating the problematic mind-independence clause from the 
definition.  
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Joyce suggests that a way to clarify the various positions, given the 
different uses of the terms currently in play, is to refer to the traditional view, 
that no relevantly mind-independent moral facts or properties exist, as “robust 
moral realism,” and Sayre-McCord’s view, which rejects the necessity of mind-
independence, as “minimal moral realism.” Joyce himself does not adopt this 
classification, however, and continues to use the traditional definition in his own 
work, with the rationale that there is “an entrenched assumption that mind-
independence is a central aspect of realism.”13 In other words, this is the 
standard understanding of the term, and thus is the one to be preferred. 
Regardless of the particular definitions one chooses to use, however, Joyce 
stresses the importance in clarifying exactly what position one intends the terms 
to refer to, as the terms are currently being used with reference to a plurality of 
views. 
 Philip Pettit defines moral realism as the conjunction of three theses. The 
descriptivist thesis accepts the existence of distinctive entities, most commonly 
understood as moral properties. The objectivist thesis holds that these entities 
“have their character fixed independently of the dispositions of participants in 
the discourse to assert and believe things about them.”14 The cosmocentric thesis 
holds that attaining truth and making progress regarding these entities is a 
process of discovery, rather than invention. Thus, ignorance and error about 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
14 Pettit. “Realism…” pp. 588-590. 
 9 
these entities is possible.15 Accepting all three of these theses implies the 
acceptance of realism, on Pettit’s view. 
Pettit presents the concept, drawing on work by Mark Johnston, of 
response-dependent concepts, which adds nuance to our understanding of mind-
independence. Response-dependent concepts include those that have 
traditionally been called secondary qualities (such as color), and are those that 
observers will not fail to have under suitable conditions. The concept will be 
accessible to observers who are capable of ever having the response (they 
possess the appropriate sense-organs or mental faculties), they do not always 
have the response, and they might sometimes have the response but disregard it 
as a false instance of the response (as in a hallucination). In other words, a 
response-dependent concept is one that is of a property that has the disposition 
to elicit a particular response under the right conditions.16 
Pettit holds that this thesis does not conflict with the descriptivist or 
objectivist theses, as response-dependent properties are not non-existent, nor are 
they dependent on the responder. He says, “People’s responses do not shape 
certain things so that they fall under the concept of redness, they shape the 
concept of redness so that it falls upon these things.”17 The response-dependent 
thesis might, however, threaten the cosmocentric thesis, Pettit says, because it is 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., p. 597. 
17 Ibid., pp. 622-623. 
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not possible for people to be ignorant or in error regarding these concepts when 
viewing them under appropriate conditions, though learning about the concepts 
will still be a discovery, rather than an invention. Response-dependent concepts, 
then, are still mind-independent in the relevant sense, though they can only be 
accessed through the responses of observers.18 
Pettit holds that response-dependent concepts are compatible with a 
realist picture, though it will be one that relies on minds to elicit those responses. 
An important distinction must be made between a response-dependent concept 
such as redness, however, and moral concepts. The objective entity that causes 
the experience of the color red exists when light waves bounce off of a physical 
object at a particular frequency. Red is perceived when a being that possesses 
the proper sense organs encounters those light waves. Redness is response-
dependent, because any time the right kind of observer encounters those light 
waves, the experience of red will occur, but the light waves that cause the 
experience of red would exist even in the absence of a perceiver. The secondary 
qualities of sounds can be understood similarly, with the existent entity being 
sound waves that exist in the absence of observers with the proper sense organs 
to detect them, and which are always detected in the presence of such observers, 
in appropriate conditions. 
                                                
18 Ibid., p. 623. 
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Contrasting the concept of color and sound with moral concepts, 
however, there looks to be something very different going on. An appropriate 
analogy would seem to be, “x is a morally good action if and only if it elicits an 
approval response when encountered by the right kind of observer under 
appropriate conditions.” However, in this case, it is unclear what the objective 
entity, existent even in the absence of an observer, would be. If there is a 
property of moral goodness in the way there is are properties of color and sound, 
mind-independent moral realism surely holds. In fact, this is precisely the point 
at which the traditional realist/antirealist lines are drawn, so the acceptance of 
mind-independent, response-dependent concepts does not undermine the 
traditional definitions.  
Perhaps moral concepts are not simple, like color and sound, which 
could explain them not being readily identifiable in the way that the light or 
sound waves are. Maybe a moral concept is something more like the concept of 
‘edible,’ which only really makes sense in relation to beings that eat. Unlike 
color or sound, there might be no single property that all edible things share, by 
virtue of which they are edible. Perhaps moral concepts are likewise irreducible 
to single simple concepts, such as red, but still exist in relation to beings of a 
certain type. If this were the case, one would look for sets of properties the 
conjunction or disjunction of which would indicate the relation. Consider the 
example of ‘edible,’ a multiply reducible property. We can break down the 
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concept of ‘edible’ into a long list of chemical properties that react in particular 
ways with particular bodies. ‘Edible’ is a relational property, in that it cannot be 
understood without reference to beings that eat, and is relative, as what is edible 
for one being might be inedible for another. However, these concepts are not 
determined by the beings themselves; their truth-value is independent of the 
mental states of the beings.  
If moral concepts are related to particular kinds of beings like the 
concept of ‘edible’ is related to beings that eat, the concepts are mind-
independent in the relevant sense needed for robust realism. To determine if this 
is the appropriate way to understand moral concepts, we would look for the 
same kind of multiple reducibility to hold true for the relation of moral concepts 
to beings of a particular type. Just as ‘edible’ is a complex term that would be 
practically though not theoretically impossible to fully enumerate, moral 
concepts are likely to be complex and difficult to fully break down into their 
constituent parts. It would seem likely, however, that some beginning progress 
could be made for moral concepts, along the lines enumerated above for 
‘edible.’  
To bring this back to the issue of defining ‘realism’ and ‘antirealism,’ if 
moral properties are to be understood as real, on a response-dependent view, 
they must hold true regardless of the mental states of the beings with whom they 
hold a response-dependent relation. If the properties depend on the mental 
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states, say, for approval or disapproval, then they are mind-dependent in the 
sense relevant for robust antirealism. There is disagreement in the literature 
regarding this point. Pettit holds that the response-dependent relationship is such 
that realism holds, as explained above, while Crispin Wright argues response-
dependence commits us to antirealism regarding moral properties, as he 
understands the response-dependence relation as such that moral properties 
depend on humans in such a way that it makes no sense to talk about those 
properties except in terms of their relation to us, making them relevantly mind-
dependent, on Wright’s account.19 
Those who define moral realism along the traditional lines hold that 
positions invoking conceiving-dependent facts, socially constructed entities, 
response-dependent concepts, and relational realism are all antirealist positions, 
because these facts, concepts, and entities are all mind-dependent. The debate 
regarding the appropriate designation of the terms “realism” and “antirealism” is 
far from settled within the philosophical community. Thus, like others writing in 
this area, I will explain clearly what I mean by the terms as they will be used in 
this dissertation.  
By ‘moral realism’ I mean the position that there are objective moral 
facts that ground morality, that there is a truth of the matter regarding the 
evaluation of particular human actions, and that this truth does not depend on the 
                                                
19 Wright, Crispin. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992, pp. 195-
199. 
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preferences, intuitions, or conventions of evaluators. Response-dependence 
views which hold that moral facts gain their truth-value by virtue of relational 
facts about particular kinds of beings are classified as realist, provided those 
facts do not rely on the judgments of evaluators to obtain their truth-value (they 
would be true or false even if evaluators did not recognize them as such).  
By ‘aesthetic realism’ I mean the position that there are objective 
aesthetic facts that ground aesthetics, that there is a truth of the matter regarding 
the evaluation of artworks, and that this truth does not depend on the 
preferences, intuitions, and conventions of evaluators. Response-dependence 
views which hold that aesthetic facts gain their truth-value by virtue of relational 
facts about particular kinds of beings are classified as realist, provided those 
facts do not rely on the judgments of evaluators to obtain their truth-value (they 
would be true or false even if evaluators did not recognize them as such).  
By ‘moral antirealism’ I mean the position that there are no objective 
moral facts that ground morality20, and that the evaluation of particular human 
actions is dependent upon the subjective preferences, intuitions, and/or 
conventions of human beings. By ‘aesthetic antirealism’ I refer to the position 
that there are no objective aesthetic facts that ground aesthetics, and that 
                                                
20 On my view, there might still be objective moral facts, but these will stem from convention, 
and thus do not ground morality in a realist sense. For example, if “X is wrong” means “X 
violates the relevant human conventions,” then there is an objective fact about whether X is 
wrong, but it is antirealist because its wrongness is derived from convention. 
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aesthetic evaluation is dependent upon the subjective preferences, intuitions, 
and/or conventions of human beings.  
Given the disagreement in the literature, any definitions I choose will be 
subject to some dispute and confusion if care is not taken to be clear about what, 
specifically, is meant by the terms. I chose these definitions because they are in 
line with the way the terms have been traditionally understood within meta-
ethics, and the way the majority of the authors whose work I am engaging with 
in this paper use the terms. It is unfortunate that there is not agreed-upon 






















Part I: The Ontological Convergence of Ethics and Aesthetics – 
Defeating Six Arguments for Divergence 
 
 Ethics and aesthetics, as theories of value, are some of the most closely 
related areas of philosophy. Ethicists and aestheticians tend to glance to their 
sister fields for examples and arguments that bolster their own positions. 
However, the dominant ontological position is that it is acceptable to hold a 
realist position about one field (usually ethics) while holding an antirealist 
position regarding the other (usually aesthetics). Even those who happen to be 
realists or antirealists about both tend not to be so for the same reasons, and it 
has rarely been argued that consistency requires taking the same position in 
relation to both fields. Divergence theorists hold that the ontological statuses of 
the two fields are independent, while convergence theorists argue that ethics and 
aesthetics are ontologically co-dependent – in other words, that accepting 
realism (or antirealism) regarding one field commits you to accepting it in the 
other.  
 In this section, I will examine six of the most commonly invoked and 
plausible purported differences between the fields of ethics and aesthetics: 
differences related to principles, properties, obligations, motivation, seriousness, 
and dilemmas. I will argue that that none of these candidate differences are 
sufficient to justify a divergence account. As these are the strongest 
justifications for divergence that have been offered in the literature thus far, I 
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will argue, through an appeal to consistency, that convergence ought to be 
accepted unless a stronger argument for divergence is given. Rather than argue 
in support of realism or antirealism, I will argue merely for ontological 
consistency between ethics and aesthetics. In Part II, I will offer my antirealist 
account of judgment formation, and in Part III, I will discuss some factors one 
might consider when deciding whether to converge toward realism or toward 
antirealism.  
(I.a) Principles 
 The presence of principles in ethics, along with the absence of principles 
in aesthetics, is a common justification offered for divergence. But is it true that 
ethics always involves principles, while aesthetics never does? In this section, I 
will discuss two standard understandings of principles of value, which I will call 
the rigid rules view and the rule of thumb view. I will argue that there is good 
reason to reject the rigid rules view in both ethics and aesthetics, and that there 
is good reason to accept the rule of thumb view in both fields. On either 
understanding of principles of value, then, the argument for divergence is 
defeated.  
A principle of value is generally understood as a claim regarding what is 
good and what is not. Such claims can serve as guides with which to judge 
actions or entities to have the same value across cases that share a particular 
element. The principle of utility, for example, tells us that we should always act 
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so as to maximize the good. If we accept this principle, it can, or so utilitarians 
claim, tell us both the right way to behave and the right way to judge the 
behavior of others. While the principle of utility is very general, many principles 
of value are much more specific. “Do not cause unneeded suffering” allows us 
to judge as “bad” actions that inflict unneeded suffering in diverse cases. 
“Protect the innocent” allows us to call “good” actions that adhere to that 
principle across cases.  
If ethics and aesthetics converge, then if moral principles apply value 
standards across actions, so the goodness of artworks must be determined by the 
application of consistent aesthetic principles. Aesthetic principles should tell us 
both what action to take so as to create a good work of art, and also how to 
evaluate works of art.21 In order for such principles to exist, it would have to be 
the case that following them would result in an increase of aesthetic value across 
artworks. It is generally agreed, however, that no such principles can exist, 
because what is good in one artwork can turn out to be bad in another (chaos 
contributes to the aesthetic value of work A but results in lower aesthetic value 
in work B), so there is no “rulebook” that artists can follows so as to 
formulaically produce a good work or judge a work to be good.22 This argument 
                                                
21 Though we might not have the artistic ability to successfully put the principles into practice, 
we should at least be able to recognize the principles that would lead to good works, had we the 
ability to execute them. 
22 For detailed presentations of these arguments see: Goldman, Alan. “There are No Aesthetic 
Principles,” in Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, edited by 
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will be presented detail in section (I.b), in the discussion of properties, which are 
typically believed to be the common entities that are being identified and applied 
through principles. 
If ethics were principled and aesthetics were not, the argument for 
convergence would fail. However, the term ‘principle of value’ has two 
common meanings. On the rigid rule view, a principle is absolute. The rigid rule 
view of moral principles holds that actions are good insofar as they adhere to 
moral principles and bad insofar as they deviate from them. A rigid rule view of 
aesthetic principles would hold that artworks are good insofar as they adhere to 
aesthetic principles and bad insofar as they deviate from them. As demonstrated 
above, the rigid rule view of aesthetic principles is readily rejected. 
The rule of thumb view, on the other hand, understands principles much 
less strictly, as a good place to start one’s evaluation, rather than as inviolable 
rules. On this understanding, moral principles are no more than guides to action 
and evaluation, which in some cases will be over-ridden, and sometimes ought 
to be violated. They will often point us in the right direction, but might 
sometimes lead us astray, as well. On this picture, moral principles are not to be 
understood as necessarily leading to right action or right judgments regarding 
moral behavior. 
                                                
Matthew Kieran. Blackwell Publishing, 2006, pp. 299-312; and Sibley, Frank. “Particularity, Art 
and Evaluation,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supplement vol. 48, 1974, pp. 1-21. 
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The rule of thumb view of aesthetic principles works the same way. 
Principles such as “dark colors create a spooky effect” and “light colors capture 
a cheery mood,” will serve as useful guides to an artist, but cannot be counted 
upon to apply in every case. On the rigid rule view, the aesthetic principle “dark 
colors create a spooky effect” would be understood as saying that dark colors 
always create a spooky effect in artworks, to which there are clear 
counterexamples.  
Which understanding of principles of value ought we accept? The rigid 
rule view might seem attractive, especially to those who hold to a realist 
understanding of value. This view is seen most often regarding moral value. If 
moral value is relevantly mind-independent, an objective feature of the world, 
then it would seem the principles that reflect those features should be more 
stable than a mere rule of thumb. In other words, if right is right and wrong is 
wrong, these things must be true across cases – right cannot sometimes be 
wrong, in the way that black is sometimes not spooky. 
Many moral realists have accepted the rigid rule view of moral principles 
because they have seen it as a necessary element of their meta-ethical position. 
However, a prominent ethical realist view – Jonathan Dancy’s moral 
particularism – suggests a way to maintain a realist account of morality that is 
not grounded in the rigid rule view of principles. Moral particularism holds that 
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there are no moral principles such that our understanding of x as wrong (or right) 
could be applied across all other cases of x. He writes: 
[T]he behaviour of a reason in a new case cannot be predicted from its 
behaviour elsewhere. The way in which the consideration functions here 
either will or at least may be affected by other considerations present. So 
there is no ground for the hope that we can find out here how that 
consideration functions in general.23  
 
Dancy offers an example. A common moral belief – something that 
could be considered a moral principle – is that you ought to return things you 
have borrowed. The fact that you borrowed it is a reason why you ought to 
return it. However, Dancy argues that relying on this principle will in some 
cases cause the agent to behave incorrectly. If I borrow a book from you, only to 
discover that you stole it from the library, the fact that I borrowed it is no longer 
a reason for me to give it back to you. In fact, I now have a duty to return the 
book to the library.24 This is not merely the overriding of a reason that is still 
operative. In this situation, the duty to return the book to you no longer exists at 
all. 
This example shows that moral reasons do not exist in a vacuum, but 
rather what counts as a moral reason depends on the circumstances – in some 
cases you have a duty to return what you borrowed, and in others you do not. No 
principle can give us a definitive answer. As a result, legitimate moral analysis 
cannot take place by asking what principles were followed, but instead must 
                                                
23 Dancy, Jonathan. Moral Reasons. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993, p. 60. 
24 Ibid. 
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involve an examination of the broader situation in which the actions and the 
reasons for them exist.25 The consideration that gives rise to a reason to do X in 
case 1 could count as a reason to do ~X in case 2, while failing to function as a 
reason at all in case 3, depending on the circumstances.  
Dancy’s particularism holds that moral reasons are situation-specific, but 
it is still a realist position, because Dancy thinks there is, in fact, a single right 
answer in every given case. In the example of the stolen library book (from the 
information we were given), the right answer is to return the book to the library, 
and to do otherwise would be morally wrong (according to Dancy). This theory 
is not to be confused with one that holds that whether or not the book should be 
returned to the thieving loaner or to the library (or kept for oneself, perhaps) is 
left up to the subjective desires of the agent, or is determined by law, or 
anything of that kind. There is one right answer. The thing that separates 
particularism from other realist doctrines is the belief that the one right answer 
will always be context-dependent, rather than determined by a set of moral 
principles that would hold across contexts.  
  Particularism presents a clear way to understand morality and moral 
reasoning that does not rely on the rigid rule view of principles. Regardless of 
whether we accept Dancy’s view in particular, however, there are good reasons 
                                                
25 It is important to note that this is not an epistemological issue, but a metaphysical one. It is not 
lack of knowledge that keeps us from being able to apply the principle – there exists no principle 
to apply. 
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to reject the rigid rule view in favor of the rule of thumb view. The problem with 
accepting the rigid rules view of moral principles is that there are so many 
potential defeaters that any rigidly applicable rule we could possibly arrive at 
would have to be so unwieldy as to be useless. If any given moral rule only 
applies to one particular situation, there is no point in establishing it as a rule. 
For example, “One ought to tell the truth” is a widely accepted moral principle, 
yet is one that most people will hold may be overridden in particular cases, to 
spare feelings, to save a life, and so forth. “Actions that cause pain are worse 
than those that avoid it” fails to hold on both the retributive and the deterrent 
views of punishment. In the former, an action that causes pain to one who 
deserves it is a better one than an action that would not cause that individual 
pain. In the latter case, the pain-causing action would be understood as better 
than one that does not cause pain because it would serve as a teaching tool to 
shape the future behavior of the person on whom the pain is inflicted.26 
Given these examples of the context-dependent nature of moral 
principles, the rule of thumb view seems to be both the most widely accepted 
understanding of the term, and also the most plausible. Blindly accepting the 
rule “return what you borrow” might lead you astray. However, “return what 
you borrow” isn’t a bad rule of thumb, provided we recognize that it might not 
actually apply in some cases. 
                                                
26 Ibid., p. 61. 
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I have argued that principles of value should be understood as rules of 
thumb, rather than as unbreakable rules. Dancy’s particularism has demonstrated 
that one of the biggest worries regarding the rejection of the strong view of 
principles of value is unfounded – realism is consistent with the rule of thumb 
view. Once the rigid rule view has been rejected, the argument for divergence 
dissolves, as aesthetics has rules of thumb, too, which parallel nicely with moral 
rules of thumb. The rule of thumb, “artists are directly involved in the 
production of their own artworks,” fails to hold in the case of Andy Warhol, 
who often did no more than sign his silkscreen prints, which were produced by 
artists in his studio, the Factory. The rule of thumb, “explosions improve action 
movies,” fails to hold in some cases. There are counterexamples to these rules of 
thumb (similar to the case of the library book, above). As in ethics, such tips are 
a good place to start, but are not enough for a full evaluation. Specific, case-by-
case analysis is needed. 
The most plausible account of principles of value is the rule of thumb 
view, which holds across the fields of ethics and aesthetics, thus demonstrating 
that the argument for divergence on the basis of principles fails. The presence of 
rule of thumb principles across the fields is not enough to settle the 
realist/antirealist question. What it does show is that divergentists need to look 
elsewhere for justification for their position. 
 (I.b) Properties 
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Related to the issue of principles is that of how we are to understand 
moral and aesthetic properties. A thinker who holds that moral and aesthetic 
properties are to be understood differently is Frank Sibley, who argues that 
moral properties can be identified by their descriptive elements alone, while the 
identification of aesthetic properties requires an extra awareness – that of taste. 
In this section, I will give a brief introduction to the concept of properties. I will 
then explain Sibley’s view and argue that both moral and aesthetic properties 
ought to be understood in terms of particularism. Because we ought to 
understand moral and aesthetic properties in the same way, we have another 
argument for convergence. 
The literature and disagreement regarding properties is vast. For our 
purposes, properties are qualities or attributes of a thing. They might be 
descriptive, such as ‘purple,’ or ‘weighing five pounds,’ or normative, like 
‘cruel’ or ‘loving.’ Properties might also be relational, like ‘larger than a tennis 
ball.’ Relational properties can only be understood to exist in terms of other 
things. Some hold that properties like ‘purpleness’ are relational, because 
‘purpleness’ can only be understood in terms of perceivers who can detect the 
property. 
Considerable time has been devoted to nailing down a definition of 
aesthetic properties that delineates the difference between aesthetic and non-
aesthetic properties. No clear agreed-upon definition exists, though some have 
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suggested that this is not much of a problem, as we seem to have no difficulty 
understanding the concept through family resemblance, with ‘beautiful,’ 
‘balanced’ and ‘gaudy’ being standard examples making it onto most 
aestheticians’ lists.27 Properties such as ‘blue,’ ‘long,’ and ‘round,’ though they 
may well be ascribed to art objects, are not taken to be aesthetic properties. 
Moral properties are likewise difficult to define, yet also generally recognized 
and agreed upon. Most ethicists’ lists of moral properties contain properties such 
as ‘vicious,’ ‘stingy,’ and ‘helpful,’ while properties such as ‘fast,’ ‘sloppy,’ and 
‘precise’ are not thought to be moral properties, though they might be ascribed 
to moral acts or agents. 
One way to distinguish moral and aesthetic properties from non-moral 
and non-aesthetic ones is by noting that moral and aesthetic properties contain 
both descriptive and normative elements, while other properties are solely 
descriptive. Take ‘stingy.’ The descriptive elements of this property involve 
facts about an agent’s attitude toward and handling of his possessions, most 
typically money. But there is also a normative element – a belief that the 
individual’s attitude and handling is inappropriate, given the amount he has, his 
own needs, and the needs of others. A negative value is built into this term.  
Rafael De Clercq offers a similar example regarding the aesthetic property 
‘garish.’ The descriptive element tells us that this property has to do with bright 
                                                
27 De Clercq, Rafael. “The Structure of Aesthetic Properties,” in Philosophy Compass, volume 3, 
issue 5, 2008, pp. 894-896. 
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colors, and the normative tells us the colors are so bright as to be inappropriate, 
thus charging the property with negativity.28  
There is disagreement about whether moral and aesthetic properties all 
contain both descriptive and evaluative elements or if some of them are solely 
normative. If ‘good’ and ‘bad’ are to be understood as properties, they are the 
best, and perhaps the only, candidates for pure evaluative properties, as they 
don’t seem to contain any extra content other than a positive or negative value. 
A property like ‘beautiful,’ while very general and capable of being applied to a 
wide range of objects, will still be restricted to the realm of aesthetic value, 
giving it at least that one descriptive element. 
Thus far, moral and aesthetic properties have been discussed as part of 
the same set, juxtaposed with non-moral and non-aesthetic properties. However, 
some philosophers hold that moral and aesthetic properties are relevantly 
different such that this could be a point at which divergence is justified. Frank 
Sibley is a divergentist (subscribing to naturalistic ethical realism and aesthetic 
antirealism). He argues for divergence based on his understanding of aesthetic 
concepts, which he thinks are necessary for one to form aesthetic judgments and 
for the attribution of aesthetic properties. On Sibley’s view, aesthetic judgments 
require an understanding of irreducible aesthetic concepts, which are known 
through the sense of taste in the way that visual judgments are assessed using 
                                                
28 Ibid., pp. 899-902. 
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our sense of sight. Without the appropriate concepts in hand, one will be able to 
provide no more than a non-aesthetic description of the work.29 
This idea parallels the view in ethics that descriptive claims alone are not 
enough to reach a prescriptive conclusion. According to Sibley, in order to make 
an aesthetic judgment – to deem a work of art “good” or “bad” – the judge must 
employ more than physical descriptors of the work’s non-aesthetic features. 
These physical descriptors are what Sibley calls “non-aesthetic conditions,” and 
will never lead to an aesthetic evaluation, which requires knowledge of aesthetic 
concepts, knowable through the sense of taste. Physical descriptors, on the other 
hand, are objectively observable properties of the type that could just as easily 
be found in ordinary objects (rather than artworks), and can be explained to a 
third party who has not directly experienced the work.30 For example, a painting 
can be described in great detail using non-aesthetic terms.  The painting might 
be on a 3-foot canvas, with a gilt frame.  The paint is oil-based, and the age of 
the work has caused the paint to fade and crack.  Nevertheless, the paint’s colors 
can be described in terms of hues of blacks and grays and scarlet.  The painting 
depicts a human figure, outdoors, clad for winter weather.  The description of 
the painting might grow more and more physically complete but, according to 
Sibley, these factors alone could never lead one to an aesthetic judgment in the 
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absence of a direct experience of those features. A mere description of the 
features, no matter how complete, will never be enough. 
In order to make an aesthetic judgment, one must employ elusive 
aesthetic concepts, which are those that can be applied only by a viewer who has 
taste or perceptiveness (as opposed to merely perception).31  For instance, 
anyone with normally functioning senses could describe Lauren Bacall as tall, 
thin, reddish-brown-haired, brown-eyed, etc., but only someone with an extra 
perceptiveness would also recognize (on Sibley’s account) that Bacall is, for 
example, smoky. An aesthetic property is one that somehow emerges out of the 
collected physical attributes of the work. It is something that we come to know 
through our sensory perception of the work, yet the sensory perception alone is 
not enough. The aesthetic property of smokiness cannot be reduced to a 
combination of descriptive elements. 
Sibley holds that there are no non-aesthetic descriptors that are logically 
sufficient conditions for aesthetic terms.32  So, for example, no amount of 
detailed physical description could be compiled such that we would have 
sufficient evidence for Lauren Bacall’s smokiness, because information is lost in 
the description, no matter how detailed. No description can provide enough 
information to let an evaluator know how she would actually be affected by a 
work, were she to directly experience its non-aesthetic features. There is by 
                                                
31 Ibid., pp. 130. 
32 Ibid., pp. 128-130. 
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definition no particular set of conditions that will lead to a guaranteed aesthetic 
property. Thus, there is no formula a would-be artist can follow which will lead 
to a particular desired aesthetic property.33 A work might conform perfectly to 
the technical specifications stipulated by a genre, yet lack the aesthetic 
properties that would make it a good work of art. 
Sibley’s argument for understanding ethics and aesthetics differently is 
based on his belief that moral properties can be quantified and coded in ways 
which aesthetic properties cannot. In other words, ethical properties are not the 
same kinds of entities as aesthetic properties. Sibley asserts that we can pin 
down and identify an ethical property, such as laziness, and apply consistent 
judgments regarding those who possess it, and to what degree. This will work, 
according to Sibley, because, packed into the term, is the concept of failing to 
perform one’s obligations. A quality such as elegance, however, is not only 
ineffable but also entirely elusive – we might recognize it in a gestalt way when 
we see it (if we have taste), but it isn’t definable in terms of non-aesthetic 
conditions as other types of properties (including moral properties) are.34   
Sibley adds that there’s something about merit terms in ethics that allows 
us to offer a description such that one can’t but help knowing that the term 
applies, if one understands the language at all.  He gives the example of 
                                                
33 Except for the formula, “Make something that is exactly like this.” If an identical reproduction 
is created, it will have the same aesthetic properties as the original from which it was copied, on 
Sibley’s account. 
34 Ibid., pp. 132-133. 
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‘courageous.’ ‘Courageous’ is a merit term, and if someone said, “Bill held 
several men at bay despite great danger to himself,” competent language users 
would have to agree that Bill is courageous.  Sibley holds that merit terms don’t 
work that way in aesthetics.  He asserts that there is no description such that a 
competent language user could not help but apply ‘graceful’ to it.  
This is counterintuitive on two levels. I agree with Siblely that no non-
aesthetic description is sufficient to guarantee an aesthetic claim, although the 
description could give us reason to suppose a particular claim is applicable. A 
description like “Mary executed each step with perfect poise and rhythm, one 
movement flowing continuously from another,” for example, could point to 
‘graceful,’ just as the previous example pointed to ‘courageous.”  Further, in the 
above example, competent language users need not agree that Bill is courageous 
nor that Mary is graceful. After all, Bill might be foolhardy, a robot, or gravely 
misinformed, any of which would lead us to conclude that Bill is not 
courageous, or at least that he has not personified courage by this particular act.  
Likewise, Mary’s performance might turn out to be overly stiff, formal, or 
boring. The most straightforward and common interpretation of the statement 
about Bill will likely conclude that he is courageous, and the same can be said 
about Mary and her gracefulness. However, neither has the one-to-one 
correspondence that Sibley thinks is present in Bill’s case, and Mary’s case does 
not rule out a most-common interpretation.  
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I hold that, given the many defeaters that could rule out both 
courageousness for Bill and gracefulness for Mary, the most reasonable way to 
understand both moral and aesthetic properties is in terms of a Dancy-style 
particularism, as discussed in section (I.a). On this view, no amount of detail 
could be poured into a description in advance such that we would know that a 
particular merit term would apply in a given case. Perhaps, in analyzing Bill’s 
situation, we learn that he is actually behaving recklessly, though the advance 
description suggested that he was courageous. There are so many possible 
defeaters, to know that Bill is courageous requires full knowledge gained 
through an encounter with the particular situation in which he is acting; anything 
short of that might offer good reason to believe he is courageous, but only the 
particulars of the situation can give us certainty. Likewise regarding Mary – a 
determination of her gracefulness (or lack thereof) is dependent on the multitude 
of factors at work in her particular situation. A description, even an extremely 
detailed one, cannot replace a direct encounter with her particular situation. 
Sibley has argued that an advance description, no matter how complete, 
is insufficient to guarantee the presence of particular aesthetic properties, which 
cannot be known without a direct encounter with the artwork. He suggested that 
moral properties are knowable through a complete advance description. I have 
demonstrated, however, that the class of possible defeaters is such that an 
advance description is insufficient regarding moral properties as well as 
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aesthetic properties, using a particularist argument to show that a direct 
encounter with the situation is needed in the moral case as well.  This means that 
it is impossible for us to issue a certain moral verdict on actions that we did not 
directly observe, although we can certainly issue educated suppositions, using 
the information that is available to us, just as we do with artworks that we have 
not directly experienced. As the two fields are analogous regarding properties, 
we have another ruling against divergence and in favor of convergence. 
(I.c) Obligations 
  Another area where ethics and aesthetics might part ways regards 
obligations. Though there are varying accounts of the nature, content and scope 
of ethical obligations, most people accept that some obligations do exist within 
the realm of ethics. However, to the extent that it has been thought about at all 
(there is not much literature on this subject), most people seem to think that 
there is no such thing as an aesthetic obligation. If ethics can obligate and 
aesthetics cannot, we either need to establish that, though this is a difference 
between ethics and aesthetics, it is not a relevant one, or we are pushed to 
divergence. In this section I will discuss the views of two people who have 
argued against the existence of aesthetic obligations – Marcia Muelder Eaton 
and Stuart Hampshire. I will then offer examples of aesthetic obligations, 
demonstrating that, as obligations do exist in both fields, this cannot be a reason 
to accept divergence.    
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 Eaton has long been committed to the view that ethics and aesthetics are 
inseparable. Her approach, until recently, was to argue that there is an 
inextricable tie between morality and aesthetics. She explains, “I have tried to 
show…that sometimes artistic success or failure results in moral success or 
failure.”35 In a recent paper, however, Eaton argues that aesthetics and ethics are 
divergent in a very significant way. This is because, she argues, our moral 
beliefs demand particular actions from us in a way that our aesthetic beliefs do 
not. For example, if your ethical code includes the belief that lying is wrong, 
then you are obligated, by rationality, to refrain from lying. Eaton argues that 
aesthetic beliefs do not carry with them reason-compelled obligations in the way 
that moral beliefs do.36  A reason-compelled aesthetic obligation would be, for 
example, that if someone, call him Roger, believes that wearing a brown belt 
with black pants is aesthetically undesirable, rationality will compel him to 
avoid wearing them together.  
 Eaton rejects the existence of reason-compelled aesthetic obligations 
because she sees no grounding for aesthetic obligations. In order for us to be 
compelled to behave in certain ways regarding aesthetic matters, that 
compulsion must stem from somewhere. Eaton considers the possibility that 
aesthetic duties might be grounded in Kantian duties to self, but rejects that 
                                                
35 Eaton, Marcia Muelder. “Aesthetic Obligations,” in The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, vol. 66, issue 1, winter 2008, p. 1. 
36Ibid., p. 1. 
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route because, for Kant, the aesthetic is reducible to the ethical, so that any 
aesthetic duties one might have can more properly be understood as a subset of 
the more primary moral duties. Eaton, on the other hand, is seeking a source of 
purely aesthetic duties.37 She then considers the possibility of aesthetic 
dilemmas as a way of confirming the reality of aesthetic obligations. While not 
offering an argument for the actual source of aesthetic obligations, Eaton holds 
that, if there are true aesthetic dilemmas, this would be enough to show that 
there are aesthetic obligations (even if we have not yet shown where they come 
from). However, Eaton then rejects the existence of aesthetic dilemmas.38 The 
issue of dilemmas, and Eaton’s argument for rejecting the existence of aesthetic 
dilemmas, is discussed in more detail in section (I.e) below. 
 Despite Eaton’s dismissal of reason-compelled obligations, the example 
of Roger’s brown belt and black pants warrants another look. Believing it is 
aesthetically undesirable to wear brown with black actually is enough for most 
people to avoid doing it. If Roger does choose to wear brown and black, one of a 
few things is probably going on. He might be making a statement of rejection 
against this aesthetic convention, either to be contrary or because he thinks the 
two colors look very nice together.39 More likely, however, Roger believes he is 
violating an aesthetic obligation, but feels he has no choice, due to mitigating 
                                                
37 Ibid., p. 3. 
38 Ibid. 
39 In this case, however, Roger doesn’t have the aesthetic belief that he shouldn’t wear brown 
with black, though he might have the belief that other people hold this belief. 
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circumstances. Maybe he got dressed in the dark, and didn’t notice the mismatch 
until he was at work. Maybe his black belt broke as he was getting dressed and 
he had no choice but to switch to the brown one until he has a chance to go 
shopping. In any event, if called out on his aesthetic faux pas, Roger is likely to 
acknowledge that he has violated an aesthetic obligation, and offer an 
explanation to excuse his behavior.40 The fact that we make such 
acknowledgements in daily life suggests both that we do feel compelled by 
aesthetic obligations, and also that we feel the need to offer justification when 
we violate them. 
Similar instances of overriding circumstances occur in moral situations. 
Cindy might feel a moral obligation to feed the stray dog that has been hanging 
around her porch, and in most cases that feeling of obligation will lead her to 
feed the dog. But, like Roger and the belt, Cindy might fail to feed the dog due 
to mitigating circumstances. Perhaps she has a strong phobia of dogs, or is too 
cash-strapped to buy dog food, or maybe when she opens the door to feed the 
dog, he runs away. If Cindy feels an obligation that she fails to fulfill, she will 
likely offer some sort of explanation to account for her failure to carry through 
on the duty. 
                                                
40 Certainly we could construct other circumstances in which Roger would not acknowledge a 
violation. For example, maybe he is attending a costume party in which, for fun, attendees dress 
in outrageously mismatched outfits. To do so does not appear to violate any aesthetic obligation. 
Easy parallels can be found in the moral realm as well. We tell lies in the service of various 
games, tricks and forms of make-believe that no one acknowledges as a violation of the moral 
duty of truth telling. 
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 Stuart Hampshire agrees with Eaton regarding the lack of aesthetic 
obligations. He says that morality places demands on us unlike anything in the 
aesthetic realm. For Hampshire, one cannot decide not to accept a moral 
demand. He says, “Action in response to any moral problem…is imposed: that 
there should be some response is absolutely necessary.”41  Of course, one can 
choose to opt out of one’s moral obligation, but Hampshire thinks one is 
necessarily behaving badly by doing so. Hampshire’s point – that we have duties 
to act in moral cases that we do not have in aesthetic ones – might be understood 
in terms of Kant’s distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives. 
Hampshire sees aesthetic imperatives as hypothetical.42 If you want to look nice, 
don’t wear stripes and plaid. If you want to create art, go for it. But moral 
imperatives are categorical. Whether or not you want to, you must be just. 
Regardless of the circumstances, you must not take your own life.  
 Hampshire sees no aesthetic counterpart to the duty always to tell the 
truth, or always to be just. The example Hampshire gives is one of an artist who 
may refrain from creating (presumably good) art without shirking any sort of 
duty.  Because the artist may refrain from engaging in good aesthetic actions, 
but the moral agent may not refrain from engaging in good moral actions, 
                                                
41 Hampshire, Stuart. “Logic and Appreciation,” in Aesthetics and Language, edited by William 
Elton. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954, p. 163. 
42 Hampshire. “Logic…” p. 163. 
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Hampshire argues the two spheres must be considered independent. His 
argument can be expressed as follows: 
 P1: If ethics and aesthetics converge, then, if there are moral obligations 
 then there are aesthetic obligations. 
 P2: There are moral obligations. 
 P3: There are not aesthetic obligations. 
  C: Ethics and aesthetics do not converge. 
Since Hampshire takes P2 for granted, the success of his argument hangs on 
whether or not he can show that there are no aesthetic obligations. Without 
justifying that premise, he cannot show that there is no convergence between the 
moral and the aesthetic. One way to rebut Hampshire’s argument is to 
demonstrate that there are aesthetic obligations, and another is to reject his claim 
that there are moral obligations. 
 On the Kantian model, categorical imperatives are those that we must 
comply with, regardless of our goals and desires. If there are any such 
imperatives in aesthetics, Hampshire’s argument fails. There is just as much 
reason to believe there are categorical imperatives in aesthetics. Consider, for 
example, the imperative “do not create art which compromises your artistic 
integrity.” Certainly many artists and viewers accept this as a categorical 
imperative, and judge those who violate it as having done something wrong 
(even if it is clear why they did it – for a substantial paycheck, for example).  
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Another example is, “do not destroy artworks without justification.” 
Clearly there is an aesthetic value at work here that underlies the prohibition on 
the wanton destruction of artworks. Sure, sometimes the wrong would be moral 
– if the artwork is not yours, we might say that you shouldn’t destroy it because 
you would be violating the owner’s property rights – a moral transgression. But 
many people hold that artworks shouldn’t be destroyed even if they belong to 
the destroyer, or belong to no one. Sometimes artworks are seen as good 
because they help us learn an important lesson, or are the source of valuable and 
irreplaceable positive experiences, and so their destruction could be understood 
as wrong in that they prevented us from achieving those ends. If it is ever wrong 
to destroy an artwork not because the work is good for some other instrumental 
reason (be it moral, financial, etc.), but because of its beauty, then we have an 
aesthetic categorical imperative, and certainly many hold that such cases exist. 
 In this section, I have argued that obligations exist in both the moral and 
the aesthetic spheres. I have argued that, in both areas, obligations carry with 
them a compulsion to act, though in neither field is it the case that the 
compulsion might not be overridden by mitigating circumstances. The existence 
of such obligations in both fields demonstrates that divergence cannot be 
established on the basis of a lack of obligations in the one and a presence of 
obligations in the other.   
(I.d) Motivation 
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 The next proposed argument for divergence I will consider stems from 
the motivational force of ethics and aesthetics. Marcia Eaton explains this idea 
in terms of compulsion. She says that there is no compulsion to refrain from 
particular aesthetic actions (ones we see as negative), but that there is a 
compulsion to refrain from moral actions that we understand as negative. Eaton 
argues that morality motivates, causing us to behave and to refrain from 
behaving in particular ways. Aesthetics, on the other hand, does not have that 
motivational force, on Eaton’s account. 
Eaton is certainly right that some do not feel motivated to act from 
aesthetic inclinations, but it is also true that some people are not motivated by 
moral concerns. The question, then, is whether anyone feels a motivational pull 
from aesthetic considerations, paralleling the moral motivation Eaton describes, 
and the answer is clearly ‘yes.’ Examples abound of artists feeling compelled by 
their aesthetic beliefs to engage in particular types of aesthetic expression, and 
to refrain from others. When Eaton speaks of moral compulsion, she seems to 
mean that the moral agent is compelled, or motivated, by his most deeply held 
beliefs to behave in a certain way. This is exactly what artists seem to mean with 
regard to aesthetic compulsion.  
 Artists walk out on commissioned projects all the time, when they feel 
their aesthetic principles are being unacceptably compromised in the name of 
commercial success. In this case, the artist sacrifices personal interests (most 
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notably, a paycheck) in the name of aesthetic value.43 What is the most common 
reason given for the breakup of a rock band? Artistic differences. The drummer 
wants to pursue these aesthetic options while the lead singer wants to pursue 
those, and eventually there is a breaking point, where they decide it is better not 
to create art at all in this collaborative group, rather than to create art which they 
feel violates their aesthetic values. Just as many (but not all) feel compelled to 
engage in and refrain from particular actions stemming from their moral beliefs, 
so some (though not all) feel compelled to engage in and refrain from particular 
actions stemming from their aesthetic beliefs. 
 In this section, I have demonstrated that moral concerns and aesthetic 
concerns both sometimes have motivational force, compelling agents to behave 
or refrain from behavior based on factors within that field. Though some feel no 
motivation to engage in aesthetic matters, others do, and some people feel no 
moral compulsion, either. In both realms, motivation is often, though not 
always, at play. The motivation argument for divergence, then, has been 
diffused.   
(I.e) Seriousness 
 One of the best reasons to accept divergence is the issue of seriousness. 
Morality is about really serious stuff – life and death, pain and suffering, 
                                                
43 It might be that in this case the artist fails to be motivated by another aesthetic obligation – to 
fulfill the contract he made through the commission. As I’m arguing only that aesthetic concerns 
sometimes motivate us to act, just as moral concerns do, this is not a problem for my argument. 
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kindness and compassion. Whereas aesthetics is about…you know, fluffy stuff. 
The extras. The stuff that entertains us. As Hampshire puts it, there are “no 
problems of aesthetics comparable with the problems of ethics.”44 In this 
section, I will consider the claim that ethics carries with it a seriousness which 
aesthetics lacks, and if that difference exists, examine what bearing it has on the 
realist/antirealist question. The seriousness charge is usually understood as 
holding that there is more at stake regarding moral choices than there is with 
regard to aesthetic choices. There is the opportunity for greater harm, and this is 
what is meant by ‘seriousness.’ I will argue that some moral choices are serious 
while others are trivial, and that the same holds true for aesthetic choices at well.  
Following this, I will discuss the bearing seriousness has on the ontological 
question. 
 (I.e.1) Ethics Holds the Potential for Greater Harm 
Perhaps the most common way to understand the proposed difference in 
seriousness is in terms of the amount of harm that could come out of moral 
versus aesthetic actions. Eaton explains her understanding of this difference 
between her view and Hampshire’s by saying, “There is nothing comparable in 
seriousness or intensity to an artist’s having to choose between vermillion or 
crimson…and say, a mother’s having to decide between saving her son or 
                                                
44 Hampshire, “Logic…”, p. 162. 
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saving her daughter.”45  The particular point Hampshire is stressing is that the 
seriousness of morality is such that it’s not acceptable to choose not to engage in 
it. We can divorce ourselves from aesthetic concerns and the harshest judgment 
we get will probably be one of pity – look at all the wonderful things we miss 
out on if we shut ourselves off from aesthetic appreciation. However, amoral 
agents tend to be judged much more harshly, because their failure to act or 
decision to ignore moral concerns often results in negative consequences for 
others, in a way that someone’s failure to develop aesthetic taste does not, 
although that might result in decisions to dress or decorate one’s home 
unattractively. 
Rather than focus on the question of the optional versus mandatory 
natures of the fields, we might instead ask whether ethics is really more serious 
in terms of potential harm than is aesthetics. When comparing the most serious 
cases in ethics with the majority of aesthetic choices, the aesthetic looks very 
minor. Choosing what color to use in a painting doesn’t look very serious when 
compared to Sophie’s choice.  And it will probably turn out that the most serious 
moral cases will trump even the most serious aesthetic cases. However, most 
moral choices are not of the magnitude of Sophie’s choice.  
Within the field of ethics, discussions tend to focus on life-or-death 
situations that most ordinary people will never face. It is amusing and perhaps 
                                                
45 Eaton. “Aesthetic Obligations,” p. 1. 
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even useful to ponder what we would do if, like Spider-man, we were forced to 
choose between saving a loved one and saving a busload of children. However, 
few of us will ever be in Spider-man’s situation. Rather than concentrating on 
fanciful desert island what-ifs, a better focus of our moral attention are the 
commonplace ethical decisions we make every day. Many of our unthinking 
actions have moral implications that usually go unconsidered. Who suffered so 
that I could eat this meal? Who was mistreated and poorly compensated so that I 
could wear this t-shirt? Who will pay in the future as a result of my decision to 
drive this vehicle?  
A focus on the moral choices we face on a day-to-day basis transfers 
perfectly to aesthetic considerations. All of us, artist or no, could face a decision 
between whether to watch The Sorrow and the Pity or Roadhouse, and whether 
to eat a peanut butter sandwich or a tuna sandwich while doing so. Relatively 
small matters, both, but each one in which someone concerned with living a 
consistent, principled life might go wrong. Just as small, daily moral decisions 
add up in a profound way, so aesthetic decisions, many of which seem trivial, 
can together have a lasting impact on our lives and the world. 
Just as we cannot go through a day without engaging in a plurality of 
moral decisions, we cannot help but make aesthetic choices all the time. The 
clothes we purchase and don each morning, the manner in which we choose to 
decorate our homes and offices, the radio station we tune to on the way to work 
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– each of these simple actions involves aesthetic choices. Even selecting the 
drabbest of garments, leaving your home starkly bare of adornments, choosing 
to drive and work in silence – these are all aesthetic choices, decisions to refrain 
from aesthetic involvement. Granted, this might be the result of neglect or 
apathy, rather than a conscious decision to abstain from aesthetic indulgences, 
but the same can be said of abstinence from ethical matters. Maybe you fail to 
give to charity due to carefully considered libertarian beliefs, or maybe it just 
never occurred to you to share your wealth with others. Failure to reflect on your 
ethical or aesthetic behavior is no excuse for that behavior, should it turn out to 
be wrong. 
Many seemingly small moral choices end up resulting in serious matters 
of harm or benefit. However, it is sometimes the case that our moral choices are 
rather trivial, and if that is so, the triviality of some aesthetic decisions does not 
push us toward divergence. Is the shade of red an artist selects for a painting any 
more trivial than the decision to walk out of the grocery store with the pen you 
used to sign your receipt? Which matters more, the smile I give my student 
when she leaves my office, or the painting I have hanging on the wall? Both 
might lift her spirits in a small way; neither is likely to be remembered 
tomorrow.  
It should not be surprising that ethics would seem more serious than 
aesthetics to those who operate well outside the aesthetic community. However, 
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artists and aestheticians seem to have the opposite intuition, stemming from their 
different standpoint regarding the two fields, which would suggest that neither is 
all-things-considered “more serious” than the other. Consider Paul Gauguin, 
who felt his aesthetic duty to create artworks trumped the ethical duty to provide 
for his family. Gauguin famously quit his job as a stockbroker and left his wife 
and children without financial support, so as to be able to pursue his art full 
time.46 More recent is the striking example of Guillermo Vargas Jiménez, the 
Costa Rican artist whose controversial 2007 exhibition, "Exposición N° 1," 
featured a starving dog tied up in a gallery without food or water (amid criticism 
from animal rights activists, the gallerist claimed the animal was fed and 
watered after gallery hours). Clearly, Jiménez felt his obligation to make an 
aesthetic statement outweighed any duties he had to care for or to refrain from 
increasing the suffering of the dog.47 
In addition to these famous examples, many artists still use lead-based 
paints, in spite of their known health hazards (especially to children) and the 
availability of lead-free paints. These artists make a decision to value the 
aesthetic over the moral when they choose their materials based on the 
effectiveness of the product at achieving their artistic ends (lead paints are more 
durable and flexible than other paint compounds), rather than on considerations 
                                                
46 For more information on Gauguin and his life, see Danielsson, Bengt, Gauguin in the South 
Seas, New York, Doubleday and Company, 1966. 
47 Couzens, Gerard. “Outrage at ‘starvation’ of a stray dog for art,” in The Observer, March 30, 
2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2008/mar/30/art.spain  
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that will affect their own health and that of others who are exposed to their 
work.   
Moreover, these types of value judgments are not restricted to artists. 
Every pastor or church council that elects to spend parish funds on purely 
aesthetic building restorations and purchases (the painstaking, expensive 
cleaning of stained glass windows, the purchase of extravagant, gold and jewel-
encrusted chalices) rather than offering support to those in need has ranked the 
aesthetic over the ethical in those particular situations. Every individual who 
chooses to donate money in support of the arts instead of to an organization that 
feeds hungry people has ranked aesthetic concerns higher than moral ones in 
that donation decision.  
One could argue that, in such cases, there are actually moral 
considerations underlying the aesthetic ones. Perhaps a beautiful cathedral will 
help parishioners get closer to God. A donation to the arts will promote human 
well-being. Two comments can be made here. First, although this might 
sometimes be the case, and it is likely that such decisions are often informed by 
a plurality of values, it is also likely that that in some cases the primary value is 
the aesthetic one. Especially in the case of the chalice, which Church law 
dictates may only be handled by a priest, the spiritual benefit parishioners might 
gain from its intricate beauty (which they will not have the opportunity to see up 
close) seems so minimal that a more reasonable explanation points us to 
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aesthetic considerations. If in any case the primary consideration was an 
aesthetic one, my point is made. Second, in order for an aesthetic choice to be 
effective at achieving underlying moral goals, it would presumably need to be a 
good aesthetic choice. Not just any chalice brings people closer to God, but ones 
that are valuable in particular aesthetic ways. Donating to the arts will promote 
well-being only if that money is then used to fund uplifting works. Thus, even 
when non-aesthetic considerations are at play as well, in the examples offered 
above, those goals are believed to be reach through value found in the aesthetic 
realm. 
Clearly, the fact that people in the real world sometimes prefer the 
aesthetic to the moral does not prove that they are right to do so. My point is 
simply that it is not clear that morality is always given priority over, or seen as 
more serious than, aesthetics. An argument for this is needed before that 
question can be settled. Eaton offers one such argument regarding dilemmas, 
which will be discussed below. 
In addition to the above concerns, it would be a mistake to underestimate 
the impact aesthetics has on our lives. Local governments spend a surprising 
amount of time making decisions regarding size caps on commercial structures, 
zoning restrictions to keep heavy industrial plants tucked neatly out of view, and 
preserving open spaces. When a balance must be found between a plurality of 
conflicting goods – aesthetic, economic, convenience, etc. – the aesthetic takes 
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priority for many people a surprising amount of the time.  Such aesthetic matters 
can win and lose elections, because it turns out people care deeply about the 
aesthetic quality of the town they live in, the routes they drive each day, and the 
quality (or lack thereof) of parks that are available for Sunday afternoon picnics 
and baseball.  
Although there are surely extremely serious moral considerations 
regarding humanity’s interaction with the environment, most ordinary people 
(non-ethicists) base their environmental decisions on aesthetic rather than moral 
factors. We want smog emissions lowered because we don’t like the hue or the 
smell of polluted air. We are enticed by the “cuteness” of the smart car, and we 
support the preservation of natural spaces (when we do) largely because we like 
the looks of them – we are drawn to their beauty and want them to be there 
waiting for us when we desire an aesthetic fix, the all-natural version of an art 
gallery. 
As one final example of the seriousness aesthetics holds for us, consider 
the amount of time, stress, and money we pour into our personal appearances. 
Wardrobe, hairstyles, make-up and complex cleansing and exfoliating products 
are mainstays for most Americans, and even the cash-strapped typically see at 
least minimal beautification products as necessities. Even those of us who 
consciously try to resist such vanity cannot help but see its importance at key 
moments – as we prepare for job interviews, for example. Personal aesthetic 
 50 
considerations do not stop at the cash we drop for haircuts and cosmetics, either. 
Millions of people willingly undergo painful, sometimes risky surgeries in 
attempts to correct their bodies’ natural “flaws” and marks of aging. Perhaps the 
most extreme illustration of the importance of one’s own aesthetic appearance 
are the individuals who, disfigured in accidents, violent assaults, or war, 
undergo face transplants. A transplant introduces foreign organic matter into the 
recipient’s body, and requires her to take anti-rejection drugs for the rest of her 
life. There is always the chance the body will turn against the new organ, 
rejecting it in a serious, possibly deadly manner. Yet many people whose 
appearances are dramatically aesthetically repellant will accept these risks, on 
the belief that their potential to experience life’s goods is unacceptably reduced 
by their aesthetic misfortune. 
Some moral choices are extremely serious, with profound impacts on the 
world. Others are trivial and really do not seem to matter very much, although 
they sometimes add up to a more serious matter. Aesthetic choices also come in 
degrees of seriousness. Some aesthetic choices seem to have little impact on 
others, though if considered carefully, even private aesthetic choices are likely 
to affect the way we behave in the world (consider the phenomenon of the 
power suit). All in all, it is clear that ethics and aesthetics both sometimes 
concern trivial matters and are sometimes serious, so this factor cannot serve as 
an argument for divergence. 
 51 
 (I.e.2) Seriousness’ Relation to the Ontological Question 
 
A strong argument offered in favor of divergence is that morality is 
serious in a way that aesthetics is not. Although the issue of seriousness can be 
cashed out in various ways, as seen above, the most common way to understand 
this issue is that ethics is more serious than aesthetics because greater harm can 
come from immoral behavior than from bad art. However, seriousness does not 
actually seem to affect the ontological question. Moral realists do not hold that 
realism is strengthened or weakened depending on the seriousness of the case. 
They aren’t realists regarding the theft of cars but antirealists about pencil theft. 
Moral realists remain realists even regarding trivial moral issues. It’s not the 
degree of potential harm or benefit that can result from an action, or the gravity 
of the imperative being violated, that makes an ethical action objectively good 
or bad, on the realist view. If this is the case within ethics, there is no reason 
why, even if aesthetics did turn out to be far less serious than aesthetics, this 
would entail divergence.  
A potential difference between the moral and the aesthetic case, 
however, is that moral choices are more likely to impact other people than 
aesthetic ones, thus placing a greater weight on our moral decisions. Although 
some moral decisions are trivial, some can have enormous negative effects on 
others, and those cases demand that we implement moral standards to guard 
against that harm. Once that standard is in place, consistency demands that it be 
 52 
applied not only in monumental cases, but also in trivial ones. Thus, if the 
potential for great harm causes us to implement a rule against stealing (to guard 
against cases of theft that could cause great harm), consistency demands that we 
retain the rule in cases where no or minimal harm is likely to accrue (like 
stealing pencils).  
If aesthetics does not involve the potential for great harm to others as 
ethics does, though there are cases in which aesthetic matters trump moral ones, 
one might think there is less of a reason to believe that aesthetics will have 
intersubjective force. Individuals must consistently adhere to aesthetic values in 
their own lives, but this will not get us a rule that must be followed by all agents. 
There seems to be a confusion here regarding the scope of moral versus 
aesthetic rules. In morality the rules are very general, possibly, on this account, 
boiling down into an imperative to avoid harm to others, which is then cashed 
out in more specific terms. An apt parallel with aesthetics ought be equally 
general, something like, “pursue beauty,” which likewise can be applied more 
specifically in particular cases. It is plausible to think that those who hold that 
one ought to pursue beauty think that obligation applies intersubjectively, just as 
“avoid harming others” does. Likewise, some will hold that both imperatives 
can only legitimately be applied to one’s own actions. The range of individuals 
the rule applies to will depend on a host of meta-evaluative considerations which 
will be discussed in more detail in Part III.  
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It is unclear how much primacy should be given to the issue of harm in 
moral or aesthetic matters. Excepting utilitarians, ethicists typically do not hold 
that harm is required to make an action morally impermissible. Consider the 
following cases: 1) A clothing store owner secretly takes nude photos of a 
patron while she is changing and posts them anonymously on the internet, where 
they are enjoyed by many people, none of whom know the woman, who never 
finds out the photos were taken. 2) A wife, after promising her husband fidelity, 
engages in a steady stream of safe sexual encounters with other consenting 
individuals. The wife is very clear with her extramarital partners about the 
nature of their relationships, and no one’s feelings get hurt. The husband never 
finds out, and considers his marriage to be a good one. 3) An employee regularly 
steals from his employer. The employee never takes enough to be noticed, and 
there is no negative impact on the business or on the relationship between 
employee and employer.  In none of these cases (and countless more could 
easily be constructed) is any harm done. Yet these are classic examples of 
immoral behavior – rights violations, infidelity (and broken promises), theft. It is 
not harm that prompts a judgment of “wrong” in these cases. 
If seriousness and the degree of harm or potential for harm were a 
relevant factor in determining ontological status, the evaluation of stealing packs 
of gum and cheating on 5 point quizzes would be subjective, while the 
evaluation of stealing cars and plagiarizing one’s dissertation would be 
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objective. This is not how most people understand these matters, however. Many 
antirealists understand morality as subjective, regardless of the seriousness of 
the case, and realists hold morality to be objective, again irrespective of the 
seriousness of the matter. Given this, even if aesthetics turns out to be at all 
times less serious than ethics, the issue of seriousness does not have any bearing 
on the issue of divergence.  
(I.f) Dilemmas 
In this section, I discuss the issue of dilemmas, as Marcia Eaton’s 
strongest argument for divergence hinges on the assertion that there are moral 
dilemmas, but no aesthetic dilemmas. After a brief explanation of dilemmas 
generally, I will offer reasons for believing that they are possible in both moral 
and aesthetic forms. I will show that the relevant considerations for a dilemma 
are the same in both the fields of ethics and aesthetics, so dilemmas do not offer 
a reason for divergence. 
Dilemmas can be understood in a couple of ways. Most commonly, they 
are thought of as situations in which one must choose between only bad options, 
but many philosophers agree that there is also such a thing as a “positive” 
dilemma, in which one has a plurality of good choices before her, and has the 
happy problem of being forced to select between them.48 Dilemmas are 
                                                
48 Rosalind Hursthouse offers, as an example of a “happy” dilemma, a parent being aware of 
many presents that would make her child extremely happy. She cannot choose them all, and 
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sometimes categorized as ‘resolvable’ or ‘irresolvable.’49 Resolvable dilemmas 
are really better understood as tough choices, rather than true dilemmas – they 
are cases in which one recognizes pros and cons that pull in different directions, 
but an all-things-considered best answer can be reached. Irresolvable dilemmas, 
on the other hand, are those in which there is no non-arbitrary decision 
procedure that could help one decide in favor of one choice over another.50 In 
the following discussion, the dilemmas under consideration are of the 
irresolvable type. 
Marcia Eaton holds that there are no true aesthetic dilemmas.  A 
necessary component of a dilemma, she says, is that one feels guilt and remorse 
no matter which horn of the dilemma one chooses.51 Sophie’s choice, in which 
she must choose which of her children will be sent to its death in order to spare 
the life of the other, is a classic example of an irresolvable moral dilemma.52 
Eaton argues that no such dilemmas exist in aesthetics, because no aesthetic 
choice is such that guilt and remorse would be appropriate no matter which horn 
of the dilemma is chosen. She says, “[I]f there are aesthetic dilemmas then there 
                                                
whatever she chooses means the others are not chosen, but the situation is win-win, rather than 
lose-lose, as we typically think of dilemmas. See Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics, 
Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 66-67. 
49 This terminology comes from Hursthouse. 
50 Hursthouse, p. 63. 
51 Presumably, Eaton is not considering the possibility of “happy” dilemmas. 
52 In Hursthouse’s terminology, this is a ‘tragic dilemma,’ one that, no matter which horn is 
chosen, will permanently mar an otherwise good life. 
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must be aesthetic obligations from which they stem,”53 and later concludes that, 
“[A]ll candidates for aesthetic or aesethical obligations reduce to ethical 
obligations…”54 
Eaton does not give a reason for the position that seriousness, guilt, and 
remorse are necessary elements of dilemmas, although this is a standard view. 
Mightn’t it be the case that one could experience an ethical dilemma over 
something very trivial? A store where I shop encourages “green” living by 
giving customers who bring their own shopping bags, or forgo bags altogether, a 
token when they check out. The customer can then choose to put her token in 
one of a variety of jars, marked with the names of local charitable organizations. 
The token stands for a donation of a few cents that the store will make to the 
charity. By putting the token in a jar, the customer is making a choice between a 
very small donation to help children, the mentally disabled, animals, or others. 
The customer might feel that it is very important to help each of these charities, 
but she only has one token. She must make a decision to help one rather than 
another. Although she might wish she could help both, guilt and remorse over a 
few cents is inappropriate. Thus, it is clear that ethical dilemmas need not be 
serious, or involve guilt and remorse.  
                                                
53 Eaton, “Aesthetic,” p. 3. 
54 Ibid., p. 8. Eaton coined the word ‘aesethical’ to refer to cases in which the moral and the 
aesthetic elements cannot be pried apart. 
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An aesthetic dilemma that follows a similar form is the always-tough 
choice between the praram curry and the drunken noodles at one’s favorite Thai 
restaurant. There are those days when you want them both very much, but could 
not possibly order two meals without being shamed by your fellow diners. You 
recognize the deep pull of peanut-y goodness in one direction, and the salty 
allure of noodles and vegetables in the other. Here is a predicament, which takes 
the form of a dilemma, and looks like it might leave one tinged with regret, no 
matter what one chooses. It lacks seriousness, but so does the above ethical 
dilemma, and Eaton has not given us a reason to suppose that a non-serious 
predicament of this form fails to be a dilemma. 
Once again, this example shows that guilt and remorse are not necessary 
elements of dilemmas. Certainly in the case of the Thai food, it is unclear that 
guilt would be an appropriate emotion, but even in cases that Eaton would 
clearly accept as dilemmas, it does not look as if guilt and remorse are essential 
byproducts of the situation. Sophie seems to have been wracked with guilt over 
her choice, but would everyone? It would seem that a different personality, in 
Sophie’s situation, would feel not guilt and remorse, but pure anger at the Nazi 
doctor who has forced her to make this choice. Guilt is an appropriate emotion 
when one has done something wrong. What has Sophie done wrong? What has 
any person who finds herself in a dilemma done wrong? The wrongness, the 
problem, is not with the agent forced to choose, but the individuals and factors 
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which have forced that agent into the position where either decision will carry 
with it an unwanted price. In choosing, regardless of which child she chooses, 
Sophie has done the best she could in a terrible situation. This is not reason for 
guilt, though it is still, of course, reason for sorrow. 
I see no reason for one who accepts the reality of moral dilemmas not to 
accept aesthetic dilemmas as well. Consider authors who must make aesthetic 
choices when turning a written work into a film. Comic writer Brian Michael 
Bendis, in adapting his graphic novel Goldfish for the screen, made a decision to 
cut dialog that he thought ought to be in his work, because his script had too 
much dialog for a movie. Bendis faced conflicting aesthetic values. On the one 
hand, he saw a great aesthetic good in translating his work into a screenplay. 
The film medium would open up new creative possibilities for the work and 
would make its aesthetic features accessible to a wider audience. So, Bendis had 
good reason to do what it took to adapt his graphic novel into a screenplay. 
However, Bendis also felt regret as he cut portions of the script which he 
thought made the work better. He sacrificed one aesthetic value – some great 
pieces of dialog – to make possible the realization of another aesthetic value – 
the production of his story as a movie. Two aesthetic values were in 
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competition, they could not be jointly satisfied, and Bendis was forced to choose 
between them.55 This looks like an aesthetic dilemma.  
Perhaps the reason Sophie’s choice appears more dilemmatic is because, 
when the stakes are higher, you are more likely to experience psychological 
trauma when making a tough decision. However, the emotions one feels do not 
point to the necessary presence of a dilemma. Feeling guilty because you 
couldn’t be in two places at once, because you had to hurt someone’s feelings, 
because you had to let someone down or renege on an obligation does not 
indicate a dilemma, but only a difficult choice. Sophie made a tough choice in 
deciding which one of her children would die, but she also did something 
wonderful – in having the strength to choose in that situation, she allowed one of 
her children to live, when otherwise they both would have died. Bendis decided 
that, though he was sorry he had to cut dialog he would have rather not cut, it 
was better, aesthetically, that the movie be made than that the dialogue remain, 
at the expense of the production of the movie. 
In this section, I have argued that dilemmas are possible in both the 
realm of ethics and that of aesthetics. Some dilemmas are serious cases in which 
guilt and remorse are appropriate responses, while other dilemmas are trivial, 
while retaining the necessary structure of a dilemma. By showing that this 
                                                
55 Bendis, Brian Michael. Fortune and Glory, volume 2, pp. 6-16.  
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feature is present across fields, I have demonstrated that dilemmas cannot be 
offered as an argument in favor of divergence.  
Conclusion 
In this section, I’ve examined the six leading candidate differences 
between ethics and aesthetics offered in the literature: differences related to 
principles, properties, obligations, motivation, seriousness, and dilemmas. I have 
argued that none of these potential differences justifies divergence. Of course, 
this list is not conclusive. If another relevant difference is presented which 
firmly shows divergence, then that ought to be considered, and accepted if it 
cannot be refuted. What I have done in this section is present an argument for 
convergence based on an analysis of these six categories, demonstrating that no 
successful argument for divergence has been offered. Thus, convergence ought 
to be accepted unless a stronger argument in favor of divergence is offered, as it 
would be arbitrary to adopt different views about the two domains if there were 







Part II: The Ontological Convergence of Ethics and Aesthetics – 
A Positive Argument Based on the Way We Form Judgments 
 
 In Part I, I looked at six reasons ethicists and aestheticians have offered 
for holding a divergence account of ethics and aesthetics. I argued that none of 
these reasons successfully established divergence. This gives support for a 
convergence account. In Part II, I will augment this account by considering the 
way we form judgments in the two fields. First, I will look at two arguments in 
support of the position that judgments are formed in one way in ethics and 
another way in aesthetics. As in Part I, I will show why these arguments fail to 
establish divergence.  
So far, I have argued against divergence by showing why various 
divergence arguments fail. In the second portion of Part II, I will consider 
several elements that are present in judgment formation in both ethics and 
aesthetics – convention, emotion, reason, and the tendency to favor acts and 
artworks that promote utility. After considering accounts offered by David 
Lewis, Marcia Eaton, Jesse Prinz, and David Hume, I will offer my own account 
of judgment formation, which draws upon the work of each of these authors, 
while correcting for places I think their arguments go wrong, to present my own 
account of judgment formation. I will offer a two-tiered system of judgments 
that accounts for our ability to objectively judge based on conventional criteria, 
as well as our ability to judge the conventions themselves.  
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While Part I discusses six factors relating to ethics and aesthetics, the 
similarity of which could contribute to a convergence account, Part II is devoted 
only to a discussion of judgment formation in ethics and aesthetics. Judgments 
are particularly interesting and merit extra consideration because, unlike 
properties, principles, obligations, motivation, seriousness, and dilemmas, 
judgments are an area in which clear positive parallels between ethics and 
aesthetics exist. Six strong arguments against divergence, combined with four 
positive arguments in favor of convergence, present a compelling case for the 
convergence of ethics and aesthetics.  
(II.a) Judgments 
 I hold that value judgments are different in kind than non-evaluative 
judgments. I suspect that all value judgments (prudential, religious, financial, 
etc.) are of a kind, but here I argue only that moral and aesthetic judgments are 
of the same kind. Before getting into the arguments, it is important to clarify 
some terms. By “judgment,” I mean a cognitive exercise whereby an individual 
considers data and arrives at a determination regarding that data. By “non-
evaluative judgment,” I mean a judgment the determination of which is solely 
descriptive. When I study the data in my kitchen and determine that I have the 
ingredients to make pizza or calzones, I have made a non-evaluative judgment. 
By “evaluative judgment,” I mean a judgment the determination of which 
involves normative elements such as the ranking of some data as better than 
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others. The determination that pizza would be a better choice than calzones is an 
evaluative judgment.  
Non-evaluative judgments that are about a moral topic, such as the 
background information surrounding the telling of a lie, will not be called 
‘moral judgments,’ as this term will refer only to value judgments about moral 
topics. The reason for this is that non-evaluative judgments concerning the 
descriptive data in the context of which a lie occurred could also lead to non-
moral value judgments, such as the judgment that the lie was ineffective at 
achieving one’s prudential goals; the term ‘moral judgment’ will be reserved 
only for value judgments, in the interest of clarity. The same will hold for non-
evaluative judgments about artworks. Aesthetic judgments may stem from non-
evaluative judgments pertaining to the artwork, but only the value judgments 
will be referred to as “aesthetic judgments.” 
I do not argue that judgments have a necessary connection to truth. A 
judgment might be true or false, more or less well supported by evidence, or it 
might have no truth-value. An antirealist might hold that there is no mind-
independent truth-value about the merits of pizza vs. calzones, while realists will 
argue that there is a fact of the matter regarding which Italian treat is better, even 
if some people do not know this fact or happen to hold false beliefs about it. 
These definitions regarding judgment types apply equally on a realist or 
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antirealist picture, and neither position is being assumed in the following 
discussion. 
Because I argue that moral and aesthetic judgments share elements in 
common that other judgments lack, it is important to get clear on what those 
elements are. Most importantly, moral and aesthetic judgments are value 
judgments. What is it that sets value judgments apart from other judgments? 
Evaluative judgments depend on prior non-evaluative judgments. It is 
impossible to make an evaluative judgment without first making a host of non-
evaluative judgments. Before a physician can decide which medicine is best for 
the patient, she must make a considerable number of non-evaluative judgments. 
What other medications is the patient taking? How severe is the condition? What 
is the patient’s financial situation?  
Before the morality of a lie can be evaluated, non-evaluative judgments 
are needed, regardless of whether the judger accepts a realist or an antirealist 
account. For one thing, non-evaluative judgments are needed to even determine 
if a lie has been told. Did the speaker realize he was speaking falsely? Was the 
listener expecting truth, or are the interlocutors in the midst of a story-telling 
game? These types of judgments must be made before the lie (if it is one) can be 
evaluated.  
Non-evaluative judgments happen before value judgments, and are 
needed to make value judgments, but non-evaluative judgments do not always 
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eventuate in value judgments (many of our non-evaluative judgments stop at the 
level of description, with no element of normativity). Moral and aesthetic 
judgments, then, are value judgments concerning, in the former case, the 
rightness or wrongness, and ranking, of acts performed by agents, and in the 
later case, the goodness or badness, and ranking, of artworks. With a preliminary 
discussion of judgments out of the way, we can now consider the way in which 
we arrive at moral and aesthetic judgments, and whether they are both arrived at 
in the same way. If they are, this will provide a positive argument for 
convergence. 
(II.b) Arguments for Divergence in Moral and Aesthetic 
Judgment Formation 
 
 In this section, I will consider the leading arguments offered by ethicists 
and aestheticians in support of the position that moral and aesthetic judgments 
are arrived at through different routes. I will explain the positions held by P. F. 
Strawson and Alan Goldman, and offer arguments to demonstrate why these 
views are misguided. Strawson holds that moral judgments can only be formed 
in the presence of initial, non-evaluative judgments, yet he argues that aesthetic 
judgments are not formed with a backdrop of non-evaluative judgments. Alan 
Goldman argues that moral and aesthetic judgments range over different things, 
holding that our moral judgments focus on particular parts of acts, while our 
aesthetic judgments range over entire artworks. I will offer arguments to show 
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that Strawson’s and Goldman’s arguments fall through, thus failing to establish 
divergence and strengthening support for a convergence view. 
(II.b.1) Moral Judgments Require Non-evaluative Judgments 
and Aesthetic Judgments Do Not 
 
P. F. Strawson argues that moral and aesthetic judgments are necessarily 
different in kind.  Moral judgments, he holds, must be arrived at by providing 
non-evaluative reasons for the praise or blame of an action. Strawson’s position 
is similar to the one held by Frank Sibley, discussed in (I.b). However, Sibley’s 
argument centers on the detection of aesthetic versus moral properties, while 
Strawson’s argument focuses on his understanding of differences involved in 
judgment formation between the two fields. Strawson holds that moral 
judgments must be preceded by non-evaluative judgments. On this point, 
Strawson and I agree. Non-evaluative judgments come first, and inform value 
judgments. Where we disagree is that Strawson thinks this process works 
differently in aesthetic judgments. 
Promoting a view that was standard at the time (the article where he 
promotes this view was originally published in 1974), Strawson does not 
provide examples of the way he understands moral judgments as unfolding, but 
says that “general rules and principles are essential” to one’s ethical 
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judgments.56  Here, he probably means that we look for rules that can be applied 
across cases, such as pain contributing to a negative judgment of an action, 
while pleasure contributes to a positive judgment (this view will be discussed in 
more detail in the following section). However, because Strawson does not give 
examples of non-evaluative judgments in ethics, we must examine his 
statements regarding aesthetics and extrapolate back to ethics in an attempt to 
arrive at a full picture of his theory.  
 According to Strawson, there are two ways in which we arrive at our 
aesthetic judgments.  One way is to simply pile further evaluative descriptions 
onto our initial judgment of ‘good’ or ‘bad,’ which was arrived at non-
cognitively. When called upon to justify that initial judgment, we might hold 
that an artwork is good, and offer, as justification, that it is original. But, 
Strawson argues, ‘original’ is itself an evaluative term, so we’re not making 
much progress with that step. We’re refining our understanding of the work’s 
goodness by specifying a way in which it is good (good due to originality, rather 
than good due to poignancy, for example). But at this point we don’t have 
grounding for the supposition that ‘original’ is good. That claim has been made 
more specific, but has not been grounded. 
 On the other hand, we could leave ‘good’ out of the definition. We might 
define ‘original’ as something like, “never having been done before,” at which 
                                                
56 Strawson, P. F. “Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art,” in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of 
Art: The Analytic Tradition. Blackwell, 2004, p. 239. 
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point it is no longer an evaluative term, but is merely descriptive. The problem 
is, now that ‘original’ is merely descriptive, we could just as easily judge a work 
to be bad by virtue of its originality. Think, for example, of any sort of genre-
specific fiction. There are rules for writing good crime fiction, a good science 
fiction story, a good work of fantasy, and these rules are going to be very 
specific to the genre. What is good in a fantasy story is not good in a sci-fi 
novel.   
Take, for example, the very specific sub-genre of espionage fiction. The 
success of the James Bond film industry rests on the ability of its creators to stay 
within very specific tropes – archetypes that keep viewers coming back again 
and again, from Connery to Moore to Bronson. The cast of villains and the Bond 
girls’ hairstyles might change, but the plot is basically the same, film after film, 
and this is seen as a virtue of the industry – viewers do not to go a Bond movie 
to see something original. Instead, they are seeking a reliable, fairly unoriginal 
retelling of the expected tropes – the sexual tension between Bond and Miss 
Moneypenny, Q and his gadgets, Bond’s smooth wit and ability to pristinely 
bounce back from any encounter.  
In fact, many judge the movie with the most original of the Bond 
plotlines – Moonraker – to be the worst Bond movie, specifically because it 
deviates from the accepted tropes of the genre, taking Bond on an outer-space 
adventure. Moonraker was released in 1979, the same year as Star Wars 
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exploded the popularity of the science fiction genre, so it was not dislike of 
science fiction in and of itself that caused the film to be judged negatively. It 
was simply the fact that science fiction does not belong in the espionage sub-
genre – introducing that element of originality into the work made it a decidedly 
worse film. 
In the past few years, the Bond industry has taken a turn, with the two 
most recent films – Casino Royale and Quantum of Solace – being decidedly 
less funny and grittier than what fans have come to expect from the franchise. 
Daniel Craig’s Bond gets dirty and stays that way, and we are shown a rawness 
beneath the sleek Bond veneer. Critics and fans complain that Craig’s portrayal 
of Bond is too original to provide the satisfying fix that keeps fans returning to 
the theater.57 
 If ‘original’ is understood as a positive evaluative term, such that any 
work that is original is better than one that is unoriginal, we are no closer to 
justifying our initial non-cognitive aesthetic judgment than before, as ‘original’ 
is merely a subset of ‘good.’ However, as the Bond case has shown, 
understanding ‘original’ as a descriptive term cannot then get us to an evaluative 
judgment, as originality is sometimes seen as positively affecting a work and at 
                                                
57 See Eastman, Marc. “Quantum of Solace – Movie Review – Bond Bails Out on Being Bond,” 
March 25, 2009. http://www.areyouscreening.com/2009/03/25/quantum-of-solace-movie-
review-bond-bails-out-on-being-bond  
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other times is understood as making the work worse. This same point would 
hold for other aesthetic descriptors, as well. 
Aesthetic judgments, then, cannot be arrived at by adding additional 
evaluative or non-evaluative descriptors to our initial judgments. The other way 
to justify aesthetic judgments, according to Strawson, is to point to particular 
features of a work, but that method is necessarily unrepeatable, because any 
non-evaluative feature of artwork x might turn out to be absent or present to 
greater or lesser degrees in artworks y and z, but our judgments do not 
necessarily match up accordingly.  For instance, we might praise the sweetness 
of Jeff Tweedy’s vocals on a song like “Hesitating Beauty”58 while also praising 
the rawness of Janis Joplin’s voice on a song such as “Cry Baby.” 59  
According to Strawson’s theory, both sweetness and rawness are 
properties of these artworks by which we evaluate their aesthetic worth, but the 
evaluation of the properties cannot be applied systematically across works to 
form evaluative principles.  The property of lyrical sweetness, if present in “Cry 
Baby,” would result in a less-good artwork, while rawness in “Hesitating 
Beauty” would diminish its aesthetic merit. This example is meant to show that 
aesthetic properties cannot be used to evaluate artworks in the way that moral 
properties can because, Strawson holds, the non-evaluative property that 
                                                
58 “Hesitating Beauty.” Lyrics by Woody Guthrie, performed by Billy Bragg and Wilco, 
Mermaid Avenue, 1998. 
59 “Cry Baby.” Lyrics by Bert Burns and Jerry Ragovoy, performed by Janis Joplin, Pearl, 1970. 
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contributes to the goodness of artwork x might lead to an aesthetic defect in the 
very different context of artwork y. 
 Strawson does not tell us the sorts of properties that he thinks can be 
applied objectively across cases in ethics, but, as they are described as non-
evaluative properties, one has to imagine that he means something like, for 
example, the property of taking something that does not belong to you and 
which has not been offered. We could then take that property and plug it into 
moral actions x, y, and z and evaluate them based on the presence or absence of 
the property within the acts.  However, is this really any different than the 
vocals? Sweetness is good in “Hesitating Beauty” because of the package of 
which it is a part.  It would be unpleasantly jarring to mix Joplin’s anguished 
voice with Woody Guthrie’s tender lyrics and Wilco’s gentle, up-beat 
instrumentation. Just so, taking something that doesn’t belong to you and which 
has not been offered usually counts against the moral worth we assign to an 
action. In some cases, however, this property does not have a negative impact on 
the act.  
Consider a police action that disarms a would-be assassin. The potential 
assassin’s weapon is legally owned and registered. The action of disarming the 
man has the property of taking something that does not belong to the police 
officers and which has not been offered. Yet, in this case, unlike most others, the 
normally negative property does not count against the morality of the act. A 
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property that in most cases would be enough to judge the action as immoral in 
this case has no effect on our moral judgment at all. 
This looks very similar to the case of “Hesitating Beauty” and “Cry 
Baby.”  The reason we praise the police officers is because we think taking 
something that does not belong to you and which was not offered is the best 
overall fit within this moral “work.” Just as a more biting style contributes to the 
overall goodness of “Cry Baby” more than sweet vocalization would, so taking 
the gun contributes to the overall goodness of the situation more than refraining 
from taking the gun would.60 This type of understanding reflects Dancy-style 
particularism, as discussed in Part I.  
Some, however, hold the position that taking something that does not 
belong to you and which was not offered is always wrong, across the board, 
regardless of its place within a complex action. This presupposes an absolutist 
moral theory.  This line can be followed through into the aesthetic case as well. 
Just as the moral evaluator might stipulate that stealing is always wrong, 
regardless of the context of the theft, so the aesthetic evaluator might stipulate 
that raw dissonance is always wrong, regardless of context (as, in fact, many 
people do). 
                                                
60 The fact that the gun does not belong to the police officer is morally neutral. If it were instead 
the police officer’s gun, which the assassin had somehow come to possess, the police action 
would not be less good. 
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An evaluator such as Strawson, who wants to allow for a contextualist 
account of aesthetic judgment formation, needs to provide an argument for 
excluding that same type of contextualism in the judgment of moral actions. 
Strawson’s argument does not succeed in demonstrating why contextualism 
cannot be extended across both ethics and aesthetics.  
Strawson’s argument for considering moral and aesthetic judgments to 
be different in kind, which contributes to an argument for divergence, has failed. 
His argument is based on the thesis that moral judgments are arrived at by way 
of preliminary non-evaluative judgments about the situation, whereas aesthetic 
judgments do not involve that initial step. I have shown that the non-evaluative 
step is present in both cases, which demonstrates that divergence cannot be 
arrived at through this route. 
(II.b.2) Moral Judgments Carry a Coherentist Constraint While 
Aesthetic Judgments Do Not 
 
Another way that moral and aesthetic judgments might differ regards the 
particular elements that can be judged. Some theorists, such as Alan Goldman, 
hold that we form moral judgments based on analysis of particular properties of 
actions. We then generalize across cases to form coherent standards by which 
we can judge other actions exemplifying those properties. Aesthetic judgments, 
on the other hand, on Goldman’s account, cannot be evaluated in terms of 
individual properties taken in isolation. Instead, each artwork is unique, and 
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must be considered on its own terms.61 This difference in judgment formation 
between ethics and aesthetics could provide an argument for divergence, as the 
method of evaluation would be disanalogous between the two fields. I will 
explain Goldman’s arguments and then offer reasons for rejecting this 
distinction between the two objects of judgments. 
Although Goldman rejects the view that our evaluative judgments will 
reach unanimity, he does think we can constrain the rules by which we judge in 
certain ways so as to reach the highest level of agreement possible. This is 
desirable, on his account, because one of the primary functions of passing 
judgment is so as to be able to impose social sanctions – we reward and punish 
actions, praise and disparage artists. Although Goldman does not deny that 
judgments could be private, with public discourse regarding the objects of 
evaluation being an important goal, it follows that we would want to establish 
the strongest evaluative constraints possible, to achieve the highest level of 
evaluative agreement.62 
Goldman holds that we cannot place the same level of evaluative 
constraints on aesthetic judgments as we place on moral judgments, and it is at 
this point that his argument might suggest divergence. He argues that the highest 
constraint moral judgments can rationally be subjected to is a coherentist 
                                                
61 Goldman, Alan H. “Aesthetic Versus Moral Evaluations,” in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, vol. 1, no. 4, June 1990 pp. 722-727. 
62 Ibid., p. 729. 
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constraint, and that aesthetic judgments cannot be likewise constrained. The 
coherentist constraint says that: 
The truth of a moral judgment…consists in its being analogous to some 
settled judgment, and in its being differentiable, making it a member of 
some maximally coherent set. A maximally coherent set is one in which, 
for all differences in judgments, we can specify nonmoral differences 
that count generally.63 
 
This constraint is stronger than a supervenience claim in that the evaluator must 
be able to articulate the non-moral difference that justifies the difference 
between evaluative judgments, though the justification need not be universally 
accepted, provided it is accepted by those who agreed to the settled judgment.64 
 An example can illustrate the coherentist constraint. An evaluator judges 
abortion to be morally permissible and infanticide to be morally impermissible. 
The evaluator now needs to demonstrate a non-moral difference between the 
two cases to justify the difference in judgment. The evaluator suggests that the 
non-moral difference that justifies abortion but not infanticide is the fact that 
infants and fetuses obtain oxygen in different ways. When pressed, however, the 
evaluator concedes that the way a being breathes is usually irrelevant to whether 
it is permissible to kill that being. Now, coherentism constrains the evaluator. 
He cannot hold that the manner in which beings obtain oxygen is relevant in the 
context of the permissibility of killing fetuses versus infants, while being 
irrelevant in other cases. Coherentism demands that either the evaluator grant 
                                                
63 Ibid., p. 725. 
64 Ibid., p. 726. 
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that abortion and infanticide receive the same evaluation, or that an (actually) 
relevant difference between the two cases be articulated.65 
Goldman argues that the coherentist constraint is possible in ethics 
because we form moral judgments based on the observation of recurring 
properties (such as cruelty, benevolence, or honesty) that retain their value 
(positive or negative) across situations. He says, “While these properties are not 
sufficient in themselves to entail moral evaluations, they generally make 
differences among judgments.”66 Goldman holds that two factors allow the 
coherentist constraint to go through: 1) in moral judgments, our evaluations are 
formed by isolating particular properties that we have already evaluated; and 2) 
we can count on there being specifiable classes of cases such that the property 
functions the same way in every case in the class. 
The property of causing pain most often points toward a negative 
judgment of acts containing that property. Sometimes, however, the property of 
causing pain points us toward a positive judgment of the action. This does not 
rule out Goldman’s coherentist constraint, provided we can pinpoint a non-
arbitrary difference between the cases that justifies the difference in judgment. 
For example, if all and only instances of the positive judgment corresponded to a 
request from the person experiencing the pain, and each instance of a negative 
                                                
65 Ibid., p. 726. 
66 Ibid., p. 726. 
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judgment corresponded to a lack of request for the act, the coherentist constraint 
has still been met. 
Due to the coherentist constraint, moral judgments, on Goldman’s view, 
must be backed up by an appeal to properties that would have the same value 
(positive or negative) in other moral situations. He says, “[W]e must find some 
morally relevant difference each time we judge differently two cases that seem 
otherwise similar.”67 If one instance of homicide is judged to be morally 
justifiable and another is not, a relevant difference between the cases must exist, 
such that we can identify sets of cases sharing relevant similarities that justify 
the status of the judgments.68 An example of such sets might be the set of 
homicides that were committed in self-defense, as opposed to the set of 
homicides that were committed in ruthless aggression.69 
These two factors are the reasons why Goldman does not believe 
coherentism can be applied to aesthetic judgments. He says, 1) aesthetic 
evaluations cannot be made on the basis of particular properties taken in 
isolation, and 2) the value of aesthetic properties does not remain stable across 
cases. Goldman holds that our aesthetic judgments, unlike our moral judgments, 
                                                
67 Ibid., p. 725. 
68 Ibid., p. 723. 
69 It is worth noting that the particular combination of factors that will be relevant to forming 
coherent judgments is extremely complicated, on Goldman’s view. My examples are meant to 
indicate the way this process works, but does not necessarily figure in all possible relevant 
factors. 
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must range over whole artworks.70 While particular features of artworks can be 
analyzed – a line from a song, a figure in a painting – the part must be 
considered within the work as a whole. Here, Goldman is picking up on a theme 
also seen in the views of Sibley and Strawson, holding that, while particular 
properties can be appealed to in order to support the aesthetic judgment of a 
specific artwork, there is simply no guarantee that that same property will 
operate in the same way in the context of another artwork. The property of 
vibrancy contributes to a positive evaluation of artwork A and a negative 
evaluation of artwork B; tranquility makes artwork C stronger but in artwork D 
it has a negative effect.  
A specific example might make Goldman’s understanding of the way 
aesthetic principles function in judgments more clear. He explains: 
We judge, for example, that Mozart is a better composer than Salieri, 
and, if asked for a reason, we might respond that Mozart’s music is less 
predictable than Salieri’s. But this response does not commit us to the 
view that being less predictable…is generally a musical virtue. The fact 
that Schonberg’s music is less predictable (auditorily) than Mozart’s 
does not at all contribute toward Schonberg’s being a better composer.71  
 
Unpredictability counts as a positive attribute in the case of Mozart’s 
compositions, but is at best neutral regarding Schonberg’s works, and is in fact a 
reason to negatively judge something like a Beckett play, where the aesthetic 
                                                
70Ibid., p. 726. 
71 Ibid., p. 727. 
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property of monotony actually contributes to a positive evaluation.72 As the 
value of aesthetic properties does not remain constant across works, Goldman 
argues that it is not possible to formulate a coherent judgment, such as 
“unpredictability improves artworks,” or even a more specific judgment, such as 
“unpredictability improves artworks in cases like X, but not in cases like Y.” 
This demonstrates why Goldman holds that we must be coherentists about ethics 
but not aesthetics. Coherentism says that each time our moral judgments are 
different, we must be able to identify a difference in the descriptive data 
connected to the situation that accounts for the difference in evaluative 
judgment, and that difference should be relevantly extendable to other cases, 
which is impossible in aesthetic evaluation.73  
The possibility of coherentism in ethics makes moral judgments 
rationally decidable, according to Goldman, but there is no rational decision 
procedure possible regarding aesthetic judgments, due to the lack of stability 
regarding the value of aesthetic properties. This is not to say that aesthetic 
evaluation is impossible, on Goldman’s account. Evaluation is possible, but 
artworks must be evaluated as unique wholes, “in which the parts have aesthetic 
value only in such complete contexts.”74 Aesthetic properties do not have 
independent value; their value is relative to the context of the individual 
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artworks in which they appear. Thus, properties cannot be pulled out of artworks 
and evaluated independently. He writes: 
a particular line of a given shape and color in a painting might be of 
great aesthetic value only there, not in the context of any other painting.  
Likewise, a musical phrase perfect in the context of a particular 
symphony need not have even prima facie aesthetic value when placed in 
other musical contexts.  All the value of such elements derives from their 
places in the unique aesthetic wholes of which they are parts.75 
 
 If Goldman is correct that morality calls for a kind of coherentism that is 
impossible in aesthetics, this might push us toward a divergence account of 
ethics and aesthetics. The question, then, is whether his two central claims are 
correct: 1) Do we evaluate moral actions on the basis of particular properties 
while evaluating artworks as unique wholes? and 2) Do the properties by which 
we evaluate moral actions retain their value across relevantly similar cases, 
while the value of properties by which we evaluate aesthetic properties change 
from case to case? In response to 1), I will argue that evaluation in both ethics 
and aesthetics involves analysis in terms of both parts and wholes. Responding 
to 2), I will agree with Goldman that the value of aesthetic properties is 
changeable, and demonstrate that the value of the properties by which we 
evaluate moral actions changes from case to case as well. This will show both 
that the coherentist constraint cannot function in ethics as Goldman claims, and 
also that this argument for divergence falls through. 
                                                
75 Goldman, p. 725. 
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 Goldman tells us that moral evaluation is conducted at the level of 
properties, while aesthetic evaluations, though involving analysis of properties, 
end in an all-things-considered judgment of the work as a whole. As an 
example, he considered the evaluation of abortion and infanticide in terms of 
particular properties. While he rejects the method of oxygen absorption as 
irrelevant to the moral question, one would suppose he would hold that there are 
morally relevant properties, such as sentience or viability, by which the moral 
cases would be judged within the coherentist constraint. While I do not deny that 
moral judgments are formed, at least in part, by appeal to particular properties, it 
is plausible that all-things-considered assessments are also made regarding 
moral actions, and this process is analogous to the process of aesthetic 
evaluation.  
 Goldman is correct that, in an aesthetic evaluation, we consider the 
property of unpredictability not as an abstract concept, but as it functions within 
a particular work. Unpredictability adds positive aesthetic value, when it does, 
because of its presence with the complex mix of other factors that combine 
uniquely in a particular artwork. The fact that unpredictability could end up 
adding negative value to a different work does not mean we cannot judge this 
work; it merely means we must consider each work on its own merits, rather 
than demanding coherence across our evaluations of works.  
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 As I argued in (II.b.1), moral evaluations work the same way. Consider 
the case of abortion mentioned by Goldman. Certainly the moral permissibility 
of an abortion will be considered in terms of particular properties, such as the 
viability of the fetus. However, the property of fetus viability is not always 
thought to add negative value to an act of abortion. Perhaps the fetus is viable, 
but afflicted with a severe, permanent disability that will cause it excruciating 
pain that cannot be adequately controlled. Many people will hold that the 
property of fetus viability, when combined with the property of severe, 
untreatable pain, will lead to a different judgment regarding the moral 
permissibility of abortion in this case as opposed to one in which the property of 
fetus viability was present but the property of severe, untreatable pain was 
absent.  
Goldman will say, at this point, that these judgments can be 
systematized. There are identifiable principles that capture the relevant 
difference between sets of cases such that viability will not always contribute to 
a negative (or positive) evaluation of the act. I argue that, though Goldman 
might be correct on that point, there will always be additional factors by which 
we can narrow our evaluations. We can continue to pull apart our sets on the 
basis of relevant differences until our sets of cases have been isolated down to 
individual instances, just like with artworks.  
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 Compare the two cases of abortion with two artworks, each possessing 
the property of gracefulness. As with the property of fetus viability, gracefulness 
renders different aesthetic judgments depending on the other properties with 
which it is joined in a particular work. In a work also possessing the property of 
tranquility, gracefulness might render the work insipid, resulting in a negative 
aesthetic judgment.76 In many other cases, however, gracefulness will lend 
positive value to the work. The only way to tell for sure is to evaluate each 
particular work, with its unique combination of factors. Likewise, each 
particular instance of abortion exists in a unique, complex web of factors that 
cannot be fully systematized without losing some of the nuances of the 
particular situation that ought to contribute to a robust moral evaluation of the 
act.  
In both the moral and the aesthetic case, properties feed into the 
evaluative judgments that are formed. Fetus viability and gracefulness are 
factors that inform one’s evaluations. In neither case are particular properties a 
reliable indicator of the overall judgment of a work, however. Goldman would 
agree that fetus viability sometimes pushes toward a negative evaluation of an 
act and at other times does not, and that gracefulness sometimes contributes to a 
positive evaluation of a work and sometimes does not. In both cases, an all-
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things-considered judgment is reached by analyzing the myriad properties that 
combine in a unique way in the particular act or work.  
Goldman holds that all-things-considered judgments do not have the 
same relation to the particular properties in ethics as they do in aesthetics, 
because of his position that, on a specific enough analysis, moral properties can 
be systematized in a way that aesthetic properties are not. I hold that the only 
analyses that will be specific enough to account for all relevant factors in the 
situation will be those analyses conducted at the level of individual acts and 
unique artworks. 
Goldman’s justification for divergence is based on the assertion that 
moral judgments are made based on a complex analysis of particular properties 
of actions, while aesthetic judgments occur on the level of whole works. I have 
shown that this is false, by demonstrating how in both cases we reach all-things-
considered judgments through an analysis of particular properties. I have 
demonstrated a consistency in judgment formation between the two fields, thus 
dissolving Goldman’s argument that moral and aesthetic judgments range over 
different objects (particular properties versus whole works/acts). I have 
demonstrated that his argument for divergence fails, thus providing an additional 




  (II.c) Shared Traits in Judgment Formation 
 This concludes my arguments against divergence. In section (II.c), I will 
consider three elements of judgment formation that ethics and aesthetics have in 
common. These shared traits strengthen the argument for convergence, as they 
show not only that potential differences between the fields can be dissolved or 
explained away, as I have done in the preceding sections, but also that there are 
positive similarities between the two fields. I will first consider conventionalist 
accounts offered by David Lewis, Gilbert Harman, and Marcia Eaton. Next, 
Jesse Prinz’s arguments regarding the role of emotion in judgment formation 
will be considered. Finally, a Humean account of judgment formation, which 




A positive argument for convergence will demonstrate ontologically 
relevant similarities between ethics and aesthetics. In this section, I will argue 
that, on both realist and antirealist accounts, convention plays an important role 
in both our moral and aesthetic judgment formations. I will offer a brief 
introduction to the concept of convention, followed by an explanation of its role 
in both kinds of judgment formation. This similarity in judgment formation 
offers a link between the two fields, and thus a reason for accepting a 
convergence account of these two theories of value. 
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Nelson Goodman describes convention as “the artificial, the invented, 
the optional, as against the natural, the fundamental, the mandatory.”77 
Conventions are non-necessary, widely observed regularities.  They can occur in 
nature, and in private, but in this paper, I will use ‘convention’ to refer 
specifically to social conventions. Uncontroversial examples of conventions 
include the meanings assigned to stop light colors and the use of letter grades to 
signify the level of students’ performance in a class. These regularities are 
observed with law-like consistency, yet could easily have been different. 
Although Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, and David Hume all spoke of the role of 
convention in social interaction and the establishment of social norms and rules, 
David Lewis’s 1969 book, Convention, established the modern framework for 
our understanding of convention.  
Conventions can explain how a practice attains widespread acceptance 
without conforming to an underlying truth or goodness. Lewis expands the basic 
notion of social norms to arrive at a full theory of the origin and power of 
conventions through the use of game theoretic models. Lewis explains that we 
regularly face a coordination problem – there is more than one way to achieve a 
desired result, and that result depends upon each of us acting in concert, but it 
doesn’t matter which of the options we choose, provided we all choose in 
coordination with our peers. Although each of us may have a slight preference 
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for one option over the others, what we all most want is to do what the others are 
doing, so we have a strong interest in establishing a convention that will tell us 
how we can expect others to act.78 
An example might make this more clear. An extended family regularly 
convenes in a central location for Thanksgiving dinner. Each nuclear family is 
committed to bringing portions of the meal, so that everyone has contributed a 
proportional amount, and a range of dishes are available. The family, not big on 
planning, assumes things will “just work out.” One year, three turkeys show up, 
and no dessert. The following year there is no turkey but five pies (three of them 
pumpkin). The third year, the matriarch takes charge and randomly assigns 
dishes to each household. The next year, dishes are not assigned, but each 
household brings the same thing as the year before. This works, and so 
continues year after year. A convention has been established which, though 
arbitrary, provides a guide that tells the family members what to expect from 
each other, and thus how they should act so as to achieve the desired 
coordination. 
Lewis offers a descriptive account of convention, and some have faulted 
his theory for stopping short of normativity. A conventionalist moral system 
could hold that, once a convention has been established, something stronger than 
“people tend to adhere to the convention” becomes true. At this point, 
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conventions assume the force of morality, and dictate not only how we do act, 
but also how we should act. 
This type of moral conventionalism is advocated by Gilbert Harman. 
Harman’s view is relativistic, grounding moral facts in human-determined 
conventions. On this view, conventions define morality – the moral action is 
whatever conforms to the established convention, which, though relatively 
stable, can change over time. He holds that conventions are difficult to change, 
as no one wants to be the one to upset the established order. However, there will 
be a point at which an individual’s preference for doing other than what the 
convention dictates will be stronger than his desire to maintain the cooperative 
equilibrium. One person violating the convention will cause no more than a 
ripple; if enough people choose to act outside the established convention, the 
order will be upset and there will be a period of flux before a new convention 
emerges.79  
Even for those who accept Harman’s account that conventions have 
moral force (and not everyone does – Richard Joyce, for example, holds that 
conventionalism cannot establish moral grounding), it can be difficult to explain 
why conventions have such power over our actions. Ruth Garrett Millikan 
argues that the tendency of humans to conform to convention relies not on an 
appeal to reason or to some underlying truth that has been recognized. Rather, 
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we conform because we are highly adaptive creatures. We modify our actions to 
make our lives better, and when we find something that works, we stick with it, 
even if a further modification would be even more advantageous. She says, 
“Coordination conventions proliferate because, rationality aside, people learn 
from experience exactly as other animals do.”80 
Millikan argues that we do not seek further modifications for a variety of 
reasons. She explains: 
A pattern may prevail over easily invented alternatives because it is 
easier or more natural to copy than to use one’s imagination, or because 
people prefer to do as others do, not wanting to be out of step, or because 
what is familiar is as such pleasing, or because people feel more secure 
in the tried and true.81 
 
On Millikan’s understanding, humans are the kind of being that tend not to 
deviate from an established pattern in the absence of a clear reason to do so 
(why do our students gravitate toward the same seats each class period?). 
Sometimes a convention will be the result of rational innovation, but it could 
just as likely be a happy accident which, once found to work, will be maintained 
until there is a clear reason to change it.82 
Conventions play a key role in judgment formation. Convention tells us 
to proceed when we see a green traffic light, and to brake when we see a red 
one. It tells us to bring deviled eggs to Easter dinner and pumpkin pie to 
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Thanksgiving dinner but not – definitely not! – the other way around. 
Conventions are key in the formation of our moral and aesthetic judgments.  The 
impact of conventions on our moral judgments will be discussed first, followed 
by a discussion of the role of convention in aesthetic judgments. 
As Millikan says, we are beings who rely heavily on precedent to tell us 
how to act. We model those around us and quickly fall into habits of behavior. 
These traits cause us to adopt and adhere to rigid rules, even when we have 
evidence that we need not follow them. Consider, for instance, groups A and B, 
both of whom are successfully operating within a subculture with values that are 
different from that of the dominant culture. Members of group A will understand 
a particular set of practices as required or forbidden based on the conventions by 
which they live. Those in group B, living under different conventions, will 
understand their own rules as binding and the rules of group B as merely 
conventional, and easily flouted. Each group can readily recognize the 
conventional nature of the other sub-culture’s rules, but neither understands their 
own code in that way. For those operating within a convention, its structure 
tends to seem much more like mind-independent reality than an institution that 
could easily have been different. 
Conventions work much the same way in aesthetic judgment formations 
as they do in moral ones. Marcia Muelder Eaton discusses this issue at length. 
She argues that art is largely a social endeavor. More often than not, we produce 
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art for other people, in order to communicate difficult ideas and emotions, 
because we want to be understood by others.83 This echoes an understanding of 
art made famous by Leo Tolstoy, who said, “Every work of art causes the 
receiver to enter into a certain kind of relationship both with him who produced, 
or is producing, the art, and with all those who, simultaneously, previously, or 
subsequently, receive the same artistic impression.”84 When art is understood in 
this way, the importance of conventions in our judgment formation becomes 
clear, as conventions are the means by which we understand one another, 
through various symbolic representations, from language and icons to the 
meanings a culture assigns to nonrepresentational elements such as color and 
tone. 
While Tolstoy understands art as necessarily a communicative act, with 
the possibility of an entirely private artwork being impossible, Eaton allows for 
the possibility of private works and private aesthetic judgments. Some private 
judgments will still make use of conventions, but she acknowledges that there 
are likely to be some judgments that are not convention-dependent. Likely 
candidates for the object of entirely convention-independent judgments will be 
objects of natural beauty, rather than artworks, however. For example, 
regardless of the conventions one brings to the scene, Eaton finds it likely that 
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individuals will experience awe at an Oregonian mountain view. This awe will 
be visceral and universal, she believes. Despite possible natural 
counterexamples, Eaton sees convention as extremely important in forming the 
majority of aesthetic judgments, which makes it an important feature to consider 
here.85 
On Eaton’s view, aesthetic judgments might be partly biological in 
origin. Here she again cites natural examples, suggesting that an attraction to 
particular types of landscapes could be tied to a connection the viewer sees 
between those particular features and a primal ability to survive.86 This would 
make us prefer sights of running water and lush vegetation to barren desert 
scenes. However, she holds that the vast majority of our aesthetic judgments 
cannot be explained in terms of biological function.  Most aesthetic judgments, 
she says, are deeply embedded in a culture that has taught us to understand and 
react to artworks in particular ways. There is almost always, Eaton says, a 
“social determination to the way in which a person reacts aesthetically to objects 
or events.”87 
Eaton supports this view by pointing out that an individual’s judgment of 
a work is informed by the elements she has been trained to look for in the work. 
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In a culture where there is no convention in place to pick out a particular 
aesthetic feature, that feature will go unrecognized.88 She says: 
The particular properties to which individuals attend when they have 
what they recognize as aesthetic experiences differ from culture to 
culture and even within cultures as subcultures develop. Wine 
connoisseurs attend closely to features of what they drink that 
nonconnoisseurs not only disregard but also fail to notice at all.”89 
 
Wine connoisseurs are formally trained to attend to particular features of wine, 
and to evaluate them according to standards established by the community in 
which they operate. Eaton’s point goes much further than that, however. We all, 
professional critics and those who have received formal training in aesthetic 
evaluation as well as the unschooled masses, bring to our aesthetic evaluations 
presumptions and understandings that are steeped in our culture.  
One of the most basic and overlooked conventions that informs aesthetic 
evaluation is language. To judge a work of poetry or prose, one must understand 
not only the language itself, but also the particular linguistic conventions at play 
in the work. Further, Eaton argues that a mastery of technical aesthetic terms is 
needed for many aesthetic evaluations. She says: 
One is not born able to distinguish a fugue from a gigue, nor an early 
from a late Indian Buddha figure. Doing so depends on acquiring a very 
specialized vocabulary. Appreciating these things, and the differences 
between them, is also language dependent, as is the particular response 
shaped by the words used to describe something.”90 
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 94 
In addition to the technical vocabulary needed to engage in specific 
critical evaluation within a genre, conventions are often needed to even begin to 
take in and process artworks. It is convention that tells us to read stories from 
left to right, and to understand a sketchy stick figure as a representation of a 
human being. Avant-garde film conventions prime us to expect non-linear story 
telling from David Lynch, and allow us to make aesthetic judgments about a 
work like Eraserhead through an understanding of metaphorical meanings and 
an acceptance that the main storyline might unfold in a temporally disjointed 
fashion. Unfamiliarity with the conventions of a particular genre can lead to a 
judgment based on misconceptions about how a work is to be encountered.  
What’s more, conventional differences will lead to radically different 
judgments of a single work between cultures and subcultures. While the 
differences between cultures are likely to be vast, perhaps of greatest interest are 
the variations in judgment within a single culture, based on differing 
conventional understandings. Eaton gives the example of rap music making 
some feel hope while arousing fear in others.91 Without knowledge that Chevy 
Chase’s delivery of the news on Weekend Update is presented as satire, one is 
likely to judge his performance as incompetent, uninformed, and grossly 
unprofessional. Knowledge of the conventions in play in a production of 
Saturday Night Live will lead to a very different judgment of the work than 
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would come from an evaluation based on the conventions of standard news 
broadcasting.  
Consider individuals’ differing judgments of two works based on their 
understanding of different conventions at play between the works. Richard 
Brooks’ In Cold Blood is far less bloody and graphic than Rob Zombie’s 
Halloween II.92 Both works are visually riveting, and involve excellent use of 
cinematographic techniques. However, the same viewer is likely to evaluate In 
Cold Blood with far more horror and sadness than Halloween II, due to the 
conventional expectations brought to the viewing of each film. Those schooled 
in the art of horror movie watching are trained to approach the films with a 
hearty understanding of make-believe, embracing the gruesomeness and 
enjoying the terror through a recognition that it is all in good fun – that it is not 
real. The conventions brought to bear when viewing In Cold Blood, however, 
are quite different. While the viewer expects Halloween II to excel, if it does, by 
taking the viewer on a imaginary nightmare of death and mutilation of epic 
proportions, if In Cold Blood excels, it is by making the viewer experience the 
simple sadness of one family’s murder. Approaching In Cold Blood with horror 
movie conventions in place is certain to leave one disappointed, wondering why 
so few were killed, and so unspectacularly. Approaching Halloween II with In 
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Cold Blood conventions in place, on the other hand, is likely to leave the viewer 
violently ill. 
It is important to note that this account of the role of aesthetic convention 
is not all encompassing. Eaton does not hold that convention is the only factor 
that figures into aesthetic judgment, nor does she argue that it should be. The 
argument is simply that conventions have a heavy influence on our aesthetic 
judgments. The presence of other influencing factors does not present a tension 
for this account. Arguments that something deeper than convention ought to 
inform our evaluations (the presence of mind-independent aesthetic properties, 
for instance, which exist regardless of particular conventions) also do not 
conflict with this descriptive account, which holds that conventions do 
contribute to judgment formations (although non-conventional elements might 
also be at work). 
Violations of established aesthetic conventions can upset our normal 
judgment methods. The normal convention in theatre or film that understands 
the audience as an unseen, omniscient presence looking in on the story is 
violated when an actor breaks the fourth wall. This violation of the convention 
can disrupt one’s understanding of the work, interfering with the suspension of 
disbelief and leading to a modification of one’s aesthetic judgment. We fault 
traditional narratives that contain a heavy amount of repetition and poor 
grammar, but easily accept these characteristics in pop songs, because 
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convention has taught us in what circumstances we are to expect and accept 
these features. 
In this section, I’ve considered the role of convention in the formation of 
our moral and aesthetic judgments. While convention does not get us a complete 
picture of judgment formation, it plays a key role in both initial judgment 
formation and more in depth evaluative elements. A recognition of the genre of 
a work plays a part in determining the way the work is to be understood, and 
technical terms are needed to assess detailed judgments regarding particularly 
nuanced aesthetic concepts. While an understanding of conventions plays an 
integral role in many antirealist accounts, holding that conventions play a role in 
value judgments does not commit one to an antirealist picture. Few deny that 
conventions play some role in the formation of our judgments, and I am not 
asserting that conventions are the only factor in value judgment formation. All 
that is needed to make this point is that conventions are involved in both moral 
and aesthetic judgments, and this position is compatible with both realism and 
antirealism. Now that the role of convention across the fields has been 
established, we have a positive argument in favor of convergence, due to this 
similarity between the fields. In the following section, the role of emotion in 





Moral and aesthetic judgments both involve strong emotional elements, a 
similarity that offers another argument in favor of convergence. In this section, 
the role of emotion in judgment formation will be considered. Jesse Prinz, a 
philosopher of mind and cognitive science, offers several arguments for the 
primacy of emotion in both the moral and the aesthetic realms. Prinz 
understands judgments as divided between evaluative and non-evaluative types, 
and sees emotion as functioning the same way in all evaluative judgments, 
although only moral and aesthetic evaluative judgments are discussed here.93 
Citing psychological and neurological studies to support his position, Prinz 
argues that there can be little dispute that there is a connection between our 
emotional responses and our value judgments. In this section, I will consider 
Prinz’s arguments for the impact of emotion on both moral and aesthetic 
judgments. 
Prinz has argued extensively that evaluative judgments are necessarily 
linked to emotion. He calls on studies from neuroscience and psychology to 
support three theses: 1) emotions co-occur with evaluative judgments; 2) 
emotions influence the content of evaluative judgments; and 3) emotions are 
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necessary for the formation of an evaluative judgment.94 Prinz’s evidence for 
each of these theses will be considered in terms of both moral and aesthetic 
evaluations to reveal the clear similarities between the two fields. 
 Studies of brain activity in test subjects have shown that there is a spike 
in activity in the emotional response portions of the brain when people are called 
upon to make moral judgments, but not what Prinz calls ‘factual judgments.’95 
Subjects are presented with a series of propositions and are asked to judge each 
of them as true or false. Propositions such as “stones are made of water” 
corresponded to no spike in emotional response, while those such as “you 
should break the law when necessary” did coincide with spikes. While this data 
does not demonstrate either that emotion causes moral judgments or that moral 
judgments cause emotional responses, it does present strong evidence of a 
correlation between the two.96  
 As with moral judgments, extensive neurological studies have shown 
elevated brain activity in the emotional response parts of the brains of 
individuals who are being exposed to artworks. In studies, individuals who 
viewed works that they had previously reported to find either very beautiful or 
very ugly had considerably higher levels of activity in those portions of the brain 
than individuals who were not exposed to aesthetic stimuli for which they felt a 
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strong evaluative response. This suggests a correlation between emotion and 
aesthetic judgment, analogous to the correlation between emotion and moral 
judgment.97 
 Prinz’s next thesis, that emotions influence evaluative judgments, is 
supported by psychological studies that demonstrate one’s emotional state 
impacts the force of one’s moral evaluation. Subjects presented with the same 
moral scenario judge the agents more harshly when their negative emotions 
were already charged when the scenario was presented. Subjects who were in 
neutral or positive emotional states evaluated the same scenario with more 
leniency. (If you need convincing, think of the ferocity with which you regard a 
poorly written essay when you’ve made the mistake of sitting down to grade 
papers when cranky.) 
 Here, too, we see a correlation with aesthetic judgments. Test subjects 
were asked to report their mood and then to rank their preferences for a series of 
landscapes. Subjects who reported bad moods preferred landscapes that depicted 
enclosed spaces, while those in good moods gave preference to landscapes 
depicting open spaces.98 This result indicates not only do emotions increase the 
force of one’s judgments, but that different emotions can actually reverse one’s 
preferences. In another study, when shown a series of photographs of the faces 
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of human beings, high-spirited judges offered more generous evaluations of 
beauty than those in bad moods, which triggered more harsh aesthetic judgments 
of the people captured in the photographs.99  
Additionally, in a study described by Prinz, individuals who had strong 
feelings, such as disgust, regarding a particular issue had a more difficult time 
modifying their moral evaluations based on evidence, although it did cause them 
to modify their factual evaluations. When evaluating the permissibility of a case 
of brother-sister incest, for example, subjects would present reasons for 
opposing the practice, such as the fact that it can result in birth defects. Subjects 
were then told that, in this particular case, the siblings were using birth control. 
Subjects then conceded that this was no longer a valid reason to negatively 
evaluate the case, but maintained that it was still immoral “simply because it is 
disgusting.”100  
Finally, Prinz argues that emotions are necessary for the formation of 
evaluative judgments. He points out that we teach moral rules by conditioning 
the moral judgment of acts with negative emotions that fall into three main 
classes – fear, guilt, and abandonment/neglect angst. We learn to negatively 
judge certain actions because we associate them with emotions we hope to 
avoid.101 Positive judgments are learned in the same way – we associate good 
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feelings with the performance or observation of particular acts, and over time we 
begin to evaluate those actions as ‘good.’ Interestingly, though Prinz does not 
point this out, we train animals to conform to particular standards of behavior in 
the same way. 
A vivid aesthetic parallel is presented in Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork 
Orange, in which the main character, Alex DeLarge, is trained to respond 
negatively to Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony after the work has been repeatedly 
paired with drug-induced negative feelings.102 On a more mundane level, many 
people report that songs they previously enjoyed have been ruined for them by 
their close emotional association with a romance gone sour. The negative 
emotions that arise in connection with the artwork might bring with them a 
negative judgment of the work itself, even in cases where the same individual 
reported both positive feelings and a positive evaluation of the artwork at an 
earlier time. It might also be the case that an individual ceases to enjoy the work 
due to such an emotional factor, but continues attribute a positive evaluation to 
it, recognizing that it is her bias that prevents her from enjoying it, rather than a 
flaw in the work itself. 
Prinz holds that to form an evaluative judgment requires an emotional 
response. Certainly we can recite something we’ve memorized, such as “killing 
is wrong,” without reacting emotionally, but this is because we are not really 
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evaluating at that time – we have come to accept the proposition as an inert fact, 
rather than a judgment occurring in our minds right now. When called upon, we 
can recite the fact without emotion. This corresponds with aesthetic judgments 
regarding artworks we’ve already seen and formed judgments about in the past. 
You experienced strong emotions the first time you evaluated the painting that 
now hangs over your mantle. Those emotions caused you to positively judge the 
work. Now, you see it every day. If asked, you will still positively judge the 
painting, though regular exposure has perhaps caused the accompanying 
emotional response to fade or even disappear altogether. 
As a final argument in support of his position that evaluative judgments 
are emotionally triggered, Prinz argues that if moral judgments were not the 
result of emotional responses, “we’d expect more moral convergence cross-
culturally.”103 Normally, when faced with the same data, our judgments 
regarding the truth-value of propositions relating to that data match up. In moral 
evaluations, however, there is a great deal of discrepancy, which Prinz holds can 
be explained best by the differences in our “culturally-inculcated passions.”104 
We all take in the same descriptive data when presented with an instance of 
polygamy, but the strong negative reaction common in America will be largely 
unshared by individuals in, for example, Saudi Arabia. The difference in moral 
judgment, he holds, keys to the differences in the way we were taught the “rule” 
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about the act. In American culture, we are taught from a young age that marital 
exclusivity is paramount, and many of us witness dramatic cases where 
transgressions of monogamy result in fear, guilt, and abandonment/neglect 
angst, as any child of divorce can testify. Alternatively, individuals who grow up 
in environments where no social stigma or negative emotional feelings are 
connected with polygamy will take in the same data and judge it neutrally, or 
even positively. 
Clear parallels of the phenomena described above can be found within 
aethetics. Those trained to appreciate classical music often have a hard time 
enjoying pop music, which triggers a negative emotional response connected 
with a negative attitude toward the music by one’s peer group. Individuals raised 
on rock and roll tend to react viscerally against country music, again, often 
because of feelings of animosity and competition between one’s own peer 
group, which endorses rock and roll, and a rival peer group, which favors 
country music. We often value works because of the emotional response they 
bring to our minds. When we encounter a work that is far removed from our 
experiences, we are likely to fail to have a strong emotional response, and thus 
to be unmoved by the work, resulting in a lukewarm evaluative judgment. The 
gap is even wider cross-culturally, with listeners or viewers frequently left cold 
by works which lack a culturally induced emotional trigger for them. 
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If Prinz is correct, negative emotions trigger negative moral evaluations, 
and positive emotions trigger positive moral evaluations. When it comes to 
artworks, however, we are far more likely to experience a negative emotional 
response and yet form a positive aesthetic evaluation. This is probably due to 
our ability to disconnect the emotions that are triggered by the art from real life 
experience, which causes us to have a positive emotional response to what 
would under normal circumstances be negative, such as the “good” fear 
experienced at a horror movie, or the “good” sadness felt at a tear-jerker. In 
aesthetic as well as moral evaluation, however, Prinz holds that emotions are 
integral to the evaluative judgment that a viewer accepts. He explains, “all of the 
good-making features of a work are added together and combined with the bad-
making features, and the result is an over-all level of goodness (or badness), 
which is what we report when we verbally appraise the work as good or bad.”105 
 
As was the case regarding convention, the thesis that emotion plays a 
role in both ethics and aesthetics does not necessitate a commitment to realism 
or antirealism. What it does demonstrate is another clear similarity between 
moral and aesthetic judgments, offering another reason to favor a convergence 
position.  
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(II.c.3) Hume on Evaluative Judgments  
 
The language of divergence and convergence was not available to Hume, 
but he clearly accepts a convergence account of ethics and aesthetics, which 
stems largely from his understanding of the dual influence of reason and 
emotion in the formation of both moral and aesthetic judgments. In this section, 
I will offer Hume’s account of evaluative judgment formation, explaining his 
view of the way humans’ natural tendency to prefer utility lends a high degree of 
uniformity to our judgments. 
Hume begins his account of evaluative judgment formation by 
acknowledging that there are good arguments to support the position that 
evaluative judgments are formed through reason, and there are also good 
arguments that they’re formed through sentiment (what we would call 
‘emotion,’ which is how I will refer to the concept in this paper), and that 
neither offers a complete account. Hume says that since the arguments for both 
are good but incomplete, it is reasonable to conclude that both reason and 
emotion are involved in nearly all evaluative judgments. To fully understand the 
way reason and emotion combine to produce evaluative judgments, a third 
element is needed. Hume describes this element as an “internal sense or feeling, 
which nature has made universal in the whole species.”106 This extra component 
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has two roles: it informs our reason and feeds our emotions, and it accounts for 
the similarities between individual judgments. Hume does not give a name to 
this “internal sense”; I will refer to it as ‘natural inclination.’  
Hume holds that the particular response a given individual might have to 
an action or artwork will initially be determined by emotion, which is subjective. 
He says, “Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind 
which contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty.”107 Yet, 
Hume holds that the emotions of different human beings exhibit a great deal of 
similarity, due to humanity’s natural inclination to prefer sense objects and 
events that promote or exemplify utility. Reason informs and corrects our 
natural inclinations and tempers emotion. 
 As we form judgments, Hume thinks that our emotions sometimes need 
to be aroused through an intuition pump, done by ascertaining the facts of the 
situation, examining relevant relations, and making comparisons between the 
present case and previous ones. Thus, all three elements come together, and 
correct each other, in moral and aesthetic deliberation. Reason is needed to 
gather information and conduct analyses, but lacks motivational force. Emotion 
is beneficial at arousing our interest, but can also be overwhelming, causing our 
judgments to run awry. While Hume insists that our value judgments need to be 
founded on empirical grounds – what he calls “fact and observation” – he 
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clearly also thinks emotion is needed to get things going, with natural inclination 
providing the common element that contributes to the uniformity he sees in 
human evaluative judgments.  
 Regarding aesthetic judgment formation specifically, Hume explains, 
“…in many orders of beauty…it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order 
to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by 
argument and reflection.”108 Given that Hume says emotions are subjective, his 
view that there is such a thing as a “proper” emotion can seem puzzling. The 
proper emotion, on this account, will be the one that is shared by other human 
beings, based on our natural inclinations, and informed by reason. For example, 
natural inclination arouses the emotion of fear at the sight of a snake, because 
snakes have the potential to present a real danger to us. This explains why many 
people fear snakes – we are naturally inclined to do so. However, in some 
contexts, reason will intervene and temper our emotional response. If the snake 
is safely confined at a zoo, or is an artistic representation of a snake, rather than 
a live one, reason will overcome our natural inclination to fear the snake, 
allowing us to form a more clear judgment. 
 Hume explains that we can trust our moral judgments through a quick 
thought experiment – if we would want a quality to be ascribed to us, it is a good 
one, and if we wouldn’t, it is not, and he thinks our gut-level judgments will 
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match up in this regard. For instance, we all want to think of ourselves as honest, 
even when we know we are not in all cases, so honesty is a good quality for a 
person to have. Likewise, no one wants to be considered greedy, making that a 
negative quality. From these initial assessments of particular character traits, 
Hume thinks we can then go on to determine the principles of moral 
judgment.109 He emphasizes his belief that starting with broad principles that are 
then applied to particular cases in order to form judgments is ineffective, 
because we won’t be able to agree about the principles at the outset. Instead, we 
must begin with particulars, see what is common, and reason backwards to 
principles. By starting with common intuitions, we’re able to work back to 
shared principles. 
 Although the thought experiment used to determine good personal 
attributes in the moral case does not directly transfer over to aesthetics, a 
reasonable parallel can be found. Regarding moral qualities, we label as “good” 
those we would like attributed to ourselves. Regarding aesthetic qualities, then, 
good ones will be those that we would like to directly experience – good 
artworks are the ones I would like to look at or listen to, and bad ones are the 
ones I would rather avoid.  
 Once he’s established the qualities we understand as good, Hume 
wonders why this is the case. Why do I want to be seen as honest but not greedy? 
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Why are there “particular forms or qualities…calculated to please, and others to 
displease”?110 Hume thinks that further examination shows that it all boils down 
to utility. We are naturally pleased to see things functioning usefully. “When a 
building seems clumsy and tottering to the eye, it is ugly and disagreeable.”111 
Hume sees poor architecture as running contrary to utility because it will lead to 
diminished comfort for the inhabitants of that structure. “The eye is pleased with 
the prospect of corn-fields and loaded vineyards; horses grazing; and flocks 
pasturing: but flies the view of briars and brambles, affording shelter to wolves 
and serpents.”112  It’s important that the utility we prefer is that which is useful 
to us, either as individuals or as a species, as Hume rejects the utility of the 
briars and brambles that house wolves and snakes. Presumably, the snakes and 
wolves prefer the briars and brambles to the loaded vineyards, as these things 
are more useful to them. 
 Hume, writing before the development of non-representational art styles, 
had no trouble fitting artworks into this picture. Art is beautiful to the extent that 
it represents the useful, understood in terms of health, life, flourishing, or as a 
commentary on these elements, which might also be accomplished through a 
representation of their opposites, to call attention to the lack of utility as a way 
of appreciating it where it is present (the representation of sickness makes us 
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understand the goodness of health). Today, in an art world filled with the likes 
of Mark Rothko, Piet Mondrian, and Franz Kline, Hume’s is a harder case to 
make.  It looks as if our appreciation of a great many artworks is difficult to 
explain in utilitarian terms.  
 Though it would hardly be fair to fault Hume for his inability to 
anticipate the advent of non-representational art, an account of aesthetic 
judgment that relies heavily on Hume’s understanding of human attraction to 
utility would need to offer some explanation of the way that might work in non-
representational pieces. One response is to suggest that, even in non-
representational art, humans tend to be drawn to certain elements, such as the 
Golden Ratio. While some might hold that we are attracted to the Golden Ratio 
because it is inherently beautiful, a Humean could respond that the ratio is 
pleasing to us because we recognize its utility in other instances. We prefer 
human beings that conform to the Golden Ratio because its proportions 
correspond to good health. We are drawn to architecture that employs it because 
of the stability it provides in construction. That same ratio, when present in non-
representational art, is naturally pleasing to us, even though we might be unable 
to articulate the reason. We recognize that the Golden Ratio is good by virtue of 
its relation to health in the human form, as well as in flowers and snails’ shells, 
and good by virtue of its relation to stability in architecture. From there, we 
draw a natural inference to its goodness in something like Mondrian’s 
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“Composition in Red, Yellow, and Blue,” which triggers a positive emotional 
response, even if we are unable to articulate why (if we are unaware of the 
concept of the Golden Ratio).113 
While the above account might explain an attraction to many non-
representational artworks, it probably cannot account for all of them. Hume 
might respond that, in these cases, brute emotion takes over, triggering a purely 
imaginative response. While this might not be the most satisfactory answer, my 
account, which is given in detail below, does not face a problem on this front, as 
I hold that emotion, convention, and reason combine with the human tendency 
to favor utility. Our value judgments are a result of a complex combination of 
factors, with utility preferences playing an important but not essential role. In 
cases of non-representational art, I hold that judgments are sometimes 
independent of assessments of utility.  
 Regarding judgments of moral behavior, Hume holds that an 
examination of particular character traits reveals the same underlying preference 
for the useful that he identified regarding aesthetic judgments. Humans value 
benevolence because it benefits us when we receive it. Hume offers charitable 
activities as an example. Applying the thought experiment described above, we 
want to see ourselves as charitable, which tells us that charity is a good character 
trait. Why? Because, when we imagine ourselves in the recipient’s shoes we feel 
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sympathy, and hope that we would receive charity if needed. However, if we 
sense that the recipients are taking advantage of the charity we react negatively, 
because we do not place ourselves into those shoes – if the recipient is seen as 
someone we do not want to be, we no longer understand that person as 
deserving of help.114 
 As an example of the underlying preference for utility that informs our 
moral judgments, Hume discusses justice, which he understands as ensuring that 
each individual has his due regarding property and rights.115 He argues that we 
value justice in periods of moderate scarcity. We do not value a just distribution 
of materials that are available in abundance, like air, because utility is not 
increased by meting it out fairly or policing who owns it when there are ample 
amounts for everyone. Likewise, in periods of extreme scarcity, honoring justice 
reduces utility, and our preference for it is thus discarded. He says: 
Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that 
the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the greater number 
from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; it will readily, I 
believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such 
a pressing emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity 
and self-preservation. Is it any crime, after a shipwreck, to seize 
whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without 
regard to former limitations of property?116 
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Although justice is normally considered a good, Hume points out that such cases 
demonstrate that justice is only valued as a means to achieve the more primary 
value of utility.  
 The shipwreck example shows that the value we place on justice is based 
on particular circumstances. Most of the time we live in a condition of moderate 
scarcity, and in that situation, justice tends to promote social utility. In situations 
at either end of the spectrum, however – extreme scarcity or abundance – justice 
actually works against social utility, and is thus discarded.117 Hume also notes 
that we only value social utility when it is actually possible to achieve it. In 
extreme cases, where no action can save the group, we fall back on the more 
modest goal of self-preservation.118 The values we apply to particular qualities, 
then, are context-dependent, on Hume’s account. He says: 
…the rules of equity or justice depend entirely on the particular state and 
condition in which men are placed, and owe their origin and existence to 
that utility, which results to the public from their strict and regular 
observance. Reverse, in any considerable circumstance, the condition of 
men: Produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity…By rendering 
justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and 
suspend its obligation upon mankind.119 
 
 As Hume’s view regarding justice demonstrates his understanding of 
utility’s influence on moral judgments, his discussion of balance reveals his 
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view regarding the influence of utility on aesthetic judgments. He says: “There 
is no rule in painting more reasonable than that of balancing the figures, and 
placing them with the greatest exactness on the proper center of gravity. A 
figure, which is not justly ballanc’d, is disagreeable, and that because it conveys 
the ideas of its fall, of harm, and of pain.”120 In art, as in life, Hume holds that 
we delight in the useful, and are naturally drawn to images that arouse feelings 
we find pleasing in life, such as stability and health. Artworks that bring to our 
imagination associations of angst we will find displeasing.  
 Hume must respond to the clear fact that not all artworks that are 
pleasing to many people portray the order and balance that is useful in life. He 
argues that, when we form positive aesthetic judgments regarding works that 
bring to our imaginations ideas that run counter to utility, these judgments are 
formed not because of these factors, but in spite of them. He says: 
Ariosto pleases; but not by his monstrous and improbable fictions…[or] 
by the want of coherence in his stories….He charms by the force and 
clearness of his expression, by the readiness and variety of his 
inventions, and by his natural pictures of the passions…; and however 
his faults may diminish our satisfaction, they are not able entirely to 
destroy it.121 
 
In such cases, then, we are attracted to elements of utility as they exist alongside 
elements of disorder. Reason allows us to recognize the artwork as a work of 
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fancy, rather than reality, and thus our minds permit enjoyment of elements we 
would find repellant if encountered in life. 
It’s important to note that Hume doesn’t think morality or art criticism 
arose because people recognized their social usefulness. Rather, he holds that we 
have a natural inclination to prefer the useful, before reason or education points 
us in that direction. To put it another way, Hume doesn’t think we first 
recognized the usefulness of particular qualities and then built a moral or 
aesthetic code around them. Instead, he thinks we are intuitively drawn to things 
that are useful, before we cognitively process their utility.122 Hume explains this 
phenomenon in terms of either a direct experience of an object’s goodness, or 
indirectly, through our ability to empathize as we recognize the object’s 
goodness by putting ourselves in someone else’s shoes. The ability to empathize 
is a trait that Hume recognizes as the key to both moral and aesthetic agreement. 
The peculiarities of individual emotion, triggered by particulars of our past 
experience, might cause us to be initially unmoved by a particular work. Upon 
seeing the pleasure it causes our peers, however, we are moved to investigate 
further, to see what it is that causes the positive reaction we initially failed to 
experience. 
 We are personally affected by the fortunes of others. Both laughs and 
tears are contagious. We are directly, sometimes viscerally moved by the 
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experiences of others, be they dear to us or total strangers. It’s hard to hear about 
an outbreak of lice at the local daycare without scratching your scalp, even if 
you are not acquainted with any of the infected parties. Fiction has such power 
to captivate and move us because we are the type of being that is extremely 
good at imagining ourselves having the experiences that we observe other 
people having. Interestingly, Hume seems to think we can relate to other 
humans, even those far removed from us in space and time, but that we are not 
likewise moved by the fortunes of other species.123  
 Hume understands sympathy as the origin of most of our aesthetic 
attraction. As an example, he describes our appreciation of architecture, which 
he holds pleases us not only because of the usefulness we imagine it could bring 
ourselves, but because we recognize the usefulness it can have for others. 
Aesthetic experience, which leads to aesthetic judgment, involves an 
imaginative engagement with, in some cases, the artist, and in other cases, the 
subject of the work. He says, “We enter into his interest by the force of 
imagination, and feel the same satisfaction, that the objects naturally occasion in 
him.”124 We judge narrative works through the imaginative act of placing 
ourselves in the protagonists’ shoes. In works that have no subject, such as 
architectural works, we instead form judgments based on our appreciation of the 
usefulness of the structures for those who will inhabit or otherwise use them. 
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 Although Hume thinks it is part of our nature to be pleased by that which 
promotes the social good,125 he holds that social usefulness varies depending on 
custom and situation, so the qualities we value change over time. For example, 
in some historical circumstances, physical strength was valued much more, and 
considered to be more essential, than it is in today’s computer age, when 
intellectual ability is at a premium.126 Likewise, some qualities valued in 
artworks change over time, with modern sensibilities accepting qualities such as 
the stream of consciousness of James Joyce’s Ulysses that previous generations 
of audiences would have found difficult to stomach. 
 While Hume does say that in times of extreme scarcity we will abandon 
social utility in favor of personal preservation, he emphasizes that his theory is 
not egoism. Private virtues such as prudence and temperance are naturally 
pleasing to us when we observe them in others. Hume says that, though such 
virtues are good for those who possess them, they cannot be of benefit to others. 
Thus, it must be that we simply find people who possess useful qualities 
pleasing, regardless of whether they are good for us personally.127 It seems to 
me, however, that private virtues do benefit others. All things considered, we 
prefer to be around the prudent and temperate more than the imprudent and 
intemperate, for a variety of reasons. A prudent individual is more likely to give 
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good counsel and to have money to lend if we need it; temperate people are less 
likely to drag you into bar fights and eat all the Oreos. Thus, we can understand 
the preference Hume recognizes for those who possess virtues that are not 
characteristically socially-minded in terms of both the empathetic response 
discussed above, as well as an understanding of the way those qualities, 
possessed by those around us, might prove useful for us as well as their 
possessors. 
 In this section I have offered an account of Hume’s understanding of 
evaluative judgment formation, based on a combination of reason and emotion, 
informed by natural inclination, which Hume sees as the key that allows humans 
to form the same or similar value judgments, despite variations in emotion, 
reason, and education. Hume believes humans are naturally drawn to useful 
qualities, with social utility thus forming the base of our evaluative systems. 
Because utility is context dependent, preferred qualities will differ depending on 
the situation. The typical list of virtues and aesthetically valuable features 
includes qualities that are usually useful, but the value of the qualities is not 
absolute – in situations where a quality, such as justice, actually works against 
utility, Hume believes humans will intuitively reject it. Of particular importance 
in Hume’s account is his thesis that preferences are based on utility, and that 
utility differs depending on context. What promotes utility for one individual 
does not necessarily promote utility for another. Hume thinks social utility 
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trumps personal utility, but that doesn’t get us out of every sticky spot, because 
we have different ideas about what would best promote social utility. Because of 
this, the idea of social utility ultimately boils down to another form of personal 
utility, as agents seek to promote their own conception of the social good. The 
similarities between the two fields offer a positive argument for convergence, as 
they demonstrate that our moral and aesthetic beliefs share a common starting 
point.  
(II.d) My Account 
 In the preceding section, I have presented accounts of moral and 
aesthetic judgment formation that include conventionalist, emotional, and 
rational elements, as well as an account holding that the commonalities among 
evaluative judgments can be explained in terms of a natural biological 
inclination towards utility. I hold that each of those elements plays an important 
role in the formation of our value judgments. In this section, I will offer my 
account of value judgment formation, which includes all four of these elements. 
While my account finds points of agreement with each of the philosophers 
discussed in the previous sections, I argue that my position is to be preferred 
because it takes into consideration each of the most common factors involved in 
the process of judgment formation. I will first discuss the individual elements of 
judgment formation, followed by an analysis of the ways in which these 
elements interact as we form and modify our evaluations. This step is important 
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to demonstrate that the elements interact in relevantly similar ways in moral and 
aesthetic evaluations. Next, I will discuss two levels at which our judgments 
might occur. We can judge an action or artwork based on already established 
conventions, or we can judge the conventions themselves. On this level of 
judgment, we can also evaluate actions directly but, rather than judging solely 
according to conventions, we might also factor in some of the other elements of 
judgment, and thus form a judgment that runs contrary to the conventional 
answer. I will explain how it is appropriate to form judgments on each of these 
two levels, to demonstrate not only that we do evaluate in relevantly similar 
ways in both ethics and aesthetics, but also that it is appropriate to do so. As 
proper moral and aesthetic judgments are formed in the same ways, this account 
offers a positive argument for convergence. 
Convention 
 I hold that conventions can play several roles in our evaluative 
judgments. First, they give us a framework for thinking about a work or an act, 
and thus are usually the basis for our initial evaluative judgments. Some 
examples might make this more clear. Consider an encounter with artwork x. 
For starters, convention is going to be the element tipping us off that x is an 
artwork rather than something else, which will have a strong influence on the 
way we judge it.  If I encounter something that appears to be food on display in 
an art gallery, I will evaluate it differently than I would if something visually 
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identical showed up on my dinner plate (although what is on my plate might be 
art as well). The gallery setting will tell me (unless I receive specific instructions 
to the contrary) that x is to be judged based on its visual elements, rather than its 
taste. Without this conventional tip-off, I would begin my judgment of x from a 
very different starting point – thinking about it in terms of a food item, rather 
than as an artwork.  
 Likewise, conventions such as literary genres often help begin our 
judgment formations of written works.  Consider a book called Nanny Ogg’s 
Cookbook.128 Were this book shelved in what seems like the reasonable place – 
the cookbook section – judges would encounter the work with the expectation 
that it was providing real, meant-to-be-prepared recipes, and would evaluate the 
book based largely on the strength of those recipes (though other factors, such as 
presentation, might also be considered). However, if this book is encountered in 
the humor section at a bookstore, a quite different evaluation will ensue. Rather 
than judging the book based on the strength of its recipes, the reader will 
evaluate the work based on its ability to amuse. Convention provides the set up 
for the subsequent evaluation. 
 Of course, the external setting in which a work is found provides only 
the initial conditioning for how we will encounter a work. Other data, internal to 
the work, will also trigger particular judgments. An evaluator who, due to 
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external data, initially understood Nanny Ogg’s Cookbook according to standard 
cookbook conventions would be likely to modify that understanding upon 
realizing that most of the recipes, if attempted, would lead to either disgusting or 
impossible-to-prepare dishes, but that the commentary and motherly advice 
offered by Nanny Ogg nestles the work securely in the category of humorous 
fiction. External conventions such as the location and manner of presentation 
offer initial conventional clues regarding the way a work will be judged. Those 
conventions are then either bolstered or corrected by internal data, which will 
more securely situate the work within a conventional setting. 
 Conventions also help set evaluative judgments regarding moral issues.  
As the genre conventions set the parameters for what would be acceptable 
within Nanny Ogg’s Cookbook, societal conventions determine the range of 
what is considered to be acceptable moral behavior. Consider the issue of 
corporal punishment in schools. In the late 1960s, caning was a common, 
acceptable form of punishment within the British school system. According to 
the convention in that time and place, the acceptability of caning was not the 
question; rather, caning was assumed to be acceptable, and the moral debate 
centered on the manner and severity of the practice. The consensus suggested 
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that children should not be forced to disrobe in order to be caned, and that the 
punishment should stop short of leaving welts or bruises on the skin.129  
Before we congratulate ourselves for the moral progress we have made 
since the 1960’s, it should be noted that corporal punishment of students in the 
public school setting is legal in 23 states in the U.S. today. Nearly a quarter of a 
million students were physically punished at school during the 2006-2007 
academic year, according to the American Civil Liberties Union and the Human 
Rights Watch. This data is supported by evidence from the United States 
Department of Education. There are reports of elementary school students being 
hit by their teachers with belts, rulers, “a set of rulers taped together,” and toy 
hammers. They are pushed, slapped, grabbed hard enough to leave bruises, and 
dragged across the floor. Many of the students subjected to this treatment are 
disabled.130 According to a national poll, slightly over a quarter of Americans 
support some form of corporal punishment in schools.131 
Evaluative response to such behavior is extremely divided. For 
individuals steeped in a culture terrified of child abuse, where children are 
encouraged to report any potentially inappropriate physical encounters, the 
                                                
129 “Education: The Cane or the Strap,” Time, September 8, 1967. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,899793,00.html  
130 Stephey, M.J. “Corporal Punishment in U.S. Schools,” Time, August 12, 2009. 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1915820,00.html  
131 Crandall, Julie. “Support for Spanking: Most Americans Think Corporal Punishment is OK,” 
ABC News Analysis, November 8, 2009. 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/spanking_poll021108.html  
 125 
question of how hard a teacher may strike a student is not even on the table. 
Convention prepares individuals to accept or reject certain practices. In a culture 
that assumes teachers have the authority to physically punish students, most 
people will accept the practice in general, and quibble about the particulars. This 
explains why the practice continues in many schools today. Teachers and 
parents were physically punished as children, and in turn continue the practice 
with little thought that it might be immoral. In an environment that forbids the 
physical punishment of children by anyone other than their parents, however, 
most people will reject the practice out of hand, without even considering the 
particulars of its execution. 
I argue that our evaluative judgments regarding the corporal punishment 
of children in schools are determined partly by convention. This is not to say 
that these influences entirely determine our views; certainly we can reject the 
norms of our society and respond negatively to the beliefs of our peer group. I 
argue merely that cultural influences feed into our evaluative judgments, and as 
such, a reaction against the conventions we live under will require extra steps, as 
we recognize the convention, consider its appropriateness, and choose to reject 
it. Those who do not go through those reflections and analyses are far more 
likely to stick with the conventional judgment that their society or peer group 
has handed to them. The interaction between convention and the other 
evaluative elements will be discussed in detail below. 
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 To consider another example, dietary conventions have an extremely 
heavy influence on what an evaluator will see as morally acceptable to eat. 
France, Germany, Italy and many other European countries have no taboo 
against the consumption of horse meat, though there have long been strong 
social sanctions against the practice in the United States. Though horses are 
slaughtered in the same way as cows, and are similar in constitution and 
intelligence, the vast majority of Americans accept the rigid convention that tells 
us the practice of killing and eating cows is acceptable, but killing and eating 
horses is not. While some might find the prospect of eating horsemeat 
disgusting, yet not immoral, it clearly is a moral issue for many. Amid 
passionate support from hundreds of American and international individuals and 
organizations, the American Horse Slaughter Prevention Act overwhelmingly 
passed in a House of Representative vote in 2006. This bill, which never went to 
vote in the Senate, sought not only to eliminate the slaughter of horses for 
human consumption, but also to prevent the sale of horses for this purpose.132 
Such an organized effort to change national law strongly suggests those 
individuals in support of the bill considered the consumption of horsemeat to be 
more than merely disgusting, but a matter of moral concern, worth considerable 
effort to prevent. 
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 Despite the usefulness and power of conventions, they can never give us 
a complete picture of judgment formation, for a couple of reasons. First, 
although conventions serve as a starting point in our moral and aesthetic 
evaluations, we can always choose to reject them. This might happen because 
we believe the conventions to be baseless or arbitrary, or because we see reasons 
to prefer a new or different conventional schema. Second, we know that 
conventions don’t provide a rock bottom grounding for our judgments, because 
conventions themselves arise from sets of judgments made by groups over time, 
and change as the judgments made by the groups change. As convention does 
not offer a full picture of judgment formation, other contributing factors must be 
considered. 
Emotion 
 Like Prinz and Hume, I hold that emotion has a strong influence on our 
moral and aesthetic judgment formations. Emotion contributes heavily to our 
response to and motivation regarding moral and aesthetic judgments. The ability 
of an artwork to elicit a strong positive emotional response will contribute to the 
likelihood that we will return to the work, in order to experience more of that 
positive emotion. Negative emotions might also be sought out in the context of 
artworks, for catharsis. Craving more of the emotion an artwork led us to 
experience, we might seek out other works that we believe will have similar 
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emotional impacts on us. These works might share a theme, or have been 
produced by the same artist. 
 Emotion influences our motivations regarding moral judgments as well. 
A strong negative emotional response to an act could prompt a desire to punish 
the agent, or to correct the perceived wrong perpetrated on the victim. This 
motivation comes from a desire to act so as to minimize the negative emotion, 
and to avoid future incidents of it. Likewise, strong positive emotional responses 
contribute to a desire on the part of the evaluator to praise the agent and to 
replicate the action, in order to produce more of that positive feeling. The 
element of emotion in moral and aesthetic judgment formation plays the 
important role of explaining the way in which these judgments contribute to our 
subsequent actions. 
 How are emotions and conventions related in our judgment formations? 
Conventions are sometimes formed based on emotional responses. For instance, 
the taboo against eating horses in America arose because of the close 
relationship early Americans had with horses. As animals used for work and 
transportation, people often formed close bonds with their horses, and as such 
saw them more as companions – like cats and dogs – than as dinner. Thus, a 
convention against eating horses developed, based on an emotional aversion to 
eating the same species of animal that you name, groom, and spend hours riding 
around on. 
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 Today, however, most Americans have as little interaction with horses as 
they do cows. At this point, the aversion most Americans have to eating 
horsemeat stems not from an understanding of a companion relationship with 
horses, but from the convention, which, throughout our lifetimes, has told us that 
horses are not food. This example shows the complicated relationship between 
convention and emotion. Emotion can play a role in setting conventions, but 
even in the absence of emotion the convention will often stick, and an action can 
trigger an emotional response simply by virtue of the fact that it violates the 
convention. 
Reason 
A third ingredient in moral and aesthetic judgments is reason. Reason is 
our attempt, in some cases, to make sense of the other elements that go into the 
formation of our judgments, and in other cases, when we see those other 
elements as flawed, to resist them. For instance, reason might help us to 
recognize that we are forming judgments about a particular matter based on an 
arbitrary convention. Realizing that the convention is arbitrary can open the door 
to its rejection, and the adoption of a new judgment. Recognizing the role of 
reason in judgment is not going to be sufficient to get us to realism, but reason 
can help improve our judgments in a couple of ways.  
One of the biggest ways reason can improve our moral and aesthetic 
judgments is by helping us to eliminate inconsistencies between our judgments. 
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If I have formed the judgment that it is never morally acceptable to kill a human 
being, and I have also formed the judgment that it is morally acceptable to kill 
human beings in war, I hold inconsistent beliefs. Reason can both help me to see 
that this is a problem and also help me to find a way out of it, by revising one or 
both of those beliefs to achieve consistency. Perhaps I really think it is morally 
acceptable to kill people who are guilty, or maybe I think it is morally 
acceptable to kill people in the name of saving more lives overall. Alternatively, 
maybe I really do think it’s immoral ever to kill human beings, in which case I 
need to revise my judgment to hold that it is immoral to kill human beings in 
wartime.  
Reason can also help us to get clear on what it is we personally value, so 
that we can then work toward a coherent individual belief system based on those 
values. It is at this point that my account differs most sharply with Humean 
accounts, which hold that humans’ belief systems will be quite similar to one 
another. As my hybrid understanding of evaluative judgments shares much in 
common with the Humean picture, it is worth taking some time to discuss some 
important differences between my view and a Humean account. The primary 
place that I part ways with the Humean regards our understandings of human 
nature.  
The Humean position is that there is a great deal of uniformity in the 
natural inclinations of human beings. These accounts hold that this uniformity is 
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the route by which people’s moral and aesthetic judgments line up with each 
other, despite differences in convention and emotion. Although I agree with the 
Humean position that humans will often share inclinations based on biological 
similarities, I do not see the widespread agreement across humanity regarding 
moral and aesthetic judgments that is described in Humean accounts.  
Humean accounts hold that humans naturally prefer utility. He combines 
that claim with the view that we are naturally sympathetic creatures. These two 
elements lead us to favorably judge objects and events that are useful, both to 
ourselves and to others. On this view, then, we will negatively judge acts that we 
understand as diminishing utility to ourselves and, through sympathetic 
extension, to others. If this position were correct, any time an individual 
correctly identified an act that resulted in diminished utility, that act would 
receive a negative evaluation. I hold that this does not actually occur nearly as 
often as the Humean claims. 
Take, for example, acts that cause pain. While not all acts that cause pain 
lead to decreased utility (dental work is a ready counterexample), there is 
certainly a strong correlation between the infliction of pain and diminished 
utility. Individuals who are suffering are less likely to be able to satisfy their 
desires or contribute to social interests. This would seem to be a fairly 
straightforward intuition, shared by those who have a personal aversion to 
suffering themselves, which would include all or nearly all human beings. Like 
 132 
the Humean, I recognize that many people have a strong tendency to empathize. 
We observe the experiences and emotional states of others and, to the degree to 
which we see ourselves as like those others, we imagine ourselves in their place. 
This leads to evaluative judgments along the lines that, if the act is one that I 
would not like done to me, it is a bad act, regardless of who is involved. 
There are two problems with the Humean thesis, as I see it. First, 
convention and emotion can cause us to understand others as relevantly unlike 
ourselves, in which case we will lack the sympathy that would have led to a 
judgment based on what we see as good for ourselves being good for others as 
well. For many years, convention convinced the majority of white Americans 
that African Americans were relevantly unlike themselves so as to justify a 
treatment that they would not have found acceptable for themselves. Today, 
most people feel likewise regarding the non-human animals that they use as 
resources.  
Some of this evaluative disagreement might be explained in terms of 
disagreements regarding factual matters. Misinformation can lead to judgments 
that are later retracted upon receipt of new evidence. A Catholic school child, 
told that embryos are microscopic, yet fully formed, sentient human infants at 
the moment of conception, might form a judgment regarding the morality of 
stem cell research and abortion that is later modified when that information is 
discovered to be false. Yet factual discrepancies cannot account for all cases in 
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which our sympathy fails to assign value judgments to acts that are reflective of 
our own preferences for treatment based on utility.  
There is little scientific disagreement regarding the facts of porcine 
physiology and cognition. Pigs are frequent subjects of experimentation, as their 
internal structure is quite similar to that of humans. Their skin sunburns, like 
ours. Their intelligence is comparable to that of dogs. Most people, if not 
already aware of these facts, report some surprise when they learn them. These 
facts might be sufficient to cause a small number of individuals to change the 
evaluative judgment, “it is morally acceptable to eat pigs” to the evaluative 
judgment, “it is morally unacceptable to eat pigs,” based on their recognition 
that pigs feel pain much the way humans do, and that they themselves would not 
like to be eaten. Most, however, take in this data, accept it as factually true, but 
are not led to modify their value judgment regarding the moral permissibility of 
eating pigs. Why not? 
I hold that, in a great many cases, our sympathy is overpowered by a 
collection of other preferences. If called upon to think carefully about the plight 
of the pigs, most people manage to dredge up some sympathetic feelings. 
However, those feelings are easily overpowered by a great many other factors, 
not the least of which is, “I derive extreme pleasure from eating bacon.” 
Humeans understand a human preference for utility as pushing us to favor acts 
that promote usefulness. However, this can get cashed out in very different 
 134 
ways. The long-term utility for the group of sentient beings is certainly 
promoted by letting the pigs live, and deriving nutrition from non-animal 
sources. However, utility for the average meat-eater looking to have dinner 
tonight might well be met most easily by heating up a pork chop.  
The second place I think the Humean goes wrong stems directly from the 
preceding point. I think the Humean account gives us too much credit for being 
other-regarding. I disagree fundamentally about his claims regarding human 
nature. I think humans have a strong tendency to put their own interests before 
the interests of society. While Hume’s shipwreck example discussed in (II.c.3) 
illustrates his position that humans promote societal interests except in times of 
extreme scarcity and need, I hold that most people’s default position is far more 
self-regarding than he believes. Many people are other-regarding only when to 
be so promotes their own interests as well, and when their own needs have 
already been adequately met. 
I also disagree with the Humean position regarding the primacy of utility 
in our aesthetic judgment formations. While I do believe utility will sometimes 
play a role – we are often attracted to depictions of flourishing life – I think the 
more primary influences on our aesthetic judgments are often emotional and 
conventional. However, I think artworks do provide us with more utility than we 
typically realize. An encounter with a work might be understood as diminishing 
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utility at the time it is viewed, but later be recalled in a way that is helpful in the 
evaluator’s life. 
As mentioned above, I hold that this collection of elements comes 
together with individuals’ particular value sets to form evaluative judgments. 
Convention will have a lot to do with the similarities between different people’s 
value sets, but conventions are changeable, and the conventions an individual 
accepts will be due largely to accidental features of their experience, such as the 
time and place in which they happened to have been raised. What’s more, 
conventions play a stronger role in determining the judgments of some people 
than of others. Some individuals are likely to unreflectively form judgments 
based on whatever conventions happen to be present in their culture, while 
others look more critically at the conventions present in other cultures, and 
consider whether or not there is a strong basis for accepting the judgments 
which the conventions of their own culture point them toward.  
In addition to the role convention plays in forming our value sets, 
emotion has a strong influence as well. The emotional responses of individuals 
will differ based on biological make up as well as a host of external factors. 
Reason can help us to recognize and work against our emotions when we 
evaluate, but we won’t be able to entirely get rid of them (and we might not 
even want to). Some hold, for instance, that emotion provides us with a solid 
evaluative guide, while others feel emotion gets in the way of one’s ability to 
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make a careful, reasoned judgment. A detailed discussion of the various ways 
the elements might interact will make it more clear that moral and aesthetic 
evaluations proceed in the same ways. 
Interaction Among the Elements 
 
On my account, emotion, convention, reason, and an inclination toward 
utility all contribute to evaluative judgment formation. I hold that there is no one 
way that we can count on these elements interacting, and I do not hold that these 
are the only possible factors that contribute to evaluative judgment. My claim is 
that these are common, dominant elements of judgment formation that exist in 
both fields, and that these elements function and interact in the same types of 
ways in both fields. 
To demonstrate that these elements function in relevantly like ways 
across the fields, I will consider a variety of ways in which a particular moral 
action could be evaluated. This is not meant to be an exhaustive account of all 
the ways an evaluative judgment regarding this action could be formed; it is 
designed to demonstrate the complexity of the process and to offer a robust 
sample of the various ways it might work. The action under evaluation in this 
example is sex between two consenting adult males. Several ways in which the 
action might be judged will be considered.  
Moral Evaluative Process A: Earl finds sex between two men to be 
viscerally disgusting, and from that disgust he forms the emotional 
response, “sex between two consenting adult males is immoral.” Earl 
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stops evaluating at the level of his emotional judgment, and does not 
consider the issue any further.133  
 
Evaluative judgments sometimes work as simply as in Moral Evaluative 
Case A, in which a single dominant evaluative element produces a judgment 
which then remains rigidly in place. More often, however, an initial judgment 
will be fed or tempered by other evaluative elements, as demonstrated in the 
following cases.  
Moral Evaluative Case B: Earl has the same emotional response as in 
case A. Additionally, he lives in an environment, and is surrounded by a 
peer group, that has in place a rigid conventional understanding of sex 
between two consenting adult males as immoral. That convention 
reinforces Earl’s emotional reaction, working to solidify his judgment 
that sex acts between consenting adult males are immoral. In college, 
Earl takes a critical reasoning course, and learns about potential biases in 
judgments and the importance of consistency in reasoning. This helps 
Earl to realize that he should rethink his hatred of women, Jews, African 
Americans, Latinos, and Asians. However, Earl’s emotions are so strong, 
and are so rigidly reinforced by the homophobic conventions under 
which he lives, that he fails to recognize that the biases he now sees in 
some of his other judgments also apply in this one. Earl retains his initial 
judgment that sex acts between two consenting adult males is immoral.  
 
Moral Evaluative Case C: Earl has the same initial emotional judgment 
and lives in the same conventional environment as case B. In this 
scenario, however, Earl has a slightly more persuasive critical reasoning 
teacher, who manages to convince Earl that his initial judgment is chock 
full of biases and inconsistencies with his other beliefs. Earl still feels a 
deep emotional revulsion to the idea of acts of male homosexuality, but 
he recognizes that emotional responses are not always keys to sound 
judgments, as he also feels a deep revulsion to broccoli, but understands 
that his personal desire to avoid broccoli does not imply that others 
                                                
133 It should not be assumed that particular individuals respond primarily through one particular 
element in every case of evaluation. I am considering particular acts and artworks in isolation in 
an effort to get a handle on a very complex process. Earl might be quite rational in some 
evaluations, guided by convention in others, etc. 
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should likewise steer clear of the vegetable. Earl modifies his initial 
judgment to conclude that sex between two consenting adult males is 
morally acceptable, though he remains personally uncomfortable about 
the topic. 
 
Moral Evaluative Case D: This case retains the emotional and 
conventional elements of case B. Earl becomes good friends with Dan, 
who he comes to regard with strong positive emotions. Well into the 
friendship, Earl learns that Dan regularly engages in consenting sex with 
other adult men. Earl cares about Dan, and does not see Dan as an 
immoral person. While he viscerally judges the idea of sex between two 
consenting adult men as immoral, Earl is not disgusted by Dan, and finds 
himself unable to judge Dan’s private activities as immoral. Recognizing 
that it is inconsistent to judge Dan’s homosexual sex acts as moral while 
judging the homosexual sex acts of strangers as immoral, yet 
emotionally unable to judge Dan’s behavior as immoral, Earl modifies 
his judgment to conclude that sex between two consenting adult men is 
not immoral. 
 
Notice that in both Moral Evaluative Cases C and D, Earl modified his 
initial emotional judgment, but the various other elements contributed 
differently in the two cases. In C, Earl’s reason overcame his emotion, while in 
D, a new emotion overrode the original one. Reason prompted him to be 
consistent, but it was his affection for Dan that lead him to conclude that other 
instances of homosexual sex must be moral, instead of concluding that Dan’s 
behavior was immoral. Either conclusion would have given him the needed 
consistency; emotion determined which conclusion he chose. In B, reason did 
play into Earl’s experience, but was not in that case sufficient to override the 
other, more dominant elements.  
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I have attempted to lay these cases out in a sufficient amount of detail to 
reflect the complexity of judgment formation, but these cases are really only 
sketchy approximations of the innumerable factors that go into evaluative 
judgment formation. Hopefully the cases offer enough detail to demonstrate 
some of the clear ways in which the elements can interact with one another to 
form and modify judgments. Next, an analysis of an aesthetic judgment will be 
provided, to demonstrate that the same types of interactions occur in aesthetic 
judgments. This similarity will offer a positive argument for convergence. In the 
moral case, Earl evaluated a class of actions of a particular type. In the aesthetic 
case, Earl will evaluate a class of artworks of a particular type – improvisational 
jazz music. 
Aesthetic Evaluative Case A: Earl hears some improvisational jazz 
music and finds it viscerally repellent. He finds it confusing and is 
resentful that he does not derive the enjoyment that he observes other 
people experiencing. Earl forms the evaluative judgment that 
improvisational jazz music is aesthetically bad. Earl stops at his 
emotional judgment and does not consider the issue any further.  
 
Aesthetic Evaluative Case B: Earl has the same emotional response as in 
case A. He lives in an environment that has no conventions in place that 
would help him to appreciate improvisational jazz. What’s more, his peer 
group has imposed rigid conventional strictures against listening to or 
attempting to appreciate music outside of a set of musical forms far 
removed from improvisational jazz. These factors reinforce Earl’s 
emotional reaction, working to solidify his judgment that improvisational 
jazz is aesthetically bad. In college, Earl takes a music appreciation 
course, and learns some interesting features of improvisational jazz that 
lead others to appreciate the music. However, Earl’s emotions are so 
strong, and are so rigidly reinforced by the conventions under which he 
lives, that he fails to appreciate the features of the music that bring 
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enjoyment to others. Earl retains his initial judgment that improvisational 
jazz is aesthetically bad.  
 
Aesthetic Evaluative Case C: Earl has the same initial emotional 
judgment and lives in the same conventional environment as case B. In 
this scenario, however, Earl has a slightly more effective music 
appreciation teacher, who helps Earl to recognize the features of the 
music that bring joy to others. Earl still does not particularly like 
improvisational jazz, but he can recognize the elements that others are 
enjoying, and he can identify positive aesthetic qualities in works of 
improvisational jazz. Earl modifies his initial judgment to conclude that 
improvisational jazz has aesthetic merit, though he remains personally 
unmoved by the music. 
 
Aesthetic Evaluative Case D: This case retains the initial emotional and 
conventional elements of case B. Earl becomes good friends with Dan, 
who he comes to regard with strong positive emotions. Well into the 
friendship, Earl learns that Dan is an improvisational jazz musician. 
Although Earl does not like improvisational jazz, he does like Dan, and 
so begins to attend Dan’s performances to show support for his friend. 
Over time, Earl’s peer group changes, such that he now operates in a 
system of conventions that support and attribute significant merit to 
improvisational jazz. Earl’s tolerance of improvisational jazz in order to 
support Dan gradually evolves into an actual appreciation of jazz music, 
until one day he is surprised to discover that he forms a positive aesthetic 
evaluation of improvisational jazz music.  
 
With these cases laid out, we can now consider whether there are 
similarities sufficient to justify convergent accounts of the manner in which the 
elements interact to produce moral and aesthetic evaluations. One of the most 
important similarities is that there is no single answer to the way this process 
goes. Often, one’s initial judgment is formed through an emotional response, but 
this will not always be the case. In cases in which emotion is the first response, 
however, the ways in which the other elements feed into the initial emotional 
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reaction are remarkably similar between the two types of judgments, and this is 
true in cases where the starting element was reason, convention, or a preference 
for utility, as well.  
Convention contributes heavily to the way one handles an initial gut 
reaction. Earl, existing in a homophobic atmosphere, receives confirmation from 
the surrounding conventions that his emotional response is appropriate. 
Likewise, his conventional context reassures him that his aversion to 
improvisational jazz is appropriate. In both of these cases, convention supports 
and strengthens Earl’s emotional response.  
A parallel story can be told regarding one’s evaluation of improvisational 
jazz. If Earl had experienced his initial emotional aversion to improvisational 
jazz in a conventional system that held the music in high regard, his initial 
judgment is far more likely to have changed much earlier, in the way that it did 
once he began to live under such conditions after befriending Dan. These 
examples show that an initial emotional response can be strengthened or 
subdued by the conventions under which one lives.  
Another common element between the moral and aesthetic cases is the 
effect of learning, which incorporates an element of reason into one’s 
evaluations. Reason can help overcome biases and can lead to more consistent 
judgments, but will not always outweigh emotional and conventional influences. 
In both Moral and Aesthetic Evaluative Case C, Earl’s reason overpowered his 
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emotional biases, yet in both Moral and Aesthetic Evaluative Case B, it did not, 
and this difference was the result of the differing levels of interplay between the 
factors.   
Beyond straight rational considerations of consistency and unbiased 
evaluation, however, the importance of prolonged exposure to an act or work 
cannot be discounted. Artworks that initially turn us off or leave us cold often 
grow on us through repeated exposure.134 The factors at work in this 
phenomenon will be complicated. As Marcia Eaton points out, lack of a 
conventional framework can leave us unable to evaluate a work, and when we 
don’t know what to make of something, a typical reaction is that of negativity, 
as we saw with Earl’s initial response to improvisational jazz. The unfamiliar 
can leave us feeling uncertain about how to react, or stupid because we do not 
possess the level of understanding we think is expected of us. All of these 
factors that could feed into a negative initial evaluation are inclined to dissipate 
over time, with repeated exposure. When Earl first listened to improvisational 
jazz he heard only noise that he did not understand. Over time, familiar elements 
emerged from that noise and began to please him. 
Relatedly, the impact particular individuals can have on our evaluative 
judgments is not to be downplayed. Whether it be a teacher, neighbor, or friend, 
                                                
134 Jesse Prinz discusses this phenomenon in detail in Prinz. “Emotion…,” p. 3. Of course, the 
oppostite can happen as well. A work that initially struck us as brilliant can come to seem trite or 
kitchy over time. 
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the influence of a person about whom we care, or whose judgment we value, can 
have a profound impact on the formation and modification of our own 
judgments. Earl had no problem hating the concept of homosexual sex, but was 
unable to hate a particular gay man. Earl’s teacher could not bring him to love 
improvisational jazz, but the love he felt for his friend, an improvisational jazz 
performer, helped him to hear the music through his ears, and to evaluate as he 
evaluated.  
In this section, I have offered an account of the way I believe judgments 
are formed in ethics and aesthetics. Although there is not one set way in which 
the particular elements interact, the types of interactions and the particular 
factors are similar across fields. Emotion can be reinforced or overridden by 
convention. Reason sometimes overpowers emotional and conventional 
influences. Prolonged exposure tends to contribute to positive evaluations. 
Particular individuals have a strong influence on our judgments. Because moral 
and aesthetic judgments both arise through a complex combination of 
convention, emotion, reason, and inclination, this account points us toward 
moral and aesthetic convergence. Next I will offer a normative account of 
evaluative judgment formation, to demonstrate that appropriate evaluative 
judgments are formed in similar ways across the two fields.  
A Normative Account of Evaluative Judgments 
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I hold that there are two levels at which we can form evaluative 
judgments, and the appropriate method of judgment formation will depend on 
the level at which the evaluator is operating. When we form judgments as a part 
of social discourse, because we want to be engaging in the same conversation as 
those around us, we will be compelled to judge within established conventional 
frameworks. I will call such judgments that are made in terms of established 
conventional standards ‘level 1 judgments.’ Level 1 judgments are objective 
within the context of the convention, though the objectivity is socially 
constructed, and thus mind-dependent. At level 1, the conventions themselves 
are not judged, but are merely accepted as socially constructed facts, and 
evaluations are made in terms of those facts. 
A level 1 judgment aims to evaluate the act or work’s conformity to the 
set standards of the language. This will be a conventional, objective evaluation; 
everyone who has adequate knowledge of the rules of the genre or society will 
form like judgments regarding the act or work’s conformity to those rules. The 
rules could have been otherwise, but it turns out they weren’t, and so a level 1 
judgment is restricted to an evaluation in terms of the rules as they stand at the 
time of the evaluation. In terms of aesthetic evaluation, a level 1 judgment 
involves evaluating artworks according to established genre conventions. The 
standards of the genre itself are not evaluated, and the work is not judged on any 
basis other than its conformity to the standards of the genre. Likewise, level 1 
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moral judgments are conducted solely at the level of moral conventions, rather 
than in terms of an evaluation of the efficacy, utility, or other value of the 
convention itself. 
Appropriate level 1 judgments, then, should be conducted through an 
attempt to focus in on the conventions, and to filter out the influences of 
emotion and the preference for utility as much as possible. Reason will play a 
role in helping the evaluator to determine whether the act conforms to the 
conventions, but reason does not have a place, in level 1 judgment, in critiquing 
the current conventions. In moral and aesthetic level 1 evaluation, a proper 
judgment is one that correctly identifies the act or work’s conformity to the 
convention, without being led astray by the subjective force of the evaluator’s 
own emotions and preferences.  
When Earl evaluated improvisational jazz according to the conventional 
standards that he learned in his music appreciation class, he was conducting a 
level 1 judgment. His judgment is a good one to the extent to which it accurately 
evaluates the artwork in terms of the conventional standards and bad to the 
extent to which it fails to do so, due to lack of knowledge of the conventional 
standards, or biases introduced due to other factors such as his own emotional 
reaction to the music. Earl’s level 1 judgment of acts of homosexual sex 
between consenting adult men is evaluated in the same ways.  
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Level 1 is the point at which evaluators will have the most agreement, 
but unfortunately, level 1 judgments are not always possible, nor do they always 
seem sufficient to the evaluator. Level 1 judgments are sometimes impossible 
for a couple of reasons. In some cases, there is no convention in place by which 
to judge the act or work in question. This is discussed in more detail in Part 
(III.c.2) regarding works that set the prototype for new artistic genres, as well as 
new moral paradigms that do not yet have established conventions. In such 
cases, a different level of evaluation is in order, and that evaluation will 
contribute to the establishment of a new convention by which level 1 evaluations 
will occur in the future. Additionally, some level 1 evaluations, though possible, 
seem insufficient to the evaluator, because in such cases the evaluator has no 
trouble identifying the proper level 1 judgment, but has non-conventional 
reasons for finding that judgment unacceptable. Level 1 judgments do not allow 
for evaluations outside of the conventions themselves, and so fail to allow for 
the type of evaluation desired in some cases. At these times, level 2 judgments 
are needed. 
Level 2 judgments are those by which we evaluate the conventional rules 
that set the objectivity of the level 1 judgments. A level 2 judgment would be 
one that critiques the rules of genre or group, rather than one that assessed a act 
or work’s conformity to those rules. For example, at level 1, all competent 
evaluators will reach the judgment that slavery in pre-abolitionist America was 
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moral, because, despite its opposition by a significant number of white people, 
as well as virtually all slaves, there were clear conventions in place that 
established it as such (it’s legality, for example). The proper way to reach that 
level 1 judgment is by filtering out emotional and utilitarian responses, as well 
as rational concerns for the consistent, humane treatment of individuals 
regardless of their race. The act of slave-holding is evaluated simply in terms of 
conventional standards. Forming that level 1 judgment will not be particularly 
difficult to do – being happy about it is another matter.  
 Many evaluators today will look back on acts such as slave-holding and 
want to be able to do more than merely say that the act is moral based on the 
conventions in place at the time; they want to be able to judge the conventions 
themselves. My account is equipped to handle such judgments through level 2 
evaluations. Here, proper judgments consider the conventions in terms of the 
other factors.  Given particular individuals’ value sets, as well as the agreed-
upon values of the society (all men are created equal), the convention that 
established slavery as morally acceptable in pre-abolitionist America can be 
rejected. This judgment will arise from some combination of emotion, reason, 
and preference for utility. Because the way these elements come together to 
form level 2 judgments is based on individuals’ value sets, these judgments will 
be subjective.  
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 Level 2 judgments, while not objective, still rely on principles of reason, 
allowing evaluations to occur between various level 2 judgments. In other 
words, if I form level 2 judgment X and you form level 2 judgment ~X, we or a 
third party can evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of those two judgments. 
The same basic principles of rationality apply in evaluative judgments as in 
other avenues of our lives. Whatever an evaluator’s value set happens to be, she 
ought to work toward consistent judgments based on those values. Thus, if an 
evaluator’s judgment regarding slavery is inconsistent with other elements of her 
value set, that judgment is worse than one that does not lead to such 
inconsistencies. On this basis, Earl’s Case B evaluations can be deemed weak, 
as he failed to recognize inconsistencies and biases that he ought to have taken 
into account in forming his judgments. 
 In addition to conforming to principles of rationality, level 2 judgments 
should be understood as better insofar as they more accurately reflect the 
evaluator’s actual value set. If the evaluator values music, and wants to be able 
to derive enjoyment from music, but has a strong emotional bias that prevents 
him from appreciating particular works due to external factors that have nothing 
to do with the properties of the works themselves (they remind him of a bad 
romantic break-up), a judgment that manages to overcome the external 
emotional biases is a better one, as it allows the evaluator to do something that 
he desires, according to his own value set. Likewise, if an evaluator’s value set 
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compels him to be a tolerant person, but he was raised in an environment such 
that he has strong negative feelings toward members of particular ethnic groups, 
a judgment that recognizes and overcomes those feelings is better, because it 
promotes the evaluator’s own value set. 
 As the various Earl scenarios show, much of our actual evaluation occurs 
at both levels 1 and 2. Although we recognize conventional standards and are 
influenced by them, our own mix of emotional reactions, inclinations and values 
combines to produce subjective evaluations of acts and artworks.  This was seen 
in Earl’s two Case C evaluations, where he was able to recognize conventional 
standards (level 1), yet his personal inclinations ran contrary to conventional 
standards. Although not all evaluators think about level 2 judgments in terms of 
the rejection of a convention, that is technically what is going on when an 
evaluator both recognizes that there exists an objective evaluation based on a 
convention, and then offers a personal evaluation that runs against that 
evaluation.  
 Although level 2 judgments cannot reach the level of objectivity, as they 
are grounded in individual emotions, inclinations, and so forth, similarities 
among evaluators as well as rational constraints will lead many evaluators to 
agree on issues such as slavery. Most people care about consistency, and 
recognize an unacceptable level of arbitrariness in singling out members of a 
particular racial group for subjugation. However, there will certainly be some 
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individuals whose value set is such that they maintain an unshakeable belief in 
the validity of the convention by which slavery is judged morally acceptable. 
Such individuals might well hold consistent beliefs, based on their other values. 
What can my account say about the judgments of such individuals? 
One response is that morality must be understood as necessarily other-
regarding in cases where the interests of others are relevant to the action. Here is 
an argument for such a view. Over time, across cultures, the conception of 
morality that has arisen and developed is one that includes other-regard as an 
essential element. Certainly an act can sometimes be considered immoral for 
exclusively self-regarding reasons (Kantian duties to the self, such as the duty 
not to commit suicide or the duty to cultivate one’s talents, are an example). And 
even if others are given due consideration under a particular act, that act still 
might be deemed immoral for other reasons, perhaps for failing to consider its 
environmental costs, for example. But despite these provisos, this argument 
goes, when evaluators think about morality, they think about it in terms of the 
impact of actions on others. Insofar as this is an essential element of morality, an 
action with effects that do not appropriately consider others is an immoral act. 
On this understanding, other-regard when appropriate is a definitional part of 
morality. Thus, regardless of individual belief sets, the morality of actions is 
assessed partly in terms of other-regard. 
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This feature of the nature of morality is a level 1 evaluation; it is 
conventional and objective. It asserts that there is a humanity-wide standard that 
says that acts that fail to be other-regarding in the relevant ways are immoral.  
The history of human morality might have developed differently, but as it turns 
out this is the way it developed, so insofar as something is a moral action, it is a 
relevantly other-regarding action. This allows us to form a level 1 judgment in 
which slavery is immoral even in a context in which it is conventionally 
accepted within a particular society.  
It would be good to say a bit more about this argument. What is 
established on this view is the conventional rule that morality involves other-
regard. What has not been established is exactly how that is understood to 
manifest in particular acts. That is set by the conventions at work in localized 
contexts. Must other-regard be extended to all members of one’s society, to all 
human beings, to all sentient beings? Does other-regard require active care for 
others or merely that one refrain from causing them harm? In what situations is 
other-regard legitimately overridden? These types of questions are left to be 
determined in the ways discussed above, through a combination of evaluative 
elements, which interact differently depending on the particular attributes, 
attitudes, and value sets of individual evaluators. 
In this section, I have offered my account of the way moral and aesthetic 
judgments are formed, as well as the way they should be formed. Level 1 
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judgments ought to be formed by accurately applying the conventional standards 
at work in the context of the act or within the genre of the artwork. Level 2 
judgments ought to conform to basic standards of rationality and should also 
conform to the evaluator’s particular value set. Additionally, I have offered an 
argument that morality has evolved as an other-regarding enterprise, and as such 
acts can be judged on the basis of their conformity to this standard. The 
similarities in judgment formation between the fields of ethics and aesthetics 
offer a positive argument for convergence. This argument stems from my 
antirealist account of judgment formations, and so leads most readily to 
antirealist convergence. However, one might instead argue for a realist 
convergence. In Part III, I will consider reasons one might be pushed toward 
realist or antirealist convergence, and discuss what would be needed to make 
such accounts viable. I will discuss the issue of who bears the burden of proof in 
the realism vs. antirealism debate. Additionally, I will flesh out an antirealist 











Part III: The Dilemma – What Should We Do Now? 
 
In the first two parts of this dissertation, I have argued in favor of a 
convergence account of our ontological understanding of ethics and aesthetics. 
I’ve shown why the proposed differences between the two fields, in some cases, 
are not differences at all, and in other cases, are not sufficient to justify 
divergence. I’ve offered a positive account of our moral and aesthetic judgment 
formations, showing that these value judgments are often formed in the same 
ways; this offers another reason to accept convergence. Accepting a 
convergence account, however, does not commit one to either realism or 
antirealism – it simply demands that, whichever position one accepts, it be held 
consistently across fields.  
The final part of this dissertation is aimed at those who began reading as 
divergentists and, convinced by my arguments and in the interest of consistency, 
are now convergentists. Out of that group, the majority is likely to have begun as 
realists about ethics and antirealists about aesthetics. Although some might have 
been realists about aesthetics and antirealists about ethics, that group is likely to 
be quite small, so this section is primarily aimed at addressing the particular 
concerns of those who began as moral realists and aesthetic antirealists 
(although the other alternatives are also considered), but who now are convinced 
that they must be convergentists. This group faces a dilemma. Presumably, they 
began the day committed to both moral realism and aesthetic antirealism. Now, 
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consistency demands that they give something up. Either they must find a 
workable account of aesthetic realism, giving up their previous commitments to 
aesthetic antirealism, or they must give up moral realism and accept antirealism 
across the board. Those choosing the latter option will need to explain why they 
endorse antirealism when it looks as if they have accepted a realist picture. This 
gets at the heart of the final section of this part of the dissertation, where a clear 
account of antirealist implications will be given. Offering a conclusive argument 
in either direction is a dissertation unto itself, but it will be helpful here to spend 
some time discussing how one might go about making a decision, and what 
some of the implications of each choice might be.  
This part of the dissertation is meant to set the stage for making a 
decision regarding which option – realist or antirealist convergence across both 
fields – is the most reasonable. It is also aimed at demonstrating why the option 
likely to be met with most resistance – antirealism – should not be rejected out 
of hand. The first section of Part III will discuss the ways in which one might 
begin to make a decision about which meta-option to accept. I will consider 
some common but weak reasons, and explain why these routes ought to be 
avoided. From there, I will examine the issue of burden of proof, as this will be 
helpful in determining the reasonableness of each option, as well as what is 
expected of each side in terms of proof of the position. By the end of the burden 
of proof section, I will have shown why the realist account bears the heavier 
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burden of proof, which argues in favor of accepting antirealism. Yet, many are 
left with some concerns regarding the implications of that view. Thus, the last 
section is devoted to a discussion of the practical implications of accepting an 
antirealist account, including an explanation of the way moral and aesthetic 
discourse could continue, as well as the continued motivation to engage in value 
reasoning even after accepting antirealism. Because this option is the one likely 
to be met with the most resistance, it will be given the most attention.  
(III.a) Realist or Antirealist Convergence?  
 New convergentists could come in four varieties: 1) originally a moral 
realist and an aesthetic antirealist, now adopting realism in both ethics and 
aesthetics; 2) originally a moral realist and an aesthetic antirealist, now adopting 
antirealism in both ethics and aesthetics; 3) originally a moral antirealist and an 
aesthetic realist, now adopting realism in both ethics and aesthetics; or 4) 
originally a moral antirealist and an aesthetic realist, now adopting antirealism in 
both ethics and aesthetics. In this section, I’ll consider some factors that could 
contribute to one’s decision about whether to converge toward realism or 
antirealism, and I will argue against some common but weak bases for one’s 
decision. 
Whether one began as a moral realist and an aesthetic antirealist or as a 
moral antirealist and an aesthetic realist, the new convergentist now faces a 
tough task. Consistency demands that realism be accepted across the fields, or 
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that antirealism be accepted across them, but necessarily the new convergentist 
is in need of a new argument, because if she had a solid argument that unified 
either realism or antirealism across the fields, she would have been a 
convergentist to begin with. The task I’m proposing is unusual. Typically, our 
meta-evaluative positions are arrived at in one of three ways. Often, we have 
intuitions in one direction or another and seek arguments to support those 
intuitions. In other cases, we accept whichever position is first presented to us in 
a convincing manner, and maintain that position until we encounter stronger 
evidence to the contrary. Finally, we might reject our default position (which we 
accepted either intuitively or because it was handed to us as truth when we were 
children) because careful inspection convinces us that it is untenable. What we 
don’t normally do is reject a system for some external reason despite the fact 
that it is working for us. But that is exactly what the arguments presented in the 
previous sections demand. 
Those who began reading with the belief that they had good reasons to 
be realists regarding one value field and antirealists regarding the other are in 
the strange position of being asked to surrender an argument that they otherwise 
find convincing, in the interest of having a consistent belief set. They will need 
to consider appropriate methods for deciding which currently held position to 
reject. This is an extremely important move, as consistency, desirable though it 
is, has little value if one’s position is consistent, but false. 
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 Probably the most common method of deciding which position to reject 
and which new one to adopt stems from the depth of one’s already-established 
commitments. If you are more deeply committed to your meta-ethical position 
than to your meta-aesthetic position, you are more likely to give up your meta-
aesthetic position, and vice versus. The depth of our commitment is often 
connected to the amount we care about a particular field, and that caring can 
come in several varieties. We care more about our meta-evaluative stance in one 
of the fields because: 1) we think it is the more important field; 2) we have 
stronger intuitions about it; and 3) we think the arguments for it are stronger 
than the arguments for the other. I will consider and evaluate each of these 
reasons in turn. 
 Out of the above reasons, 1) and 2), though common, are both 
problematic. Regarding 1), what does it mean for one field to be more important 
than the other? Perceived importance can come in several forms, some of which 
were discussed and dismissed in Part I. There is a common belief that morality 
is more serious than aesthetics, and thus should hold more weight in our meta-
evaluative decision-making. This seriousness might be understood in terms of a 
compulsion to act regarding ethics that is lacking regarding aesthetics. 
Responses to that position were discussed in (I.c), where I offered strong reasons 
to suppose that aesthetics also carries with it an obligation to act. This is borne 
out not only by the actions and testimony of artists, but by the behavior of lay 
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people, who feel the need to apologize for mismatched clothing, and who 
maintain that neighbors with ill-kept yards or garish paint jobs are doing 
something wrong.135 If morality is not more serious than aesthetics, this is not a 
good reason to converge toward realism. 
 On the other hand, some might hold that aesthetics is more important 
than ethics, resulting in a decision to converge in the direction of one’s aesthetic 
commitments. Although this is a less common view, it is very likely to be one 
held by some artists, who are strongly motivated by their understanding of their 
aesthetic obligations, but who give little thought to morality at all, or who feel it 
ought to take second place, either in their own lives or in everyone’s. This is a 
position exemplified by Paul Gauguin, as discussed in part 1. The problem with 
this reason for determining the direction of one’s convergence mirrors that 
discussed above. It is unclear that aesthetics is more important than ethics; in 
fact it looks like some aesthetic decisions are more important than some moral 
ones, and vice versus. If neither field is clearly more important than the other, 
we ought to avoid deciding which way to converge on this basis. 
Another common reason for choosing which way to converge is that we 
feel the stakes are higher regarding one field than the other. Usually, the belief is 
                                                
135 In some cases it might be thought that the neighbors are morally transgressing; an overrun 
yard could harbor rodents who might then move into my yard, and your untended dandelions 
will certainly travel next door on a windy day. However, the concern is often, if not mere 
aesthetic displeasure, one of diminished property values. If your ugly property can cause the 
value of my house to plummet, we have a good indicator of the seriousness of our aesthetic 
choices.  
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that the stakes are higher regarding morality. This was expressed by Marcia 
Eaton in the example of Sophie’s choice about which of her children’s lives to 
save, as opposed to a painter’s choice regarding the colors to use in a particular 
work. Sophie’s moral decision determined the fate of two human beings. Eaton 
argues that no aesthetic decision has such high stakes. The problem with this 
argument, as discussed in (I.e.1), is that our meta-evaluative ontology is not 
based on the height of the stakes in particular cases. We are not realists when the 
stakes are high but antirealists when they are low (remember the example of 
stealing cars versus stealing pencils). Most of the moral decisions we make are 
far less serious than Sophie’s choice, and many of the aesthetic decisions we 
make have higher stakes than a paint color. Regardless, because ontology does 
not hinge on this point, it is not a good reason to decide which flavor of 
convergence to adopt.  
Another form reason 1) might take is that we foresee negative 
consequences stemming from moral antirealism that we don’t see stemming 
from aesthetic realism. A lot of these fears come from a misunderstanding of 
what antirealism entails, leading to the concern that antirealism must be avoided 
at all costs. For instance, there is often the concern that antirealism requires us to 
surrender all moral judgment. People are generally less concerned about the 
possibility of being unable to evaluate artworks, so what seemed like a small 
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problem for aesthetics looms large regarding ethics. This issue will be discussed 
at length in (III.c), and so will be set to the side for now. 
A second reason that might influence a new convergentist’s decision 
about which direction to converge is 2), that his or her intuitions are stronger in 
one field than in the other. At least among non-artists, most people report 
stronger intuitions regarding ethics. This seems to be connected with the idea 
that lay people generally consider themselves to be more expert regarding 
morality than regarding aesthetics. With no formal instruction, most of us have 
the idea that we can find our way around a moral landscape, that we are 
equipped to pass evaluative judgments about our own actions and others we 
observe or hear about, and we tend to feel that those judgments are accurate, and 
justified, even if we cannot articulate a clear moral system or ground our moral 
claims. 
Certainly many lay people are also happy to be amateur art critics, 
confidently pronouncing one work “brilliant” and another “absolute junk.” 
However, regarding artworks, a lay person will generally back down pretty 
quickly if asked to provide reasons for such claims. Non-artists and non-
aestheticians quickly lose their nerve and surrender aesthetic positions that they 
can’t ground – remember John Cleese’s final sputter at the end of the 
“Michelangelo and the Pope” Monty Python sketch, “I may not know much 
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about art, but I know what I like!”136 But regarding moral matters, intuitions are 
so deeply grounded we are much more likely to maintain a position even if we 
are unable to adequately argue for it. Of course, there will be individuals who 
feel ill equipped to argue points of morality, but who have deep-running 
aesthetic intuitions that they find harder to surrender than any moral intuitions 
they might have. 
In both cases, the idea seems to be, if my intuitions run this deep, there 
must be a solid grounding for the belief, even if I do not happen to know what it 
is. Our shallower intuitions are easier to surrender, on the assumption that we 
probably got something wrong. The problem with this reason for realist 
convergence will be covered at length in the next section (III.b). In short, strong 
intuitions run in both directions, they are unreliable indicators of truth, and they 
have often led us to believe, endorse, and act on things that we now look back 
on in horror (the moral acceptability of enslaving other human beings based on 
race or class, for example, has been a common intuition across many times and 
cultures). Knowing that intuitions are unreliable and even dangerous in these 
ways, depending on them to answer the meta-evaluative question seems clearly 
ill advised.  
As for the issue of “feeling like a moral expert,” it is unsurprising that 
many of us feel like we know more about morality than we do about aesthetics. 
                                                
136 Monty Python Live at the Hollywood Bowl, 1982. 
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We live in a morality-laden culture, where we are told what is right and wrong, 
and quickly learn to tell others the same, from a very young age. Thus, it makes 
sense that we feel more equipped to pass judgments regarding morality. Whether 
all this field experience actually makes us better moral judges is another 
question, however. If the judgments stem from poor sources – intuitions, 
unreflective authority figures, unconsidered traditions – they are unlikely to be 
any more informed or reliable than the weaker beliefs we have regarding our 
aesthetic judgments, although they are likely to be extremely powerful – 
certainly strong enough to push us toward a convergence for which we lack a 
well-formulated account. 
Certainly, professional philosophers, the presumed audience of this 
paper, will have subjected their intuitions to critical analysis that will eliminate 
some of these elementary pitfalls of intuitive judgments. However, philosophers 
from any area of specialization seem to find themselves qualified to say a few 
words about morality, whereas most non-aesthetician philosophers quickly 
become quiet when the subject turns to art. This seems to suggest that the same 
trends we see in lay circles persists in philosophical circles as well. What’s 
more, an appeal to common sense intuitions is often offered as a reason to shift 
the burden of proof one way or the other, so lay intuitions are worth some 
consideration here. 
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An additional problem is that members of the primary target audience of 
this section – new convergentists – are likely to have had strong intuitions 
running in both directions – realist in one field and antirealist in the other, which 
originally prompted them to be divergentists. The strength of those intuitions is 
likely to stem from a variety of factors, many of them having little to do with 
powerful arguments. Instead, these intuitions stem from one’s culture, 
upbringing, social group, and particular set of life experiences, all of which 
inform one’s gut response to the dilemma, without necessarily much 
consideration of arguments. More will be said about this in the following 
section. 
 The above are two common but weak reasons why new convergentists 
might choose which meta-evaluative route to adopt across the fields. The 
strongest basis for such a decision is 3). Here, the individual, realizing that 
consistency demands convergence, reevaluates his reasons for initially accepting 
his moral and aesthetic positions, and concludes that the arguments which 
convinced him of the truth of one are stronger than those that convinced him of 
the truth of the other. As there are many arguments for each of these positions, 
an exhaustive discussion would be misplaced here, but whatever those 
arguments are, it looks like this is exactly the right reason to appeal to in 
deciding which way to converge. You had good reasons to accept both A and B. 
Now you realize you cannot accept both A and B, as they are inconsistent. So, 
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you have to give up either A or B. If the arguments for B are weaker than the 
arguments for A, the reasonable thing to do is to start looking into the arguments 
for ~B. 
 Accepting whichever argument is stronger sounds pretty straightforward 
and obvious, but the above (weak) moves are common, and we still need to 
figure out what is needed to construct a stronger argument one way or the other. 
What’s more, unless the former divergentists had really lousy reasons for being 
divergentists in the first place, it looks like they ought to be approaching the 
dilemma in a state of agnosticism, rather than with an assumption that the right 
answer will obviously be realist convergence. Meta-value theory carries with it 
particular roadblocks and tendencies for flawed reasoning that merit considering 
this issue apart from the standard reasons we might offer for evaluating a 
philosophical argument. One of the most important considerations in the meta-
values debate is determining which side – realism or antirealism – bears the 
burden of proof. The next section will discuss this issue in detail. 
(III.b) Burden of Proof 
 Meta-value theory inevitably involves burden of proof shifting. Whose 
job is it to demonstrate the positive truth of their position? How does a view get 
to be the default position, the one that others must respond to and argue against? 
Realists ask antirealists to prove there are no mind-independent evaluative 
criteria, and antirealists demand that the realists show them these mind-
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independent moral and aesthetic properties they speak of. So, who really bears 
the burden of proof in this debate? In this section, I will examine the issue of 
burden of proof regarding realism and antirealism. This will be helpful in 
determining which flavor of convergence we ought to adopt, as we want to hold 
not only consistent but also defensible positions. If the greater burden falls on 
one side, rather than the other, accepting and defending a new position – either 
moral antirealism or aesthetic realism – will be a more difficult task. This is a 
good thing to know when deciding which choice to make regarding the 
dilemma. 
In Part I, I argued from the position that the burden of proof was on my 
opponent regarding the convergence/divergence debate. It was clear in that 
section that divergentists – those positing a difference between the fields – bear 
the burden of demonstrating that difference. If that cannot be done, the fields 
should be considered together, as relevantly similar. In this section, I will also 
present the common view that the burden of proof falls to the antirealists. 
Although this position has been offered by many meta-value theorists, I will 
examine the arguments offered by ethicist William Frankena, as they are both 
clearly stated and commonly cited as decisively settling the issue.  
The counter-position offered by antirealists will be considered next. 
Here, Richard Joyce’s argument against realists such as Frankena will be 
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given.137 Joyce’s argument, which I will expand and improve, offers support for 
placing the burden of proof on realism. In addition to Joyce’s argument, I will 
consider other reasons to support placing the burden of proof on realism, which 
will in turn demonstrate the difficulty of the realist position.  
 There are at least three distinct ways in which we determine who bears 
the burden of proof in a philosophical debate. First, error theorists are usually 
thought to bear the burden. If your position is that people are generally mistaken 
in their beliefs, intuitions, or ways of speaking about things, the burden is on 
you to explain why. Second, if one view is clearly counterintuitive and lacking 
the folk endorsement of the majority, that view is thought to bear the burden of 
proof.  In a meat-eating society, vegetarians are usually asked to bear the burden 
of proof against omnivores. Finally, the position favored by ontological 
parsimony gets to shift the burden of proof to its opponent. The theory of 
evolution and intelligent design both offer an explanation of a data set, but the 
theory of evolution can explain the data without positing additional entities, so 
the burden of proof falls to the proponents of ID. Each of these arguments will 
                                                
137 Frankena calls himself an absolutist, but in the interest of clarity I will continue to use the 
word ‘realist.’ His particular flavor of realism is of the ideal observer variety, holding that we 
would all form the same value judgments if we had complete knowledge. The completeness of 
this knowledge, on Frankena’s account, seems to be so extensive (including the attainment of 
something he refers to as ‘enlightenment’ on the part of the observer) that it appears to be a 
“God’s eye view” account, though he does not use that language. Frankena, William K. Ethics. 
Prentice-Hall, 1973, p. 112. 
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be considered regarding realism versus antirealism, and will then be applied to 
the convergence/divergence debate.   
(III.b.1) Error Theories Bear the Burden of Proof 
 One reason to think a particular position bears the burden of proof is that 
it holds that ordinary people are in error with regard to their speech, beliefs, and 
practices. Although error theory is usually associated with moral antirealism, 
one could be an error theorist regarding any or all classes of judgments. Moral 
error theories hold at least three propositions in common: 1) moral judgments 
aim to represent mind-independent moral facts; 2) there are no mind-
independent moral facts; 3) no moral judgments can be true.138 Moral error 
theory, then, seems to imply that ordinary people are mistaken about a great 
many things – all moral claims, for example – and a theory that holds that many 
of our already established beliefs are in fact false needs to explain why that is. 
The burden is on those who challenge the belief system status quo. 
Ethicist William Frankena argues that moral antirealists bear the burden 
of proof against moral realists. He offers several arguments, but perhaps the best 
way to classify his line of reasoning is in terms of the error theorist complaint. 
Frankena relies on the widespread acceptance of moral beliefs to make his case 
                                                
138 Shaffer-Landau, Russ and Terrence Cuneo. “Moral Error Theories,” in Foundations of 
Ethics: An Anthology, edited by Russ Shaffer-Landau and Terrence Cuneo. Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007, p. 9. 
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for asking antirealists to shoulder the burden of proof. If antirealism is correct, 
an awful lot of people are wrong.  
For this line of reasoning to go through, universal acceptance of moral 
beliefs is not required, but Frankena does hold that moral judgments would be 
unanimous, under ideal conditions. Frankena argues that there is a unified moral 
code – a moral fact sheet, one might call it – and that some cultures and 
individuals simply fail to see or to properly understand those facts. Divergences 
in opinion regarding morality do not reveal an actual divergence or lack of truth 
about morality, but rather they show us simply that some people are mistaken.  
The error theorist denies the existence of the moral fact sheet, which in turn 
implies that claims regarding the content of the fact sheet must be false. The 
burden of proof is on the antirealists, Frankena says, to defend the claim that 
those facts, accepted by so many people, do not exist.139  
 Frankena further bolsters his argument by pointing out that our ordinary 
language presupposes moral realism. We are not in the habit of saying, “I would 
prefer that you refrain from stealing that car.” Nor do we say, “Our society 
prohibits car theft.” We also don’t say, “You shouldn’t steal that car if you want 
to avoid the risk of punishment.” No, we say, “It’s wrong to steal that car.” We 
say, “You should not steal that car” and “Do not steal that car.” Frankena argues 
                                                
139 Frankena, William K. ‘Recent Conceptions of Morality,’ in Morality and the Language of 
Conduct, edited by Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian. Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1965, p. 13. 
 169 
that the language we use speaks to an already-accepted truth about morality. The 
burden is on the antirealists to explain why our language does not reflect the 
metaphysical reality they claim exists. If the universe is devoid of moral truths, 
why do we speak as if they exist? If the world contains only hypothetical and 
prudential oughts, why do those caveats not come through when we judge, warn, 
praise and sanction?140 
 One way to respond to Frankena’s point about the formal structure of our 
language is to point out that we engage in loose talk and hyperbole all the time, 
and that these figurative uses of language are not typically believed to be keys to 
an underlying truth that we would otherwise miss. “God damn it,” “Heaven 
forbid,” and “Good luck” are common phrases that are used meaningfully by 
those who do not hold that they key to some underlying real property. We use 
these phrases to mean something like, “I’m really upset,” “I hope x does not 
happen,” and “I hope you succeed at your endeavor,” without any necessary 
belief in or commitment to the reality of God, heaven, or luck. 
 The above examples demonstrate that antirealism need not involve error 
theory at all. The fact that people use such expressions does not decisively 
indicate their commitment to mind-independent moral facts, so denying the 
existence of the facts need not involve accusing people of systematic error, as 
Frankena claims. What’s more, an antirealist might hold that there are moral 
                                                
140 Ibid. 
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facts, and thus we can speak meaningfully, and even objectively, about them, 
but that these facts are mind-dependent. On this view, “It’s wrong to steal the 
car,” is not necessarily meaningless, but it is shorthand for a longer claim. It is 
wrong to steal the car, but not categorically. Stealing the car violates the rules of 
private property. It is illegal to steal the car. Stealing the car might result in 
punishment. So, if by “wrong” you mean “illegal,” “might result in punishment” 
or “violates the rules of private property,” stealing the car is wrong. Thus, an 
appropriate response to Frankena is that “it’s wrong to steal the car” is shorthand 
for a more complex claim, which could perhaps be summed up as “The moral 
norms prevalent in our society hold that stealing the car would be unacceptable.” 
But this is not evidence that speakers who use the phrase are committed to an 
underlying moral realism. On this understanding, ‘wrong,’ though not 
meaningless, does not mean what Frankena thinks it means. 
We use imprecise language all the time. Sometimes this leads to 
confusion that then requires us to clarify the content of our communication 
through more precise wording. Most of the time, however, loose talk is an 
effective means of communication because both speaker and audience have the 
same understanding of the way the language is being used. We translate 
incoming data, much of the time without even being aware that we’re doing it. 
“I’m starving” means “I’m really hungry.” “Nobody dresses like that anymore” 
means “Your clothes are out of date,” etc. Frankena holds that antirealists accuse 
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individuals of making false or meaningless statements, but in fact antirealists 
need not be error theorists. A more reasonable way to understand what is going 
on is that everyone – realists and antirealists alike – makes non-literal assertions 
and literal shorthand assertions all the time.  Just as “heaven forbid” does not 
commit its speaker to belief in heaven, so “stealing is wrong” does not commit 
its speaker to belief in moral realism. 
It is also worth pointing out that realists use this same sort of loose talk 
and hyperbole when engaging in moral discourse. One of the most universally 
accepted moral imperatives of all time, “Thou shalt not kill,” is a perfect 
example of hyperbolic language. Given both the context in which it was 
originally written as well as the way it is understood today, this moral 
imperative seems to mean something more along the lines of, “thou shalt not kill 
innocent human beings except your enemies in wartime.” Frankena has 
observed an interesting feature of the way we use language, but he has not 
discovered an underlying truth about moral reality. 
Above, Frankena argued that the realist language inherent in our speech 
indicates a truth about moral realism. I have pointed out why it is not necessary 
to understand our use of moral language in this way; there is a viable antirealist 
alternative that does not involve the attribute of widespread error, as our 
langauge is riddled with speech referring to socially constructed and otherwise 
relevantly mind-dependent facts. However, Frankena might respond that our 
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attitudes underlying our moral speech often point to a deeper, realist 
underpinning to the content of our language. Thus, while granting that much of 
our language refers to mind-dependent facts, Frankena might argue that at least 
some moral language is not, and is instead referring to mind-independent facts. 
This is evidenced by our beliefs and attitudes about what we are doing when we 
engage in moral discourse. In other words, Frankena holds that we sometimes 
mean something real, and more robust than the type of conditional statements 
mentioned above. He says, “[W]e are claiming some kind of status, justification, 
or validity for our attitudes and judgment.”141 This kind of validity can only be 
obtained if we are talking about something real, Frankena claims.  
Here, Frankena seems to be assuming a theory of truth similar to that of 
Bertrand Russell, who holds that the only true assertions are those that 
accurately map onto the actual world.142 On this view, if our moral claims can 
assert truth, they must map onto things that exist in the actual world – relevantly 
mind-independent moral facts.143 Thus, once again, because we already accept 
realism – our attitudes as well as our language bear this out – the burden of 
proof is on those who claim otherwise, namely error theorists who accuse 
                                                
141 Frankena, “On Saying the Ethical Thing” in Perspectives on Morality, edited by K. E. 
Goodpaster, University of Notre Dame Press, 1976, p. 116. 
142 See Russell, Bertrand. “On Denoting,” in Mind, New Series, vol. 14, no. 56, 1905, pp. 479-
493. 
143 There is a great deal of literature regarding what it means for something to be an existent 
object. On some views, moral and aesthetic facts need not be mind-independent in order to be 
real; they could, for example, be socially constructed entities. On the definition of realism and 
antirealism I am using (see Part I), however, moral and aesthetic facts must be relevantly mind-
independent for realism to be true.  
 173 
ordinary people of being seriously mistaken about what they are doing in the 
instances where they understand their moral assertions as literal. 
Some examples will help make this point more clear. When we say, “It 
was wrong of you to steal that car,” Frankena will argue that we mean 
something more robust than, “I disapprove of you stealing that car,” or “I wish 
you hadn’t stolen the car.” We are claiming that we have knowledge of 
something true about the world. We are not merely voicing our preferences in 
the hopes of causing you to feel remorse, or to get you to return the car. We are 
not airing our views in an effort to convince others not to steal cars. We are 
actually claiming knowledge – we claim to know that it was wrong of you to 
steal the car, and in order for that to be possible, there must be a moral fact of 
the matter.   
The antirealist response is simply that, in the above cases, there is a 
moral fact of the matter; it is simply socially constructed. The above statements 
are objectively true, and can be classified as level 1 judgments. They are not true 
in an absolute, unchanging sense, but they are true relative to the conventions 
under which the speaker is operating. Thus, there is no error when the above 
claims are made. 
Frankena holds that maximally informed and enlightened observers will 
agree in their moral judgments, and that this agreement points to an underlying 
realism. In cases where there is disagreement, he argues that the burden falls to 
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the antirealist to demonstrate that the observers are actually maximally informed 
and enlightened. If they cannot do so, they have failed to establish the validity of 
their antirealist claims, as it is likely that the observers in question are simply 
less than ideal, which accounts for the discrepancy, rather than the lack of a 
moral fact of the matter.144 The problem with this argument is that it makes 
realism unfalsifiable. There is no way to detect whether the observers are 
actually “ideal,” so any instance of disagreement will get to count as evidence 
that the observer is not ideal. Frankena describes the process: 
…we must do our best, through reconsideration and discussion, to see if 
one of us is failing to meet the conditions in some way. If we can detect 
no failing on either side and still disagree, we may and I think still must 
each claim to be correct, for the conditions never are perfectly fulfilled 
by both of us…145 
 
Frankena goes on to say that the proponent of this view “…is not claiming an 
actual consensus, he is claiming that in the end – which never comes or comes 
only on the Day of Judgment – his position will be concurred in.”146 If ideal 
observer conditions occur “never or only on Judgment Day,” there is no way to 
demonstrate that there is actually a set of ideal observers who disagree with each 
other. This move requires proof of the antirealist that it would be impossible to 
ever obtain. 
                                                




 As a way to make this line of objection more fruitful, Frankena might lay 
out criteria for ideal evaluators such that it would be possible to know if 
someone qualified. In that case, we would have a clear test of falsifiability. If 
two individuals both meet the standards of an ideal observer and fail to agree, 
Frankena’s point has been refuted. The problem is, as Frankena himself admits, 
ideal observers are not actual observers, and actual observers are never ideal. 
What this means is, no set of observers are in a position to make the kind of 
judgment needed to get to a unified evaluation. Because it is impossible to 
establish the standards of ideal observers, find observers that meet those 
standards, and then test the unity or disunity of their evaluations, the problem 
persists. Frankena’s appeal to ideal observers does not offer new evidence in 
support of his position; it merely restates his original position that moral 
disagreements stem from ignorance. 
 What’s more, the antirealist can argue that even if maximally informed 
and enlightened observers did end up agreeing about their moral judgments, this 
would not necessarily point to an underlying realism. An objectivist antirealist 
could agree with Frankena’s claim that maximally informed observers will 
converge in their judgments once they have perfect (or at least adequate) 
knowledge of the relevant social norms, emotional states, and so forth applicable 
to the situation; the agreement would be at level 1 on my schema.  An antirealist 
variety of the ideal observer theory would be one in which the ideal observer has 
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full knowledge of the facts, and so is able to determine what the operative 
conventions are, and whether a particular act or work complies with those 
conventions. 
In this section, I have considered the argument that error theorists, and 
thus some antirealists, bear the burden of proof in the realism versus antirealism 
debate. Frankena shifts the burden to the theory that attributes to ordinary people 
widespread error in their beliefs. This is a reason to shift the burden of proof. 
However, I have argued that we can understand moral language as making 
objective claims about socially constructed and mind-dependent facts, thus 
demonstrating that antirealists need not be error theorists. As antirealism can 
preserve the widespread intuition that we are not in error each time we make a 
moral claim, this argument for placing the burden of proof on the antirealists 
fails. 
(III.b.2) Intuitiveness and Majority Opinion 
Frankena offered arguments in favor of shifting the burden of proof to 
the antirealists, based on the strength of the beliefs which error theory would 
find to be mistaken. Frankena’s concerns were addressed by demonstrating that 
moral beliefs and corresponding assertions could be understood as involving 
claims about the way particular acts fit with social norms. Thus, the antirealist 
need not hold that speakers are in error when they make moral claims. However, 
in addition to the argument for a burden of proof shift based on error theory, an 
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argument from intuitiveness can be given. Many feel realism is the intuitive 
position – that we default to realism unless called upon to consider the antirealist 
position. In this section, I will consider whether the intuitiveness of a position 
presents a good reason to shift the burden of proof onto the opposing position, 
and whether realism is actually more intuitive than antirealism. There are a 
couple of problems with giving intuitiveness weight regarding the burden of 
proof. First, how are we to know which view is more intuitive? Should we 
conduct a poll? Who do we ask – a random sample of all human beings? Only 
those we deem to be adequately educated? Only philosophers? Only ethicists 
and aestheticians? Any one of these groups is likely to give at least somewhat 
different answers, and the answer of the cross-section of humanity, as opposed 
to only ethicists and aestheticians, is likely to be very different indeed.  
 Further, even if we did find reason to take majority intuition as a reliable 
indicator of truth, it is unclear where the majority stands. Within the fields of 
ethics and aesthetics, there are clear instances of respected philosophers arguing 
on both sides. Most problematically, majority intuition goes one way regarding 
ethics (realist) and the other regarding aesthetics (antirealist), as anyone who 
began the day as a divergentist knows, so popular opinion is especially useless 
in resolving the particular question before us. 
There are more people who write in ethics and aesthetics on the realist 
side, though a plausible explanation for this is that, if you’re committed to 
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antirealism, you tend to think there’s not a whole lot left to say, and that the 
enterprise is a waste of your time. This phenomenon is seen in philosophy of 
religion, also. Though there are a few atheists participating in the discussion, the 
majority of figures writing in the field of philosophy of religion are theists, as 
they are the ones who think there is real, productive, and extremely important 
work to be done in the field. If you reject belief in God, you are likely to think 
there are better uses for your time than participating in arguments and 
discussions about the attributes and preferences of an imaginary being. Just so, 
in ethics and aesthetics, if you are committed to the belief that there are no 
knowable truths or standards in these fields, you are less likely to want to devote 
your research time to the subject. I actually think this is misguided, and will say 
more about that below. 
 Realists will often claim that their position is more intuitive, as most 
people seem to live their lives as if there are objective answers regarding 
morality, and to a lesser extent aesthetics. This point is similar to Frankena’s 
claim about moral language, but is different in ways important enough to receive 
separate consideration here. If questioned, the vast majority of individuals, 
regardless of their philosophical background or metaphysical pre-commitments, 
will tell you that you shouldn’t pour gasoline on cats and light them on fire for 
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recreational purposes.147 Out of the group of hold-outs, those who are unwilling 
to commit to a judgment about the morality of setting gasoline-soaked cats on 
fire in the abstract, only the most hardened will be able to refrain from gasping, 
crying out, or moving to stop you if you soak a cat in gasoline and reach for 
your lighter right in front of them. This shows, the realist will say, that we all are 
actually realists about some moral claims, even if we don’t want to admit it. As 
realism argues only that at least some claims are true in a mind-independent 
way, while anti-realism argues that none of them are, even this one example is 
enough to demonstrate the intuitiveness of realism. Regarding the cat, realists 
get to demand that the antirealist give an explanation about why cat flambé is 
not mind-independently bad – the burden is intuitively shifted to the antirealist 
to give an argument that shows how such an action could possibly be acceptable.  
 It is unclear that our intuitions really do side solidly with realism even in 
moral cases like the flaming cat. Sure, most people will argue that it shouldn’t 
be done, but there could be many reasons behind the argument, some realist, 
others antirealist, and some entirely amoral. It might be that you think the cat 
shouldn’t be toasted because you fear legal repercussions for the arsonist. 
Maybe, like many meat-eaters, you don’t see anything wrong with killing 
animals, but strongly prefer not to witness the death out of squeamishness. 
Perhaps you object to burning the cat based on your belief that the arsonist 
                                                
147 This example comes from Gilbert Harman. The Nature of Morality. Oxford University Press, 
1977, pp. 4-5. 
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would be engaging in an internally inconsistent act, given her beliefs about 
burning sentient beings generally.  
Most likely of all, however, you object because you really don’t want the 
cat to suffer a fiery death. You care about the cat, at least at this moment, at least 
enough that you don’t want it to suffer needlessly in this way. Such a motivation 
is not inconsistent with an antirealist account. Deep, impassioned preferences 
can still be understood as just that – preferences not dependent on an outside 
standard. Even if everyone had the same overwhelming concern for the cat and a 
strong feeling that it should not suffer in this way, this would not establish 
realism, as those feelings are easily understandable within an antirealist picture, 
as stemming from personal desires, preferences, and emotions that happen to be 
shared by many human beings.  
What’s more, Joyce argues that, although most people do seem to feel a 
strong, immediate reaction against a crass egoist or relativistic account, it is far 
less clear that most people reject the idea that values are mind-dependent. The 
ideal observer view, on my account (and Joyce’s), is antirealist, as it depends on 
facts about humans as a basis for judgment. Thus, if the types of intuitions we 
are talking about involve any kind of mind-dependence, an intuitive account 
would actually end up shifting the burden in the other direction. Joyce 
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concludes, and I agree, that there is no clear answer regarding which way our 
intuitions push us about this matter.148 
 Neither intuitiveness nor majority opinion can settle the question of who 
should bear the burden of proof in the meta-values debate. The same is true 
regarding the moral and aesthetic convergence versus divergence debate. 
Certainly historically, convergence has been the majority position, both among 
philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant), and lay people. Today, informal polling 
suggests that lay people have an unreflective inclination toward convergence, 
while aestheticians and ethicists tend more toward divergence. Intuitions can be 
pumped in either direction, winning some converts each way. The next step, 
then, is to consider the issues of explanatory strength and ontological parsimony 
regarding the burden of proof debate. 
 (III.b.3) Explanatory Power and Ontological Parsimony  
A final argument regarding the burden of proof stems from the issue of 
ontological parsimony. This principle holds that, other things being equal, 
theories that posit fewer ontological entities are preferable to those that posit 
more. Appealing to ontological parsimony suggests that the burden of proof 
ought to be shifted to the realist, as antirealism is more parsimonious. Closely 
connected with this issue is that of explanatory strength. While parsimony is 
desirable, the position under consideration must also effectively explain the 
                                                
148 Ibid. 
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available data. These are more compelling questions than those of intuitiveness 
and popularity, for even if everyone or almost everyone feels intuitively that 
there are mind-independent moral and aesthetic truths, we are not 
philosophically justified in appealing to those feelings unless we have some 
evidence to support them. Likewise, strong, widespread intuitions toward 
antirealism can’t compete with solid arguments against the existence of mind-
independent moral and aesthetic facts. Thus, if both realism and antirealism can 
adequately explain the data, antirealism is to be preferred, as it posits fewer 
entities. The burden of proof thus falls to the realist to offer a justification for 
allowing additional entities into her ontological schema. 
Richard Joyce spends some time discussing the question of burden of 
proof in meta-ethics, and his arguments can help make sense of the issues of 
explanatory power and ontological parsimony.149 Joyce points out that, when our 
intuitions pull us in one direction but the explanatory force of an argument pulls 
us in the other, we are compelled to surrender intuition in favor of the position 
that offers the best explanation. For example, Newtonian physics is more 
intuitive than Einsteinian physics, but we are compelled to accept Einstein’s 
model because it offers a better explanation of the data.150 
                                                
149 Similar points can be made regarding meta-aesthetics, as well, though Joyce focuses on meta-
ethics, here. 
150 Joyce, Richard. “Does Either Moral Realism or Moral Anti-Realism Explain the Phenomena 
Better Than the Other?” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. 
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 It seems legitimate to ask both the realist and the antirealist why they 
hold the position they do. The antirealist answer is likely to be something along 
the lines of, “I don’t see sufficient justification for this belief.” It is epistemically 
irresponsible to hold beliefs without sufficient justification. So, until the realist 
can show me why I also should be a realist, I ought to remain an antirealist. Can 
the realist make a similar claim? Is it legitimate for the realist to say that she 
doesn’t see any evidence for antirealism, and thus she is justified in being a 
realist until the anti-realist gives her evidence? Is, “this is my default position” 
enough reason to shift the burden of proof? 
Here’s an argument against that position. If we are to maintain consistent 
methodological principles across fields, we are committed to asking for 
evidence of the existence of things in a way that we are not expected to offer 
evidence of the absence of things. The person positing the existence of Yeti 
needs to show us some footprints. The Yeti-antirealist is not expected to show us 
all the places in which there are not footprints; rather, she is required to respond 
to any Yeti evidence presented to her.  She cannot turn her back on the Yeti 
realist’s discovery of mysterious tufts of white fur left behind in a cave, but 
there is no such thing as positive evidence for a negative hypothesis. All the 
antirealist can do is appeal to the lack of evidence. If we scour the area where 
Yeti is supposed to roam, looking carefully for footprints, fur, droppings (and it 
seems these would be impressively large and hard to miss), not to mention the 
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beast himself; if we set out an assortment of enticing treats, and despite all our 
efforts find no evidence, the most plausible conclusion, and the one we ought to 
accept, is that there simply is no such creature. The burden of proof falls to the 
Yeti realist to demonstrate his existence. 
Joyce points out that even though our intuition might be to accept mind-
independent moral and aesthetic facts at face value, most of us are antirealists 
about a host of other unseen entities. We are antirealists regarding unicorns, for 
example, because we have not seen them, and we feel justified in shifting the 
burden of proof onto the unicorn realists to show us evidence if we are to accept 
their position.  
If realism were always the default position, and the burden were always 
on the antirealists to demonstrate why we shouldn’t accept particular entities as 
real, each of us would be busy each day working to disprove the existence of 
every imaginable entity. Russell’s teacup, the flying spaghetti monster, the 
efficacy of voodoo practices, and the Abominable Snowman will all be fair 
game for existence, until we offer positive arguments against them. And the 
problem is, in the midst of all that snow, it’s going to be awful hard to be sure 
that the Snowman isn’t there. If you’re happy to be an anti-realist about Yeti but 
not moral facts, we have at least diffused the idea that realism is always the 
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intuitive position, and thus that anti-realists must justify their position against 
it.151 
The question is, on what basis do we reject the existence of unicorns and 
the like, and are moral and aesthetic facts relevantly similar such that they 
belong in the same category and thus may also be rejected? One way in which 
unicorns and Yeti are importantly different from moral and aesthetic facts is that 
they are the type of thing that we would expect to see, if they existed. They are 
understood as physical objects, and thus when we look in the places we would 
expect to find them (such as the snow-topped peaks of the Himalayas) and they 
are not there, we conclude that they do not exist. This, of course, is an unfair 
criticism to launch against moral and aesthetic facts, as they are not the type of 
thing we would expect to find physically manifested in the world. If we are to 
reject their existence on parsimonious grounds, it will have to be for a reason 
other than our ability to detect their physical presence.  
In addition to not finding an entity where it ought to be, if it were real, 
there are other grounds for rejecting something’s existence. Joyce explains a 
position accepted by both himself and Gilbert Harman: “Given the apparent 
possibility that any phenomenon may be satisfactorily explained without 
recourse to an appeal to moral facts, the onus is on the believer in such facts to 
                                                
151 Joyce, Richard. “Is Either Moral Realism or Moral Anti-Realism More Intuitive Than the 
Other?” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007. 
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clarify persuasively how they fit into the causal world order.”152 In other words, 
as we can explain the world just fine without positing mind-independent moral 
facts, those wanting to posit those extra entities must put forward reasons for 
doing so. 
Unicorns and Yeti are not needed in our ontology. We gain no benefit 
from belief in them. They do not account for otherwise mysterious phenomena; 
they do not help us to make sense of the world. This is an important distinction, 
because failure to see physical evidence of something is not alone enough to 
cause us to reject its existence. A persistent fever causes doctors to be realists 
about the existence of an underlying illness, even if they cannot determine what 
it is. We allow quarks into our ontology, although they are the type of thing we 
will never be able to physically detect. The question, then, is whether mind-
independent moral and aesthetic facts contribute something to our beliefs about 
the world such that it is worth adding them to our ontological scheme. Are they 
more like quarks, or the Abominable Snowman? 
Ontological parsimony asks us to keep our ontology as trim as possible. 
This means we should cut out belief in as many entities as we can, without 
losing anything important. We trim many things from our ontology without 
conclusive proof that they do not exist, and the principle of ontological 
parsimony tells us that is as it should be, for waiting until something has been 
                                                
152 Joyce. “Does…,” paragraph 9. 
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positively disproven would result in an enormous ontology in the meantime, 
given how difficult it can be to disprove an entity’s existence. We can’t be sure 
there is no Yeti, or that crystals do not actually have healing properties when 
combined with a mindset of openness and acceptance. However, believing in 
these entities doesn’t buy us anything that would make bloating our ontology 
worth it.  
Accepting belief in Yeti would not cause us to modify our lives or 
understanding of the world in any way. If we are going backpacking in the 
Himalayas we might be more fearful if we accepted his existence, but we 
already have good reason to accept Himalayan polar bears into our ontology, so 
there does not seem to be much gained from an extra fear of Yeti, as we will 
already, if wise, be prepared to encounter vicious, white furred beasts on our 
journey. Likewise, belief in the healing power of crystals fails to buy us 
anything when the efficacy of modern medicine has already been established, 
and can provide us with the same benefit that open-mindedness about crystals 
promises.  
 Ontological parsimony, then, tells us we should only accept the existence 
of mind-independent moral and aesthetic properties if we need them. If we can 
get by without them, our ontology will be trimmer, and this is desirable. I will 
spend quite a bit of time in (III.c) arguing that mind-independent moral and 
aesthetic properties are not needed – that our understanding of and ability to act 
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in the world work just as well without positing these extra entities. It is worth 
saying a bit about that here. What could accepting the existence of mind-
independent moral and aesthetic properties add to our understanding of and 
ability to act in the world? They do not explain the data better than their 
absence, as discussed above. They do not contribute to our ability to act in the 
world, nor does the rejection of their existence prohibit us from acting. We can 
still judge, praise, and blame. If we are able to think, live, and act in the world in 
just the same ways with or without belief in mind-independent moral and 
aesthetic properties, ontological parsimony demands that we reject belief in their 
existence, as all they do is bloat our ontology. 
 When deciding whether to converge toward realism or antirealism, the 
process of reflective equilibrium could be helpful. Former divergentists now 
realize they hold irreconcilable views. To determine which view to modify or 
reject, reflective equilibrium suggests that the option that would require the 
fewest changes to their current belief schemes is the one that should be accepted, 
all things being equal. This principle in itself does not provide a clear answer 
about which way to go; for some, the adoption of realist convergence would 
require a sweeping rewrite of one’s belief system, whereas others will require 
fewer changes if accepting antirealist convergence. 
 In this section, I have discussed three reasons for understanding the 
burden of proof as shifting one way or the other on the realist versus antirealist 
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debate. Error theorists are usually believed to bear the burden of proof, as they 
posit widespread mistakes in many people’s beliefs and speech. I have argued 
that antirealists need not accept error theory, and the form of antirealism I 
endorse does not hold that most people’s moral and aesthetic beliefs and speech 
are in error, so that worry is discharged. Regarding intuitiveness and majority 
opinion, I have argued that neither realism nor antirealism is clearly more 
intuitive, and thus that point cannot be used to establish which side bears the 
burden of proof. Finally, antirealism is clearly the more ontologically 
parsimonious position. It has the power to explain the available data as well as 
realism, while positing fewer entities, so on that count, realism bears the burden 
of proof. 
Certainly no reflective realist or antirealist thinks he is justified in 
holding whatever beliefs happen to occur to him until someone shows him why 
he shouldn’t. Of course, we do hold many beliefs without proper evidence, but 
when this is brought to our attention, as philosophers, we think the fitting action 
is to then examine those beliefs to make sure we are justified in holding them. 
Thus, when moral and aesthetic realists realize that they hold beliefs regarding 
the existence of entities for which there is insufficient evidence, or which are not 
needed to explain the available data, it looks like the burden is on them to justify 
those beliefs in the face of this challenge. On the flip side, it seems equally vital 
that antirealists refrain from taking a head-in-the-sand attitude that refuses to 
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consider reasons for accepting a realist position (those footprints and white fur 
tufts demand accounting for).   
As the intuitiveness of each position remains an open question, and 
ontological parsimony rules in favor of antirealism, it looks like it is more 
reasonable to place the burden of proof on the realist. However, the uncertainty 
regarding intuition suggests that the issue is not conclusively settled. The 
appropriate stance for both realists and antirealists, I think, is that of “Please, 
opponent, convince me. Show me your evidence.” To bring this back to the 
divergence versus convergence debate, until an argument for divergence is 
offered that can respond to the objections given in parts I and II, it looks like the 
most plausible position is that of convergence – there is no evidence to support a 
divergence position. 
At this point, we should reassess the state of the dilemma. New 
convergentists must decide whether to accept all-out realism or all-out 
antirealism. Either way, arguments will be needed to support the switch from, 
taking the one horn, moral realism to moral antirealism, and taking the other 
horn, aesthetic antirealism to aesthetic realism.  The task of those who choose 
the realist option will be to offer evidence in support of mind-independent153 
aesthetic facts, while the job of those who choose the antirealist option will be 
                                                
153 I understand the terms as Philip Pettit does, holding that a fact could be response-dependent 
yet mind-independent, if the response is not determined by the mental states of the being. Thus, 
a mind-independent aesthetic fact could be a property that has the disposition to produce a 
certain kind of response in observers. 
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that of responding to evidence of the existence of mind-independent moral facts. 
Given what has been established in this section, antirealism looks like the less 
daunting task. Yet, it is the one that is less likely to be chosen. In the following 
section, I will discuss the reasons one might resist antirealist convergence, and 
offer some responses to that resistance, with the goal of demonstrating that 
antirealism does not imply unacceptable consequences. 
(III.c) Accepting Antirealism 
 While I am not arguing that antirealist convergence is the only 
reasonable way to go, or that all realist arguments fail, it does seem like a 
mistake to accept realism solely or largely due to misconceptions about 
antirealism and its implications. While some aesthetic antirealists probably 
arrived at their position through an unreflective intuition, many of them were 
likely to have already tried out aesthetic realist arguments and found them 
lacking, which then pushed them to aesthetic antirealism. The new realist 
convergentist now has to revisit those rejected arguments and try again to find a 
workable one.  
Additionally, as established in (III.b), a heavier burden of proof falls to 
realists, who must produce some evidence to support the positing of mind-
independent moral and aesthetic facts, while antirealists are not called upon to 
produce positive evidence of their negative hypothesis (that mind-independent 
moral and aesthetic facts do not exist). Despite antirealist convergence being the 
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easier to establish option, it is less likely to be taken than realist convergence. In 
this section, I will discuss reasons why moral and aesthetic antirealism are often 
shied away from, explaining why many of those reasons are misguided, 
stemming from some misunderstandings of what antirealism does and does not 
entail.  
Those tending toward realist convergence for weak reasons, or who are 
unable to find an acceptable aesthetic realist account, might be inclined instead 
to adopt a moral and aesthetic antirealist position.  These will usually be 
individuals who are inclined toward moral realism and aesthetic antirealism 
(though they might also have begun as moral antirealists and aesthetic realists). 
Most people who are considering or who have committed to antirealism do find 
particular moral and aesthetic frameworks more compelling than others, but they 
are unable to offer robust groundings for these preferences.  Recognizing that 
such preferences seem to be based on intuitions that are not universally or, often, 
even widely shared, and acknowledging the problems with intuitionist accounts 
as discussed above, these new convergentists feel compelled to look toward 
antirealism, despite realist intuitions and concerns about antirealist implications. 
Overcoming some of those concerns will make realism a more viable option for 
those who are interested in deciding which way to converge based on the 
strength of the arguments, rather than concerns regarding antirealist implications 
which could influence one’s evaluation of those arguments. 
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The most likely reason one might be pushed towards antirealism is the 
observation that there are areas in both fields where firmly held beliefs are 
clearly split. Is choosing your own time and manner of death moral? Was 
bombing Japan to end World War II a horrendous evil or a utilitarian good?  
Aesthetic judgments are perhaps even more divergent. Critics and common folk 
divide over artists such as Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, while critics 
themselves are divided over whether Jay Leno is funny, and whether Vampire 
Weekend is any good. These are areas in which thoughtful, rational, other-
regarding individuals remain in disagreement. 
It is worth noting that there are some profound disagreements regarding 
the proper interpretation of scientific data as well. In many cases, these 
disagreements are sharp at the advent of a new discovery, and then dissipate 
once more information has been gathered. In such cases, the disagreement stems 
from an initial lack of factual data. The scientific community remains divided on 
some matters, however, such as the proper understanding of quantum 
mechanics. In those areas, for precisely that reason, some hold that we must be 
instrumentalists, as there is no evidence to support an objective answer to the 
questions.154 This is similar to the attitude taken by many antirealists regarding 
moral and aesthetic disagreements.  
                                                
154 Paul Dirac, Richard Feynman, and David Mermin hold this view. 
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The divergence of views regarding moral and aesthetic judgments, as 
well as problems with responses to that divergence, such as ideal observer 
arguments, might push us toward antirealism. However, few are willing to 
accept a position that commits one to the rejection of all evaluative discourse 
and makes nonsense of our judgments. Too often, the tendency is to grasp for a 
realist answer at all costs, even if that means weakening the position to the point 
that it fails to be realism anymore. So, does antirealism commit us to these 
things? 
Drawing on arguments from Richard Joyce as well as my own 
arguments, I will show that antirealism need not lead to a disintegration of 
values or order, mass chaos, or the dissolution of art and morality as we know 
them. In fact, art criticism and ethical evaluation would continue in much the 
same way as they always have, according to objective evaluative standards. The 
main modification will be that we recognize we are judging based on 
conventional criteria, rather than according to a mind-independent standard. I 
described this process in (II.d), but more detail will be offered here. This 
demonstration should indicate why antirealist convergence is not to be avoided 
if it ends up being the most reasonable position, given the evidence and 
arguments. 
As an alternative to my own account, Joyce’s moral fictionalist account 
offers another route by which we can understand the way meaningful moral and 
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aesthetic discourse could continue in light of the acceptance of antirealist 
convergence. Joyce offers both a motivation for the continuance of moral 
discourse as well as an explanation of what exactly an antirealist can be 
understood as doing when engaging in moral discourse. Although Joyce focuses 
on moral discourse, his account can be extended to aesthetics as well, and I will 
explain how that extension would work. I will analyze the strength and 
weaknesses of Joyce’s account, which is one among several options available to 
the antirealist. It is worth noting that I am not endorsing Joyce’s position 
specifically; rather, I am presenting it as one response to the charge that 
accepting antirealism makes moral discourse impossible. 
While the best realist moral philosophers generally work to construct 
positive realist accounts, the response by regular people, including philosophers, 
to the proposal of antirealism is often one of instant dismissal. How could we 
even consider accepting antirealism? It implies an inability to engage in moral or 
aesthetic discourse. It would mean we couldn’t evaluate artworks or actions, that 
we would have no grounds for praise or punishment. Basically, the common 
view seems to be that accepting antirealist convergence means we’ll have to quit 
talking about morality and aesthetics altogether. So many people seem to think 
realism implies things that it does not, it is worth spending some time discussing 
what the antirealist picture I am presenting really looks like, in order to deflate 
some of those ungrounded fears. These concerns seem to come in three main 
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flavors: 1) antirealism implies a breakdown of order; 2) antirealism destroys 
individuals’ ability to evaluate; 3) antirealism undermines the ability of groups 
to engage in evaluative discourse;155 and 4) antirealism eliminates moral 
motivation. Each of these concerns will be addressed and deflated.  
(III.c.1) Moral and Aesthetic Order Will Persist  
A common fear about antirealism is that it would result in a breakdown 
in the established order. For instance, that antirealism is thought to imply a 
rejection of rules that would lead to a chaotic society. However, as discussed in 
(II.d), antirealism is in fact consistent with the invocation of moral rules; it 
simply holds that these rules are grounded in human conventions and 
agreements rather than in mind-independent realities. Even the most dyed in the 
wool realist accepts the existence and validity of many rules and systems that 
are not “real” in any sort of metaphysical sense. Much of the order in our lives 
has been placed there by conventions – some of them arbitrary, some matters of 
general taste – but all of it acting as a stabilizing force in our lives, even though 
it easily could have been different.  It is completely arbitrary that Americans 
drive on the right side of the street – the left works just as well, as many other 
countries have demonstrated. Yet, this is a rule that even a hardened lawbreaker 
will recognize is extremely important to follow. Left or right, it doesn’t matter. 
                                                
155 There is an important difference between 2) the ability to evaluate, and 3) the ability to 
engage in evaluative discourse. Evaluative discourse is done by groups and communities, and 
can involve elements that would not be present in individual evaluation, such as persuasion, 
negotiation, and agreements that could lead to the establishment of conventions. 
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What matters is that we all agree to do one or the other, and it is the power of 
that arbitrary agreement which keeps our roads from dissolving into chaos.  
The power of our traffic laws is generated entirely from human beings, 
and not even all humans at that. Speed limits, for instance, differ from block to 
block, or even based on time of day. We find some of these rules distasteful, 
inconsistent, unnecessary. The ones we are most likely to follow with slavish 
obedience are those whose importance as stabilizing and safety-ensuring forces 
we recognize, such as which side of the street to drive on, and using headlights 
when driving after dark. Anyone who thinks about it will realize that these rules 
did not exist before a group of people got together and agreed upon them. They 
have changed over time, and can easily be abolished, thus losing their present 
force. The only power these laws have is what we give them, in the name of 
order, convenience, and safety. 
In the interest of clarity, it is worth briefly revisiting the sense in which 
things like traffic laws are antirealist. Given that groups of people have gotten 
together and codified traffic laws, these rules are now real in the sense that 
statements about them have truth-value. “It is illegal not to stop at red lights” is 
a true statement in places where that law has been set. “Green means stop” is 
false, and “The speed limit on the street nearest my house is 35 mph” is true. 
However, these propositions are all true and false based on conventions that 
have been established by human beings, could have been otherwise, and could 
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easily be changed. Lacking the relevant conventions, the truth-value of the 
propositions would no longer hold. 
Traffic laws are an example of antirealist rules that are extremely 
powerful and useful, while being clearly non-necessary and the product of 
human convention. Our lives work better when we have standards we can agree 
upon, and when there are no absolute standards out there in the world (no holy 
book or careful deliberation can tell us whether the left or the right side is better 
for driving) we simply choose one and go with it, because in cases like driving, 
a rule arrived at by a coin flip is far better than no rule at all.  
So many of the rules that guide our daily lives are like this. There is no 
particular reason why my section of Introduction to Ethics needs to meet from 
6:30 to 9:20 on Thursday evenings. It might be that everyone in the class would 
prefer to begin at 6:00, instead. Perhaps the nearly three hour time slot is less 
conducive to learning than shorter blocks of time a couple of meetings per week. 
Maybe everyone in the class feels this way. Maybe everyone wants to meet 
earlier, and for shorter blocks of time, and on Mondays as well. We could do 
this. We could buck the rule, or change the rule. But we don’t. Why? Partly 
because many of us don’t recognize how easy it might be to violate the rules, 
and how consequence-free many of those violations might be. Perhaps we think 
we are the only ones interested in a change, or we fear admonition from 
authorities. However, those of us who think about it might realize that we could 
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violate the rules in all sorts of ways, but don’t, because we respect the system of 
which those rules are a part. This example demonstrates that a recognition of the 
arbitrariness of a great many rules does not lead us to reject them. We continue 
to follow rules and accept systems that are useful, so to the extent that moral and 
aesthetic rules and systems are useful, we have good reason to believe they 
would continue to be embraced with the acceptance of antirealism. 
We already accept that we abide by and value rules and systems that are 
the product of human invention and are subject to change. Moral and aesthetic 
antirealists agree with this, and add that some of the rules and systems that you 
might think are absolute are in fact more like traffic laws or university degrees. 
Contrary to popular belief, most antirealists, like realists, see great value and 
power in these conventions – even the arbitrary ones. Thus, there is no reason to 
think the acceptance of antirealist convergence would cause us to feel differently 
about matters of ethics or aesthetics. Antirealists hold that even something as 
basic as lying is not deeply, metaphysically wrong (or right). However, 
antirealists will still have many good reasons to tell the truth, and to want others 
to do so as well, and these reasons will in many cases mirror the reasons we 
have for honoring traffic laws and university regulations.  
It is worth discussing the difference between a rule about which side of 
the street we drive on, which seems to be arbitrary, and a prohibition on lying, 
which seems not to be arbitrary. While it really makes no difference which side 
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of the street a society agrees to drive on, provided everyone drives on the same 
side, there are good prudential reasons to favor truth telling to lying. A system in 
which everyone has reason to think the information they receive will be accurate 
is, practically speaking, preferable to one in which it’s anyone’s guess whether 
any given statement you hear is true. Truth telling works better, all things 
considered, than lying. This difference between traffic laws and lying might be 
offered as a reason to think that truth telling is compelling in a way that 
surpasses arbitrary convention, and thus we should consider the wrongness of 
lying as relevantly different (more real) than the wrongness of driving on the left 
side of the road in the United States.  
Truth telling versus lying might be understood as more analogous, then, 
to something like the convention of driving vehicles forward, rather than in 
reverse. While our roads could function if people regularly drove around in 
reverse, things clearly go better when we drive our cars forward, so that is a 
convention which is to be preferred not just in the interest of finding a set 
standard which everyone will follow, but also because it has practical 
advantages. The clear practical advantage of driving forward over reverse does 
not imply that driving forward is better in a morally realist sense, however; it is 
prudentially better – better for avoiding accidents and getting where we’re going 
as easily as possible.  
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Although some systems or practices have clear practical advantages over 
alternative systems, this does not demonstrate that they should be granted realist 
status. H. Paul Grice argues that truth telling should be favored over lying 
because it leads to a better system of communication.156 Many have held that 
truth telling is preferable because there are practical advantages to being seen as 
an honest person. There are many reasons to prefer truth telling to lying that 
have nothing to do with moral realism, or with morality at all. In fact, the clear 
advantages to a system of truth telling make it extremely likely that people 
would continue to embrace the practice in the face of antirealism. There is near 
100 percent adherence to the driving on the right side of the street convention, 
which is admittedly arbitrary. Given that there are plenty of non-arbitrary 
reasons to prefer truth telling, we have good reason to think truth telling would 
continue even if widely rejected as a realist moral rule. Being an antirealist 
about the moral status of lying does not change our truth-telling behavior in the 
world, so antirealism should not be feared or avoided for this reason. 
(III.c.2) Moral and Aesthetic Judgments Are Still Possible 
 
Another common, and ungrounded, fear is that if antirealism is true, 
there will be no room for moral judgment or deliberation, or for art criticism. As 
discussed in (II.d), we regularly engage in critical analysis and evaluation of acts 
                                                
156 See Grice, H. Paul. “Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3, Speech Acts, 
edited by Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan. New York: Academic Press, 1975, pp. 41-58. 
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and works that are based on conventional standards. The standards of judgment 
for any athletic performance are conventional. Football players can run with and 
kick the ball, but if a basketball player does either we judge him harshly. Soccer 
players can’t even touch the ball without a negative evaluation, though they do 
get to kick it. We understand that these standards have been assigned by 
ordinary, fallible individuals who could have done things differently, yet we also 
find something pleasing about learning those arbitrary standards and using them 
ourselves to assign judgments to athletic performances.  
In the same way, there is no reason to think the acceptance of antirealism 
would prevent us from engaging in art criticism. In fact, antirealists already do 
so. Rather than an appeal to what is mind-independently beautiful, antirealist art 
criticism determines artistic merit based on agreed-upon standards, which 
admittedly could have been different, just as the standards for athletic evaluation 
could have been different.   
One concern about a conventionalist approach is that it does not allow 
the conventions themselves to be critically evaluated, as there is no standard 
outside of the convention by which it could be judged better or worse. Those 
who accept a realist view of value will argue that the conventions should be 
evaluated and modified in terms of that outside standard. In the moral realm, 
conventions should be adjusted to line up with mind-independent standards of 
right and wrong, and regarding aesthetics, conventions should be adapted so as 
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to conform with mind-independent standards of beauty. The problem is, on an 
antirealist picture, there is no outside standard by which to judge the 
conventions, so the worry is that we will be stuck with what could be 
undesirable conventions with no way to critique and change them.  
While it is true that conventions cannot be evaluated according to a 
relevantly mind-independent standard on an antirealist view, there are multiple 
ways in which they could be subjected to non-conventional evaluation. I do not 
espouse thoroughgoing conventionalism. As discussed in Part II, I hold that 
there are several factors that influence and ultimately determine our value 
judgments (such as the reasons for preferring truth-telling to lying, as mentioned 
above). In addition to convention, emotion, utility, and reason all play roles, and 
these additional factors allow for a critique of the conventions themselves. If an 
established convention began, for any number of reasons, to be unsatisfactory 
for those who follow it, common consensus is all that is needed to change it. An 
example of a modification to convention is the errata that are added to rules of 
play in games when it is found that the original rules are flawed in some way, 
perhaps in the interest of safety, or to make the game flow better or to add 
excitement.  
In the following sub-sections, I will discuss genre-specific art criticism 
and convention-specific moral evaluation to demonstrate that much of our 
current aesthetic and moral evaluation already adheres to a conventionalist 
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model, and that this does not threaten our ability to judge or the quality of our 
evaluations. These are level 1 evaluations, using the terminology introduced in 
Part II. 
Genre-Specific Art Criticism 
Rock music critics Greg Kot and Jim DeRogatis of Chicago Public 
Radio’s Sound Opinions argue that the Ramones and AC/DC ought to be praised 
for their characteristic sound (even though all of their songs basically sound the 
same, by their admission), because those songs established the genre 
conventions by which we now judge other works of those genres (punk rock and 
heavy metal, respectively). The Dave Matthews Band, on the other hand, ought 
to be negatively judged for their characteristic sound, as it does nothing more 
than work within an existing genre (jam band) in a non-innovative way, so the 
fact that all their songs sound the same is a bad thing.157  
New York Times book critic Vanessa Grigoriadis analyzes David 
Sedaris’ When You Are Engulfed in Flames specifically in terms of the “realish” 
personal-anecdotal genre to which it belongs. The action in the book is 
agonizingly mundane – Sedaris writes of passing the time in his isolated 
Normandy home by developing unhealthy attachments to the spiders that live in 
his windowsill (he captures insects to present to the arachnids as gifts), and of 
                                                
157 Kot and DeRogatis have made this and similar points on numerous occasions. See Sound 
Opinions #65, October 16, 2007, #151, October 17, 2008, and #184, June 5, 2009. 
http://www.soundopinions.org/  
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the wave of love he feels when his partner is willing to lance his hard-to-reach 
boil (what a moving indicator of the depth of one’s commitment!). Such 
material would be dreadfully out of place in most works, but fits perfectly in a 
genre that is at its best when the writer is willing to expose and analyze his 
personal, yet ultimately universal and relatable, moments.158 
Similar examples can be found for any genre. The unrealistic props, 
terrible costumes, and over the top portrayals which make a series like Mr. Show 
a brilliant example of sketch comedy would be inappropriate and distracting in a 
low-budget drama. Because antirealists don’t think there is a final form of 
beauty or aesthetic goodness, there would be little grounds for judging a work as 
all-things-considered better than all other works. Evaluation will have to be 
genre-specific, and will largely be higher and lower ratings, rather than 
something like a numbered list.  
Although antirealism is often resisted, this is actually the way art 
criticism works today, as the above examples make evident. Works are 
evaluated within genres, and critics can point to specific established standards 
by which works are judged. We don’t fault The Sorrow and the Pity for its 
failure to be funny, or Airplane! for its lack of serious content. A critic who 
would do so doesn’t understand the genre-specific conventions by which we 
judge these films. While much of art criticism is compatible with antirealism, 
                                                
158 See Vanessa Grigoriadis. “Up in Smoke,” Sunday Book Review, The New York Times, June 
15, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/15/books/review/Grigoriadis-t.html  
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this does not demonstrate that realism is false. What it does demonstrate is that 
concerns that antirealism would lead to an inability to engage in art criticism and 
aesthetic discourse are unfounded, as antirealist art criticism, which conforms to 
objective genre-specific standards, is already the dominant form of art criticism 
we see today.  
Additionally, as these examples show, evaluation based on standards that 
have been established and agreed upon by groups of people do not make the 
evaluations arbitrary or reducible to “whatever I happen to like.” Even in cases 
where a particular genre falls out of fashion, the standards of that genre can still 
be applied, regardless of the popular success of the work. The conventions 
themselves can also be the subject of evaluation, in level 2 evaluations, as 
explained in Part II. Probably the most common way this happens in aesthetics 
is through the emergence of a new genre, which will be discussed in detail 
below. 
The acceptance of conventional standards gives artists something to 
shoot for, it gives us a common language in which to engage in dialogue, and it 
helps us teach others the value we see in particular artworks. However, because 
these standards are merely conventional, there is nothing stopping an artist from 
choosing to step outside of the established conventions and create a work that, at 
the time, defies all genres. Maybe it’s a hybrid genre, like the interesting musical 
mixture created by Uncle Tupelo that we now call alt-country, or something 
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entirely new, such as Marcel Duchamp’s found art. When something new hits 
the scene, we usually don’t know quite how to handle it, because no evaluative 
standards are in place. This probably partially accounts for the poor reception 
that initially meets such innovators. However, over time, if the style sticks 
around, evaluative standards are established which deal with the particular 
merits common to the genre. Works by new practitioners are then judged based 
on those criteria. 
An interesting phenomenon occurs when new genres are created. The 
musician Girl Talk calls his music ‘collage,’ and understands his work as 
importantly different than the genres that most closely resemble what he is 
doing. Some critics want to lump his work in with DJ music, while others want 
to evaluate him according to mash-up standards, but Girl Talk himself and at 
least some critics – Sound Opinions’ Kot and DeRogatis, for example – 
understand his work as a genre unto itself. This means that an evaluation of one 
of his works in terms of the genre standards of DJ or mash-ups fails to 
accurately evaluate the work. Girl Talk is currently establishing the prototypes 
by which other collage artists will be evaluated in the future. Once the genre has 
been set, we will be able to look back on the earliest examples and discuss the 
ways in which those standards were set. For the moment, we will have to be 
content with an awkward, incomplete evaluation of these earliest examples of a 
new genre.  
 208 
Convention-Specific Moral Evaluation 
 Genre-specific art criticism is all well and good, but how does this 
translate over into our moral evaluations? Do we do anything similar when we 
form moral judgments, or is moral evaluation necessarily more universal? There 
are in fact clear parallels in ethics, the most obvious of which can be found in 
the sub-field of professional ethics. Different standards of evaluation are applied 
to individuals depending on their institutional roles. In the state of Oklahoma, 
not known for the progressiveness of its legislation, an individual can receive up 
to five years in prison for killing an animal (this includes “any mammal, bird, 
fish, reptile or invertebrate, including wild and domesticated species.”)159 In 
addition to the legal prohibition against ordinary citizens killing animals, most 
people react with horror at such stories – it is commonly considered to be 
grossly immoral. Yet, certain individuals, such as pest control workers and 
slaughterhouse employees, are not only permitted to kill animals, they are 
supposed to do it – it is their job.  
 An individual who is aware that a crime has been committed yet fails to 
report this information to the police can be charged as an accessory. We tend to 
think badly of people who allow others to get away with crimes. Yet, we make 
special moral rules for attorneys, granting them attorney-client privilege, 
whereby they not only do not have to report their knowledge of the crime, their 
                                                
159 Oklahoma Animal Cruelty Statutes. http://www.ok.gov/~okag/forms/ogc/anc.pdf  
 209 
job is to not tell – to protect the person they (in some cases) know to be a 
criminal. Most moral realists recognize that individuals have special rule sets 
depending on the particular institutions to which they belong. 
 These institutions are not all connected with one’s profession, either. 
Parents are granted special authority to make decisions on behalf of their 
children that others may not make. We hold our close friends responsible for 
telling us the honest truth even when it hurts, but we permit acquaintances to get 
away with false niceties. Relationship exclusivity in some degree is expected in 
many romantic relationships, but would be considered strangely territorial in 
non-romantic friendships.  
 As in genre-specific art criticism, discussed above, moral conventions 
themselves can be evaluated and modified. This will happen as part of level 2 
evaluation, which involves a subjective combination of intuition, emotion, 
reason and a preference for utility that is particular to the evaluator and her value 
set. Despite the individualistic nature of level 2 evaluations, however, there is 
usually a great deal of overlap, as discussed above, because most people care 
about many of the same things – consistency, rationality, and so forth – which 
leads to a similarity in judgments.  
One worry that exists regarding moral conventions that is less of a 
concern in aesthetics is that we tend to want to say that some moral conventions 
that have existed are just plain wrong. While a thoroughgoing conventionalist 
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cannot make such a claim, many antirealists can, including the strain of 
antirealism I advocate. While antirealism won’t allow for a mind-independent 
moral evaluation, certainly individuals and groups can pass judgment on 
conventions. If convention A serves an individual or group better than 
convention B, A can be judged objectively better than B, in that sense (as in the 
cases of driving forward rather than backward, and telling the truth, rather than 
telling lies).  
Consider how this works regarding an institution such as slavery, which 
was discussed above. There have been societies in which slavery was a 
conventionally accepted practice, and was considered acceptable by the vast 
majority of the population, despite the fact that a minority group’s interests were 
not taken into consideration. If antirealism commits us to holding that slavery is 
beyond judgment, and is in fact acceptable, in those societies, many will object 
that this is a deep problem with the position, as the interests of the minority 
population should not be discounted. An account of morality that is entirely 
based on convention is committed to the position that, until a particular 
convention is changed, practices complying with that convention are in fact 
morally acceptable, as morality consists of nothing more than conforming to the 
conventions under which one lives. Thus, in slave societies, slavery is morally 
acceptable, and in free societies slavery is morally unacceptable. This 
consequence is sufficient for many to reject thoroughgoing conventionalism. 
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Antirealists need not be committed to this position, however. On my 
account, moral and aesthetic judgments emerge from a plurality of factors, 
convention being one, along with emotion, reason, and a tendency to prefer the 
useful. In level 2 judgments, convention and morality are separable, so it is 
possible to judge a convention as immoral in the time and place that it exists. In 
level 2 analysis, conventions, like the other factors, are subject to rational 
criticism, which in the case of slavery might well include the point that the 
convention fails to serve the interests of some of the members of the society. 
Such criticisms will often be the driving force that eventually results in the 
modification of the convention. If we accept the argument that morality has 
emerged as an other-regarding institution which was offered in (II.d), the fact 
that the institution of slavery fails to promote the interests of some members of 
the group can be offered as evidence that the convention ought to be rejected in 
favor of a convention that takes all group members’ interests into consideration. 
This is not a realist move, as the establishment of morality as other-regarding is 
itself conventional. 
Above, I discussed Girl Talk, the musician who is making music that is 
currently the only example of its genre. This is analogous to the situation that 
arises when new technology presents moral quandaries for which no established 
norms are in place. An area where this is clear today regards intellectual 
property. Our previous standards by which someone’s creative work is 
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considered their own have been turned on their head by the availability of 
electronic media and file sharing. Common intuitions tell us it is wrong to walk 
out of a music store with an unpaid-for CD, but there are also strong intuitions 
telling us there is nothing wrong with making a copy of a CD for a friend. So, 
what happens when suddenly you have thousands of friends happy to share their 
CDs with you? Electronic media presents a new case. Electronic music files are 
not CDs, and your BitTorrent friends are not the same as the people you invite to 
your birthday parties. There is a great deal of uncertainty right now about how 
we should regard electronic property, and until we get a bit of distance from it, 
we will be left fumbling for appropriate evaluations, much as we fumble to 
evaluate Girl Talk today. 
 Just as the presence of conventional standards of evaluation in art 
criticism does not demonstrate the falsity of realism, so the fact that some of the 
moral judgments we make today are based heavily in convention and are 
changeable does not disprove realism. The above examples have shown, 
however, that moral judgment is still possible and meaningful on an antirealist 
picture, which should alleviate worries about that possible implication of 
antirealism. In the following section, I will consider the worry that antirealism 
leads to an inability to engage in any sort of moral discourse, as well as the 
concern that it undermines moral and aesthetic motivation, leading to an 
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“anything goes” attitude. Richard Joyce’s fictionalist account will offer one 
possible route out of these concerns.  
(III.c.3) Is Antirealism Self-Undermining? 
 A worry regarding antirealism is that it leaves us with no guide for our 
actions. As Joyce puts it, “If there’s nothing that we ought to do, then what 
ought we to do?”160 The concern here is that without a moral system in place, it 
makes no sense to consider how we should behave at all, which would quickly 
result in a descent into chaos. Judith Jarvis Thompson discusses this problem in 
terms of what she calls the Moral Assessment Thesis, which states, “moral 
assessment is pointless unless it is possible to find out about some moral 
sentences that they are true.”161 On this account, antirealism entails serious, 
unsavory consequences, as it undermines our ability to engage in moral and 
aesthetic discourse. We would be unable to discuss morality and art at all (in 
anything but a nonsensical way), and without the ability to discuss, any 
possibilities of sanction, judgment, punishment, and reward will be lost. We will 
be resigned to living in a world in which anything goes and no judgments are 
possible. 
Joyce’s response to the worry presented by Thompson (which is a 
common concern among realists) demonstrates that this isn’t the case, as we can 
                                                
160 Joyce, Richard. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 175. 
161 Harman, Gilbert, and Judith Jarvis Thompson. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996, p. 67. 
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distinguish between moral and practical ought’s. Joyce argues that, on an 
antirealist account, moral ought’s are nonsensical, but he still holds that there 
remains plenty of room for a clear, consistent, principled code of conduct, based 
on any number of practical considerations. All antirealism eliminates are 
categorical imperatives; hypothetical imperatives will remain alive and well. I 
take the more modest position that moral ought’s are not nonsensical, but that 
they make sense only within particular contexts. My disagreement with Joyce 
here is a minor, mainly semantic one. Joyce understands hypothetical 
imperatives as amoral, whereas I see some hypothetical imperatives as moral. 
The moral ones are those that concern one’s behavior as it impacts other 
people’s preferences, while the amoral ones are those that impact only one’s 
self. “If you want to avoid cavities, brush your teeth,” is an amoral hypothetical 
imperative, and “if you want to ease the suffering of others, give to charity,” is a 
moral hypothetical imperative. Joyce would understand both of these 
imperatives as amoral, as the appropriate course of action is premised on 
individual preference in both cases.  
 Joyce understands amoral practical decision making as the business of 
satisfying preferences (either actual or informed, and not necessarily selfish) 
through cost-benefit analysis.162 He presents an account of how we might 
understand a continued engagement in moral discourse by individuals who do 
                                                
162 Ibid., p. 177. 
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not believe there is any moral truth to be found. What would these individuals 
be doing? Continuing to believe something they have already accepted as false? 
That would be both irrational and psychologically very difficult. Then, shouldn’t 
moral antirealists simply not engage in moral discourse, just as those who don’t 
believe in astrology don’t sit around talking about it? Joyce acknowledges that 
this is an option, and one he’s not necessarily ruling out; maybe antirealists 
should simply find something else to talk about. However, he maintains that it 
might turn out that holding onto moral beliefs and the structure they provide 
produces more good than harm, and such beliefs should be retained for that 
reason, regardless of their truth.163  
How do moral beliefs benefit us? Joyce argues that moral beliefs “bolster 
self-control,” by encouraging us to do things which are practically desirable, yet 
which we might be tempted to avoid, whether because they are difficult or 
simply out of laziness.164 For example, one might see a practical good in marital 
fidelity without believing there is a moral imperative to be faithful. However, 
“this is a bad idea that will probably end up netting more bad than good for me” 
is less persuasive in the heat of temptation than “infidelity is morally wrong.” In 
such a situation, a moral belief could benefit an antirealist by keeping her on a 
path toward overall preference satisfaction.  
                                                
163 Ibid, p. 178-180. 
164 Ibid, p. 181. 
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 This account of the usefulness of morality is purely individualistic. Joyce 
says: 
Morality is a useful institution only if the sense of “must-be-doneness” is 
attached to the already useful actions. But this way of addressing the 
issue cannot proceed until we get straight on the issue of to whom the 
benefits are accruing or being denied…. A vague thought is that when 
we are asking how useful morality is we’re asking about how useful it is 
to the society as a whole. But it is far from clear what sense can be made 
of this notion…165 
 
Joyce points out that what is good for one society or segment of society may 
well be bad for another. He gives an example of a war of aggression that is 
clearly bad for the ravaged country, but just as obviously good for the 
aggressors. He concludes, then, that the benefit of morality must be unpacked in 
terms of individuals, rather than societies. 
 Joyce argues that, once we work out the game theoretic calculus, moral 
behavior (cooperation, rather than defection) nets more benefit than loss, in 
general. Though there will be cases in which there is more to be gained through 
defection, one will fare best, in the long run, by adopting a moral lifestyle. Once 
this has been established, Joyce thinks it is better to throw oneself whole-
heartedly into the project. He says, “…we should not think of the task as 
instrumentally justifying moral beliefs on a case-by-case basis – rather, I am 
satisfied to provide instrumental justification for ‘being a moral believer.’”166 
Psychologically, Joyce thinks shifting in and out of moral belief as it is useful 
                                                
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid., pp. 181-182. 
 217 
will be impossible, so the smart action, for the moral antirealist, is to will 
himself to believe in morality, for pragmatic purposes. 
This argument by Joyce is fairly weak. It amounts to antirealists tricking 
themselves into accepting the force of morality “for their own good.” Certainly, 
pragmatic arguments for the retention of morality for the purpose of crowd 
control are popular and not unconvincing. But this is not what Joyce is 
advocating. He is not talking about unreflective individuals who are unable to 
engage or uninterested in engaging in meta-ethical theorizing. Joyce is talking 
about himself and others like him – intelligent, reflective individuals who have 
adopted antirealism after careful consideration of the meta-evaluative options. I 
do not think his argument gives adequate consideration to the difficulty such 
individuals would have in tricking themselves into toeing the moral line, even 
for their own good. What seems more likely is that the individual Joyce 
describes, weighing the pros and cons of, say, fidelity, will reach a decision 
through reason, and then will either stick by that decision or fail to do so, due to 
weakness of will. Given that even those whole-heartedly convinced of 
morality’s force often succumb to temptation, it seems very unlikely indeed that 
someone who is trying to trick herself into being a moral believer will find that 
little trick to be that extra boost needed to strengthen her will. 
 Joyce’s argument regarding the usefulness of moral belief understands 
‘good’ as ‘useful,’ leaving us with the question, useful to whom? Armed robbery 
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might be useful to me, if I can get away with it, though it is certainly not useful 
to those I rob. Joyce’s picture of the good we are seeking through maintaining 
moral beliefs relies on work in evolutionary biology and game theory that tells 
us that cooperation is more beneficial than hostile competition most of the time, 
and thus that it should be seen as the preferred strategy. This gives us a clear, 
practical, amoral explanation for following a course of action that accords 
closely with traditional morality.  
 It might appear that this explanation offers the grounding for realism that 
moral theorists have been seeking. What is the moral course of action? It is 
whatever maximizes group cooperation, which in turn maximizes the good for 
the individuals in the group. Unfortunately, this is not the case, as a realist 
system would tell us that the good really is that which maximizes group 
cooperation, and the evolutionary game theoretical picture cannot give us 
anything that definite. The best this picture gets us is what Joyce calls “for the 
most part” terms. In general, promoting cooperation is a good way to proceed, 
but there will be cases in which an individual or the group’s preferences can be 
satisfied better by failing to cooperate, and in those cases the best course of 
action really is to lie, cheat, steal or bully – whatever will promote the agent’s 
preferences.  
This is not a moral system, so restraints on action simply because 
something oughtn’t be done are nonsensical. Joyce says, “…if a person’s desires 
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are not for self-interest, but perhaps for a fiery self-destruction in which she 
takes as many innocents with her as she can, then we can provide no reason for 
her to refrain.”167 Of course, being able to provide reasons that succeed in 
talking someone out of an action is different from that action being morally right 
or wrong. Joyce’s point is that, if this is the system you are accepting, there is no 
answer beyond that which best promotes your interests – that is why he holds 
that the system he proposes is not a moral one. 
 The difference that Joyce describes between the preference satisfaction 
model and a moral model might be better understood through an example. The 
prescription for action might be the same in both cases, but the reasons for the 
actions are different. Joyce tells the story of A and B, who are in a long term 
committed relationship which has enjoyed a long history of mutual cooperation 
that has resulted in a high level of trust and security between the two. They have 
come to rely on each other not to defect, and this has made both of their lives 
better. Thus, when A defects on a particular occasion, A, B, and interested 
bystanders will all be likely to say it would have been better if A hadn’t 
defected. Trust has been shaken, and work will be needed to regain the level of 
efficiency and benefit these individuals enjoyed prior to the defection. Both the 
preference satisfier and the ethicist are likely to negatively judge the defection. 
The difference between them – and it is an important one – is that the preference 
                                                
167 Ibid., p. 183. 
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satisfier will say that A shouldn’t have defected because it was not in her 
enlightened self-interest to do so, and the ethicist will say that A shouldn’t have 
defected because it was not in B’s interest for her to do so; same judgment, 
different reason.168 
 Now, one might object that A regrets her defection not because it ended 
up making things worse for her, but because she actually cares about B, and 
regrets harming him. This may well be the case, but that doesn’t get us a moral 
grounding, because A’s caring for B is still a contingent fact. If she didn’t care 
for B, or if she stopped caring for him, then there would be no reason for her to 
refrain from harming him. It is bad for A to harm B only insofar as A harming B 
causes harm to A (in this case, in the form of emotional distress). Moral 
judgments, Joyce maintains, do not depend on the agents’ self-interest or on 
whether they care for their victims.169 
 Joyce thinks that there are benefits to maintaining moral beliefs, yet the 
antirealist seems unable to do so, without embracing falsity and thus 
irrationality. As a solution to this predicament, he presents a fictionalist solution.  
…to take a fictionalist stance towards a discourse is to believe that the 
discourse entails or embodies a theory that is false…, but to carry on 
employing the discourse, at least in many contexts, as if this were not the 
case, because it is useful to do so.170 
 
                                                
168 Ibid., p. 183. 
169 Ibid., pp. 183-184. 
170 Ibid., p 185. 
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Such action is sensible, Joyce tells us, in cases where the discussion is so 
important to us that the benefit of a continued dialog is greater than the cost of 
having a discussion that falls short of the truth. A couple of examples might be 
helpful in illustrating Joyce’s point.  
Many theologians believe that it is impossible to really say true things 
about God, that he is so wholly other that no human language could possibly 
express truth about his nature. Yet, these theologians believe it is so important to 
talk about God, rather than to remain silent, that they embrace what Thomas 
Aquinas called analogical predication – they make what they believe to be false 
ascriptions to God regarding his attributes, because they are the only way to 
express anything about his nature. Thus, God is described as our father, though 
he is not a father in anything like the sense in which we normally use the word. 
The analogy is meant to capture our imperfect approximation of the relationship 
we are to have with God. 
In another vein, many physicists who are instrumentalists about science 
talk about wave functions and the block world, believing these descriptions to be 
false and misleading, because they do not have the vocabulary to fully express 
the concepts, yet they believe the benefit of continuing the discussion outweighs 
the drawback of discussing the concepts in imperfect terms.171 In any of these 
                                                
171 Some will hold that the ‘wave’ in ‘wave function’ is simply a new use of the word, different 
from ‘wave’ in ordinary language. However, many admit that they cannot really articulate what 
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cases, the fictionalist thinks the right answer is, “keep using the discourse, but 
do not believe it.”172 These examples should make Joyce’s points more clear. 
The moral fictionalist, then, will continue to engage in moral discourse 
while not believing his own assertions. This might sound difficult, but we 
actually engage in similar discourse all the time, when telling stories and 
discussing fiction. We see nothing unreasonable about saying Santa is fat, 
bearded and wears a red suit, while also being certain Santa does not exist. We 
engage in animated conversations about what Kate and Jack and Sawyer are up 
to on Lost, while not for a minute believing they are real people, or that the 
island exists.  
On Joyce’s account when a moral fictionalist makes a moral claim, he is 
asserting something to be the case inside a particular fictional world, the moral 
world, in which stories we tell about morality have truth-values. The moral 
world is not the actual world, but it can be useful to talk about it, just as it can be 
useful to talk about Santa and the survivors of Oceanic Flight 815. The next 
question for Joyce, then, is why? What good is moral discourse if we’re doing 
nothing more than chattering about fictions? Does it boil down to the same sorts 
of trivial amusements we get from impassioned discussions and speculations 
about our favorite television heroes, or is there something more to be gained 
                                                
this new meaning of the word is, understanding it rather as a rough, imprecise approximation of 
the ordinary language meaning of the word. 
172 Ibid., p. 185. 
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 One concern that arises in response to an antirealist moral position is that 
antirealism gives us no reason to be moral – that it will cause us to reject any 
sort of order, restraint, or respect for rules. This is concern 4), above. This worry 
is puzzling to me, as we continue to respect and adhere to all sorts of 
conventions that we already accept as human dependent, and even arbitrary. The 
creator of Uno might just as easily have designated 8 cards as the starting hand, 
but this does not cause Uno players to riotously begin the game with an extra 
card. There are many good reasons for accepting morality, some of them 
psychological, others socially practical. Joyce offers one such account, 
stemming from an understanding of human fallibility and limited rationality 
regarding prisoner’s dilemmas. I present Joyce’s argument as one possible 
motivation for an antirealist acceptance of morality. I largely agree with Joyce, 
and at the point where I disagree with him, I offer an alternative motivation for 
moral action. 
 We all know that, in prisoner’s dilemma situations, the group would 
benefit most by cooperating, but any one individual can benefit more by 
defecting. In terms of practical action, then, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
teaches us that morality, understood as cooperation, is beneficial. Yet, the more 
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we can count on others to be moral, the more we can cut corners ourselves, and 
benefit from the stability the moral code provides.173 If most of us uphold the 
moral code by paying into public radio, you can free ride. If we all try to free 
ride, the airwaves will go silent. Thus, enlightened self-interest encourages us to 
buy into the idea of public radio fund drives (and “buying in” prompts us to 
donate), because without the system we would not be able to get away with not 
donating sometimes. 
 The above is a basic game theoretic account, which Joyce then expands 
upon to explain why antirealists will still want to buy into a moral system. Even 
the most rational agent sometimes makes mistakes in her tit-for-tat calculations. 
On a recent airplane flight, I witnessed two self-interested agents attempt to use 
the existing moral code to their advantage. Enlightened self-interest tells us that 
everyone will get off the airplane quicker if we observe the Rule of Deplaning 
which tells us those at the front of the plane get to go first, row by row, until it is 
our row’s turn, although no one but those in the very first row are maximally 
advantaged by this. Consequently, a gentleman from the back of the plane took 
advantage of the fact that everyone else was adhering to the rule, and made a 
mad dash for the front of the plane the instant the doors opened. The existing 
code kept the rest of us in our seats, which allowed this man to free ride and 
deplane significantly sooner than the rest of us in the back. Inspired by his 
                                                
173 Joyce. “Myth…,” pp. 207-209. 
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success, a woman attempted to follow suit, but was stopped by passengers, 
alarmed at the chaos they could see emerging before their eyes, which would 
have ended in all of us stuck on the plane for longer, as everyone pushed toward 
the front, causing a clog of people.  
 What can we learn from the successful man and the thwarted woman? 
We learn that the system can work to make things better for us than they would 
be without the system, but we also learned that we can be imperfect calculators. 
The woman believed she could be down the aisle and off the plane before the 
crowd stopped her and implemented a punishment, but she was wrong. She 
didn’t get off the plane any sooner than if she had stayed put, and she was also 
publicly shamed by her peers. Our inability to successfully play the system 
means it is often wise, and certainly safer, to settle for second-best, and allow 
the moral code to benefit us, while recognizing that others will manage to 
benefit even more by free riding the system.  
 Once we realize we can play the system, Joyce argues that we will be 
tempted to do so too often. Enlightened self-interest will always compete with 
the temptation to give in to impulsive self-interest, where we try to seize as 
much as we can for ourselves, moral rules be damned. The temptation of the 
immediate payoff will cause us to lose our heads, taking risks that fail and result 
in lowered utility for everyone. Thus, buying into the compulsory force of 
morality ends up being good for us. Joyce explains, “This…is an important 
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instrumental value of moral beliefs: they are a bulwark against the temptations 
of short-term profit.”174 Our flawed, weak-willed natures mean we need morality 
to keep us in line – we will willingly accept its boogie-man force, even while 
recognizing, as antirealists, that it is not binding in any sort of realist way. To 
make sense of this, consider the importance of self-imposed deadlines for 
academics. There is nothing real, outside of my own stipulation, that says I have 
to grade ten papers and write two pages before I can stop working for the day, 
but without such deadlines, far less work would get done, so it is good for me to 
think of the deadline as real. Antirealists will not opt out of morality, because it 
is useful to them. Joyce recognizes that understanding morality as a guard 
against a weak will might make it seem uncomfortably trivial, yet he maintains, 
“it is not being claimed that this is the only value of morality, but it will suffice 
for our purposes.”175 
 As expressed earlier, I am unconvinced that antirealists will succeed in 
fooling themselves into accepting morality because it seems like a beneficial 
motivator. I am also concerned that this would not be desirable, even if it were 
possible.176 However, though I disagree with Joyce on this particular point, I 
                                                
174 Ibid., p. 213. 
175 Ibid., p. 214. 
176 This issue seems similar to that of Pascal’s Wager. Certainly many people can be 
brainwashed into accepting religious dogma without good reasons, and that brainwashing might 
sometimes prove beneficial. However, that kind of self-imposed control seems most likely to 
work on the unreflective and weak-willed, which is not the group of individuals Joyce is talking 
about. What’s more, deliberately manipulating oneself into holding false beliefs ought to be a 
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think he is correct in his assessment that antirealists will not be compelled to 
surrender morality, and the psychological explanation he offers is likely to be 
attractive to some. 
I part ways with Joyce only regarding his view that antirealists ought to 
“talk themselves into” a moral belief system because actually holding the beliefs 
will be more effective at achieving one’s desired ends. I argue that the costs of 
adopting a moral system that one holds to be false are greater than the benefits 
that can be derived from a whole-hearted acceptance of the system. Although 
some effectiveness might be lost by keeping the system at arm’s length, I think 
the greatest overall benefit will come from fostering beliefs one accepts as true, 
and using the system only when it is actually perceived to be beneficial. On 
Joyce’s view, the adoption of a moral belief system will mean adhering to that 
system even in particular cases where more is to be gained by deviating from the 
system, in the interest of long term gain. A more rational route for the antirealist 
seems to be applying the system of pre-established conventions only in instances 
of perceived benefit, or to reassess and work to modify the conventions 
themselves, using level 2 judgments. 
Even with my proposed modification to Joyce’s view, antirealists will 
continue to engage in moral discourse and behavior for a variety of reasons. For 
one thing, antirealism is not likely to be universally accepted anytime soon. 
                                                
frightening proposition to those who are concerned with getting to truth, even when the truth is 
uncomfortable and less practically beneficial.  
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Antirealists want to communicate and effectively interact with realists. Thus, 
they will have a good practical reason to engage in moral behavior and dialogue. 
The moral language that is already in place is effective at conveying both realist 
and antirealist sentiments, and if the existing language works, it will continue to 
be used. Antirealists will continue to desire things, and to wish to modify the 
behavior of others, as well as having robust beliefs regarding right and wrong, 
stemming from their particular value set. Moral discussion is an extremely 
effective way to pursue one’s ends; it is certainly more effective than candidly 
explaining to your listeners that you think there are no moral rules outside of 
human convention and preference, but that you would like very much for them 
to do as you prefer.  In short, antirealists will be motivated to engage in moral 
discourse, because it makes their lives better.  
The same point can be made about antirealist aesthetics. The belief that 
there is no objective truth about aesthetics will not cause people to stop 
engaging in aesthetic evaluation. We will continue the exercise because we care 
about aesthetics. We want to explain to others why we like certain works and 
dislike others. We want to convince others that they should make similar 
aesthetic evaluations, and we want standards that we can point to in making our 
claims. The fact that those standards will be conventional will not cause us to 
stop using them, just as we continue to accept and evaluate football in terms of 
its conventional standards. 
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Conclusion  
Part III has been aimed at helping the new convergentist determine 
whether to accept realism or antirealism across the board. To this end, I have 
discussed the issue of the burden of proof. Several considerations go into 
determining which position bears the burden of proof. After a discussion of 
these considerations, it is clear that, though the issue is not conclusively settled, 
there are more reasons to suppose realism bears the burden than to suppose that 
antirealism does, which offers significant prima facie support for antirealist 
convergence.  
Despite this, there is likely to be quite a bit of opposition to antirealism, 
particularly in the moral realm. To alleviate some of those worries, I have also 
discussed the practical implications of accepting antirealist convergence, 
explaining how moral and aesthetic judgment and discourse are still possible as 
well as motivated. I have not offered an explicit argument in favor of 
antirealism, but what I have done is explained why it is not a dangerous or 
unpalatable option for those inclined to take it. This should be helpful to those 
persuaded by my arguments in Part I and II, who are now deciding whether to 
converge toward realism or toward antirealism. 
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have argued that that the six strongest bases for 
moral and aesthetic divergence fail. I have argued that the rigid rule view of 
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principles is untenable in both ethics and aesthetics, but that rules of thumb exist 
in both fields. Regarding properties, I have argued that neither moral nor 
aesthetic properties can be detected through a description alone; in both cases a 
direct experience of the act or object is needed to be certain about the presence 
of the property. I have offered examples to demonstrate the existence of 
obligations as well as dilemmas in both fields. Both ethics and aesthetics have 
the capacity to motivate action, though in neither case is that motivation 
guaranteed, as there might be mitigating circumstances that will override one’s 
actions. Finally, I have argued that some moral and some aesthetic choices are 
serious, and others are trivial, but that the seriousness of the choice does not 
have a bearing on the ontological question. 
 Following my deflation of the six leading arguments in favor of 
divergence, I argued against two divergence accounts of judgment formation. 
Moral and aesthetic judgments both require initial, non-evaluative assessment of 
particular properties that is then processed into an all-things-considered 
judgment. A careful study of the impact of convention, emotion, reason, and a 
tendency to prefer utility reveals an understanding of evaluative judgments that 
is informed by a combination of these elements, but in which no one element 
will necessarily be involved in any given judgment. Judgments occur on two 
levels. Level 1 judgments are based on established conventions, and are 
objective. Level 2 judgments are used to critique the conventions themselves, 
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and are subjective, stemming from the particular value sets of individual 
evaluators. Appropriate level 1 and level 2 judgments employ the elements in 
similar ways, leading to a convergence account. 
 The final part of the dissertation considers whether it is more reasonable 
to converge toward realism or toward antirealism. I entertain reasons for 
determining which side ought to bear the burden of proof in the realist/antirealist 
debate. While error theories ought to bear the burden, antirealists need not be 
error theorists, and the type of antirealism I defend is not an error theory, so this 
cannot be offered as a reason for antirealism to shoulder the burden. I argue that 
there is not a conclusive answer regarding which position is more intuitive, so 
the burden of proof cannot be settled on the basis of intuition. However, 
ontological parsimony clearly favors antirealism, as antirealists can explain the 
data as well as realists, without positing extra, difficult-to-prove mind-
independent facts. 
Following the discussion of the burden of proof, I offer a careful analysis 
of antirealism that demonstrates that evaluative judgments and dialogue are 
possible on an antirealist picture. There is still motivation to engage in moral 
and aesthetic behavior and evaluation, and the order imposed by these evaluative 
institutions would remain in force even if their basis were understood as socially 
constructed or otherwise mind-dependent.  
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I argue that consistency demands that we accept a convergence account 
of ethics and aesthetics. While realist or antirealist convergence could 
consistently be accepted, my account of judgment formation, along with the fact 
that the burden of proof falls more heavily on realists, suggests that antirealism 
is the more reasonable option. As I have met the most common objections to 
antirealism, demonstrating that it is neither implausible nor threatening to the 
established order, I hold that it is a position that ought to be given serious 
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